Pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning by Kilpatrick, Stephen George
 
 
 
 
PRAGMATIC FACTORS OF DEONTIC REASONING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEPHEN GEORGE KILPATRICK BSc (Hons), MSc, CERT. ED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements of the University of Wolverhampton  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
April 2007 
 
Revised October 2008 
 
Amendments & corrections March 2009 
 
 
This work or any part thereof has not previously been presented in any form to the 
University or to any other body whether for the purposes of assessment, publication or 
for any other purpose (unless otherwise indicated). Save for any express 
acknowledgments, references and/or bibliographies cited in the work, I confirm that 
the intellectual content of the work is the result of my own efforts and of no other 
person. 
 
 
 
The right of Stephen George Kilpatrick to be identified as author of this work is 
asserted in accordance with ss. 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs And Patents Act 
1988. At this date copyright is owned by the author. 
 
 
 
Signature……………………………………………. 
 
Date…………………………………………………. 
Declarations 
 
Material included in Chapters 3 and 4 were presented at the following conferences: 
 
Over, D.E., Manktelow, K.I. & Kilpatrick, S.G. (1998, June) Deontic reasoning; its 
philosophy & psychology. Paper presented at The Society for Philosophy and 
Psychology (SPP) Annual Meeting. University of Minnesota, Michigan, USA. 
 
Manktelow, K.I., Kilpatrick, S.G. & Over, D.E. (1996, August) Pragmatic effects on 
deontic inference. Poster presentation at the Third International Conference on 
Thinking, University College London, London, UK. 
 
Manktelow, K.I., Over, D.E. & Kilpatrick, S.G. (1996, July) Pragmatic factors in 
deontic reasoning. Paper presented at the XXVI International Congress of 
Psychology, Montreal, Canada. 
 
Material in Chapters 4 and 5 was included in the following book chapter and 
conference: 
 
Manktelow, K.I., Fairley, N., Kilpatrick, S.G. & Over, D.E. (2000). Pragmatics and 
strategies for practical reasoning. In W. Schaeken, G. De Vooght, A. Vandierendonck 
& G. D’Ydewalle (eds.), Deductive Reasoning and Strategies. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Over, D.E., Kilpatrick, S.G. & Manktelow, K.I. (2001, June). Mitigation, aggravation, 
cheating and violations. Paper presented at the Human Behaviour & Evolution 
Society Conference, University College London, London, UK. 
 
Material included in Chapter 6 was presented at the following conferences and forms 
the basis of a forthcoming journal article: 
 
Kilpatrick, S.G., Manktelow, K.I. & Over, D.E. (2000, August) Power of source as a 
pragmatic factor of deontic reasoning. Poster presentation at the Fourth International 
Conference on Thinking, Durham University, Durham, U.K. 
 
Kilpatrick, S.G., Manktelow, K.I. & Over, D.E. (2007) Power of source as a factor in 
deontic inference. Thinking and Reasoning, 13(3), 295-317. 
 
Material included in Chapter 7 was presented at the following conferences: 
 
Kilpatrick, S.G., Manktelow, K.I. & Over, D.E. (2003, July) Pragmatic effects and 
judgement revision in deontic reasoning. Paper presented at the Psychology 
Postgraduate Affairs Group (PSYPAG) Conference. University of Wolverhampton, 
UK. 
 
Kilpatrick, S.G., Manktelow, K.I. & Over, D.E. (2003, September) Judgement 
revision with conditional promises, threats and warnings. Poster presentation at The 
XX BPS Annual Cognitive Psychology Section Conference. University of Reading, 
UK. 
 
 2
Acknowledgements 
I wish to acknowledge the support and continuous encouragement of my two 
supervisors, Professor Ken Manktelow and Professor David Over. I had greater 
contact with Ken who provided much of the inspiration for the research reported in 
this thesis. I miss our lengthy chats in the Art Gallery and other places around 
Wolverhampton City Centre where ideas were discussed and developed. I must also 
acknowledge Ken’s patience when progress was slow and endless deadlines were 
missed. Although I had less contact with David, his phenomenal output provided me 
with much theoretical material and aided me in keeping abreast of developments in 
the thinking and reasoning field. As will be seen David’s work provided the 
theoretical basis to this thesis. On our infrequent meetings David was always cordial 
and treated me as an old friend. I can only describe the two as true Scholars and 
Gentlemen! 
 
I am also indebted to my family who have had to endure this project over so many 
years. Carolyn has given me the space and time required to undertake such a 
mammoth task, even when she would prefer that I was doing something else. Our four 
children have also been tolerant of my absences and pre-occupations for which I am 
dearly grateful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
This work is dedicated to my parents, particularly to the memory of my Mother, and 
to Carolyn and our four children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4
Contents 
       Page 
Abstract      8 
Chapter 1: Deontic Reasoning   9 
1.1 Introduction     9 
1.2 Content & Context Effects in    9 
Syllogistic Reasoning 
 
1.3 Facilitation Effect on the Wason   13 
Selection Task 
 
1.4 Deontic Reasoning    17 
 
1.5 Deontological Ethics    17 
 
1.6 Theories of Deontic Reasoning   19 
 
Chapter 2: Pragmatics and     40 
Decision-Making 
 
2.1 Introduction     40 
 
2.2 Pragmatics of Language    40 
 
2.3 Pragmatic Effects of Deontic Reasoning  41 
 
2.4 Power of Source     44 
 
2.5 Reasoning with Inducements   46 
 
2.6 Decision-Making Theories   47 
 
2.7 Deontic Reasoning and Decision-making 54 
 
2.8 Rationale to the Thesis    56 
 
Chapter 3: Scale of Violation in a Working  60 
Rule Scenario as a Pragmatic Factor of Deontic  
Reasoning 
 
3.1 Experiment 1: Rationale    60 
 
3.2 Experiment 1: Method    62 
 
 5
3.3 Results      66 
 
3.4 Experiment 2: Rationale    68 
 
3.5 Experiment 2: Method    69 
 
3.6 Results      74 
 
3.7 Discussion      75 
 
Chapter 4: Scale of Violation and Mitigating  80 
and Aggravating Circumstances as Pragmatic 
Factors of Deontic Reasoning 
 
4.1 Rationale      80 
 
4.2 Experiment 3: Method    87 
 
4.3 Experiment 3: Results    90 
 
4.4 Experiment 4: Rationale    91 
 
4.5 Experiment 4: Method    92 
 
4.6 Experiment 4: Results    97 
 
4.7 Discussion      101 
 
Chapter 5: Judgement Revision with    105 
Motoring Violations 
 
5.1 Rationale      105 
 
5.2 Experiment 5: Method    109 
 
5.3 Experiment 5: Results    113 
 
5.4 Discussion      116 
 
Chapter 6: Power of Source as a Pragmatic  121 
Factor of Deontic Reasoning 
 
6.1 Rationale      121 
 
6.2 Pilot Study: Method    125 
 
6.3 Experiment 6: Method    128 
 
6.4 Experiment 6: Results    133 
 
 6
6.5 Experiment 7: Rationale    135 
 
6.6 Experiment 7: Method    138 
 
6.7 Experiment 7: Results    144 
 
6.8 Experiment 8: Rationale    147 
 
6.9 Experiment 8: Method    151 
 
6.10 Experiment 8: Results    160 
 
6.11 Discussion     163 
 
Chapter 7: Judgement Revision with Power  168 
of  Source and Inducements 
 
7.1 Rationale      168 
 
7.2 Experiment 9: Method    175 
 
7.3 Experiment 9: Results    181 
 
7.4 Discussion      184 
 
Chapter 8: General Discussion   187 
 
8.1 Overview of Chapter Content   187 
 
8.2 Summary of Experimental Findings  187 
 
8.3 Implications of Experimental Findings  191 
 
8.4 Theoretical Discussion of Experimental  196 
Findings 
 
8.5 Future Research     202 
 
References      204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7
Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning, namely scale of 
violation, aggravating and mitigating circumstances and power of source. Nine 
experiments are reported investigating deontic reasoning and judgement revision. 
Experiment 1 established scale of violation as a modifying factor of a working rule 
with an inferential reasoning task, however, the effects were not transferred to a 
deductive reasoning task in Experiment 2. Scale of violation and circumstances were 
found to influence the reasoning of motoring violations with a major offence and 
aggravating circumstances being rated as more serious and receiving greater fines 
than a minor offence or mitigating circumstances (Experiments 3 & 4). These effects 
were also observed with a judgement revision task (Experiment 5). Power of source 
was included as an additional pragmatic factor and was found to influence the 
reasoning of conditional statements (Experiment 6), inducements (Experiment 7) and 
ratings of credibility and probability of outcomes (Experiment 8). The final study 
(Experiment 9) found significant effects for scale of violation / compliance and power 
of source within a judgement revision task. However, no difference was observed in 
the reasoning of superordinate and non-superordinate statements. The findings are 
explained in terms of the conditional probability hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Deontic Reasoning 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Deontology has a long philosophical history but has only recently been studied by 
psychologists. The seminal paper of Cheng & Holyoak (1985) was the key influence 
with their insight that reasoning was most likely to be facilitated when a deductive 
reasoning task involved a permissible or obligational context, that is, a deontic 
context. This chapter will describe the precursory areas of research that lead to the 
psychological investigation of deontic reasoning. The effects of content and context in 
syllogistic reasoning and on the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968) will be reviewed 
before examining deontic reasoning in detail. The philosophical background to 
deontology will be explored, followed by an outline of the major psychological 
theories that attempt to explain this recent and developing branch of human reasoning. 
 
1.2 Content & Context Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning 
The traditional distinction in the study of reasoning has been between deductive and 
inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning involves the derivation of conclusions from 
given premises; the premises must be assumed to be true and, therefore, the inferred 
conclusion must also be true. Inductive reasoning involves inferring conclusions 
based on ones knowledge or experience, thus, one goes beyond the given information, 
however, the drawn conclusion cannot be assured of being true. The focus in this 
section will be on deductive reasoning tasks, however, as Manktelow (1999) notes 
such a distinction may be erroneous as more recently the two areas of research have 
become blared. 
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For any deductive reasoning task a distinction can be made between its form and 
content; the form being the problems logical structure and the content being the 
scenario or context in which the problem is based (Evans, 1989). Evans (1989) 
distinguished between three general types of problem content; abstract, arbitrarily 
realistic, and knowledge-related content. Abstract problems are devoid of everyday 
knowledge or experience and such tasks are considered a test of pure reasoning. 
Problems comprising arbitrarily realistic material contain everyday terms and 
concepts but do not invoke relevant knowledge and beliefs to reach a solution and are, 
therefore, taken as problems requiring reasoning based on the logical form of the 
problem. Knowledge-related content problems utilise materials that link directly to an 
individual’s previous knowledge, experience, and/or beliefs. Thus, it is not at all clear 
whether the form or content of the problem is influencing the process of reasoning. It 
is this latter type of problem content that will be the focus of this section and the next 
when we examine syllogistic reasoning and the selection task, respectively. 
 
Aristotle considered rationality to be the ultimate human ability. Aristotle developed 
the syllogism and categorical logic and his notion of reason was based on the ability 
to think in a formal and systematic way. This logical explanation of reasoning 
remained unquestioned for several centuries. However, empirical investigations with 
reasoning tasks have shown that the content of materials and the context in which they 
are set influence obtained responses. Some of the research examining content and 
context effects in syllogistic reasoning will now be discussed along with their 
implications. 
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According to logic the form of an argument should determine ones reasoning, 
irrespective of content. Further, from a Piagetian perspective adults should have 
attained the formal operational stage of thinking, and any contextual influence would 
be indicative of the inferior concrete operational stage (Evans, 1982). 
 
One of the earliest systematic investigations of syllogistic reasoning was conducted 
by Wilkins (1928). She used syllogisms comprising of a major and minor premise 
with participants choosing a conclusion from a given list. The syllogisms entailed 
both valid and invalid conclusions that were embedded in four types of content. The 
type of problem with the corresponding correct response is given below: 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Problem Content  Correct Response (%) 
 Thematic    84 
 Abstract    76 
 Unfamiliar    75 
 Belief bias    80 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1.1 Percentage of correct responses to four types of syllogism  
(Wilkins, 1928; adapted from Evans, 1982) 
 
Wilkins did not provide significance levels but Evans (1982) calculated that reasoning 
with thematic-rich syllogisms was significantly superior to reasoning with both 
abstract and unfamiliar materials and was marginally significant compared to 
syllogisms embedded in a belief bias context. Wilkins interpreted her findings in 
terms of belief bias. She found realistic (thematic) content could facilitate logical 
reasoning relative to abstract and unfamiliar content. Further, prior beliefs and 
attitudes could bias reasoning; hence the belief bias effect. The belief bias effect was 
supported by a number of contemporary researchers (Janis & Frick, 1943; Lefford, 
1946; McGuire, 1960). 
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An alternative influential theory of syllogistic reasoning, at that time, was the 
atmosphere hypothesis (Woodworth & Sells, 1935). This hypothesis proposes that the 
premises create an atmosphere indicating a particular conclusion. For instance, a 
syllogism with a negative premise (No… or Some…Not) creates a negative 
atmosphere suggesting a negative conclusion, while a syllogism with an extensional 
premise (Some… or Some… not) creates an atmosphere in which an extensional 
conclusion is more likely to be accepted. 
 
Research that has attempted to test the two proposals, the belief bias effect and the 
atmosphere hypothesis, has tended to support belief bias (Janis & Frick, 1943; 
Lefford, 1946; Morgan & Morton, 1944). However, much of this early empirical work 
has been criticised on methodological grounds (Evans, 1982; Revlin, Leirer, Yopp & 
Yopp, 1980). 
 
Chapman & Chapman (1959) claimed that at least some errors in syllogistic reasoning 
could be explained by what they called the conversion hypothesis. Individuals are said 
to convert one or both premises of an argument and to reason from the converted 
premises. Statements in moods I (Some) and E (No) convert to logically valid 
inferences while statements in moods A (All) and O (Some…not) convert to logically 
invalid conclusions. The content of premises can influence conversion. For example, 
given the A statement, “All dogs are animals” individuals are unlikely to convert this 
to “All animals are dogs” because of prior knowledge concerning dogs and animals. 
However, the logically equivalent statement, “All ticket holders are allowed to enter 
the exhibition” is likely to be converted to, “All the people who are allowed to enter 
the exhibition are ticket holders”. There exists a number of studies in support of the 
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conversion hypothesis, for instance Newstead (1990) found such errors common 
when participants were requested to say what follows from given statements. 
 
Content effects have also been observed in areas other than syllogistic reasoning, 
including causal attribution tasks (Cheng & Novick, 1991), categorical syllogisms 
(Evans, 1982; Evans, Barston & Pollard, 1983) and conditional reasoning tasks 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett & Oliver, 1986; Griggs & Cox, 
1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Newstead, Ellis, Evans & Dennis, 1997; Wason & 
Johnson-Laird, 1972). Research into content and context effects within conditional 
reasoning continues to the present (e.g. De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2003; 
Markovits & Potvin, 2001). 
 
The research cited above clearly illustrates the influence of both content and context 
in the domain of syllogistic reasoning. We will now consider such influences with the 
Wason selection task and the conditions in which reasoning on this task is facilitated. 
 
1.3 Facilitation Effect on the Wason Selection Task 
A further task demonstrating the influence of content and context on deductive 
reasoning is the selection task. The selection task was introduced by Wason (1968) 
and has become the most widely used problem in the study of human reasoning 
(Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993). The standard abstract form of the task comprises 
of four hypothetical cards showing either a number or a letter and a statement, “If a 
card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side”; 
traditionally, the cards shown denote E, K, 4, and 7.  The cards are referred to as the p 
card (vowel), not-p card (¬p, non-vowel), q card (even number) and not-q card (¬q, 
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non-even number). Participants are asked, “Which cards would you need to turn over 
to test whether the statement is true or false?” According to the logical truth-table for 
material implication the only selections to falsify the rule would be the p-card (or 
vowel, E) and the ¬q card (non-even number, 7). If, as the logicists would have us 
believe, people employ formal logic in their reasoning, then this should be a relatively 
easy task as nothing more is required than implementing the appropriate truth-table. 
However, typical solution rates are below 10% (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) 
suggesting that people are using alternative modes of reasoning when faced with the 
task. Most participants choose the p and q cards or the p only card. Thus, they appear 
to be attempting to confirm the rule, rather than disconfirm it. This led to the earliest 
theory of the selection task proposed by Wason himself (Wason, 1968; Johnson-Laird 
& Wason, 1970) known as confirmation (or verification) bias which assumes that the 
statement is considered as a biconditional rather than a material implication 
conditional. That is, given if p then q as true, one assumes that q then p, is also true. 
 
However, Evans & Lynch (1973) found participants would select the items named in 
the statement, even when negatives were used, irrespective of the conditional rule, a 
phenomenon they labelled matching bias. Attempts have been made to simplify the 
task with the aim of inducing facilitation. Indeed, if the task involves only the q and 
¬q instances, referred to as the Reduced Array Selection Task (RAST), facilitation is 
enhanced with participants making more ¬q selections (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 
1970; Wason & Green, 1984). Dominowski (1995) reviews a number of variations of 
the selection task and the facilitatory effects these variations have on task 
performance. 
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The form of the selection task to enhance performance significantly is the thematic 
selection task, in which it is observed that the logically correct p and ¬q cards are 
chosen. Thematic versions of the task employ a range of concrete, contextually-rich 
scenarios that relate directly to personal experience. The first of these thematic tasks, 
the so-called transport rule, was devised by Wason & Shapiro (1971) in which 63% 
chose the logically correct solution compared to just 6% with the abstract version of 
the rule.  
 
Familiarity with a rule is also an important factor as shown by Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzi & Legrenzi (1972) who used an unusual postal rule that was prevalent in 
Britian and Hong Kong at the time. The postal rule stated that if a letter is sealed then 
a first class stamp must be placed on the letter. A facilitation effect was once again 
found with this task in comparison to the standard Wason selection task. However, the 
postal rule task has been criticised for being “too realistic” (Evans, 1982, p.182) as 
participants may be using their knowledge of postal rules and not be engaging in any 
form of reasoning whatsoever. This criticism has some support from the finding with 
American participants unfamiliar with the postal rule who showed no facilitation 
effect (Griggs & Cox, 1982). 
 
Despite some early reservations the facilitation effect with the selection task is now 
well established as the evidence in its favour has grown. One study involving realistic 
material but not involving a rule that cues memory or prior knowledge is that of 
D’Andrade (reported in Rumelhart, 1980). D’Andrade devised the so-called Sears 
rule in which an American department store (Sears) issues the following rule to its 
staff, “If any purchase exceeds $30, then the receipt must have the signature of the 
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departmental manager on the back”. With a rationale for the rule a facilitation effect 
was observed. 
 
A study that has been replicated many times is that of Griggs & Cox (1982) who 
introduced the Drinking Age rule. Participants are cued to the role of a Policeman 
enforcing the following rule: “If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be 19 
years of age” (note: 19 was the legal age to drink alcohol in Florida at the time). Four 
cards were presented showing Beer (p card), Coke (¬p card), 16 (¬q card) and 22 (q 
card). As with the indicative form of the task the p and ¬q cards were considered the 
correct selections and over 70% of participants chose these two cards compared to 
none for the standard task. 
 
However, the concreteness of a thematic task is not sufficient by itself to produce 
facilitation. Gilhooly & Falconer (1974) used the following rule: “ Every card which 
has Manchester on one side has a car on the other side” but achieved only modest 
improvement on the abstract selection task. In some cases facilitation may not be 
achieved at all. Manktelow & Evans (1979) used statements concerning food and 
drink such as, “If I eat fish, then I drink gin” and found performance to be no better 
than with an abstract version. In this study the associations between food and drink 
may be too arbitrary to produce facilitation. 
 
In sum, concrete material per se does not lead to facilitation on the selection task. 
However, scenarios analogical to everyday experience, such as the Sears rule or 
Drinking Age rule or those that can be supported by a rationale, for example the postal 
 16
rule do improve performance significantly. Dominowski (1995) provides an in depth 
analysis of the factors that contribute to the facilitation effect. 
 
Impressively, thematic versions of the reduced array selection task (RAST), in which 
only the q and ¬q cards are made available, have produced facilitatory effects with 
children (Girotto, Blaye, & Farioli, 1989; Girotto & Light, 1991; Girotto, Light, & 
Colbourn, 1989) and Cummins (1996a) has obtained such results with children as 
young as 3 - 4 years old. 
 
1.4 Deontic Reasoning 
The word deontic is derived from the Greek word dei, meaning one must. Deontic 
reasoning involves reasoning about what one must, should or ought to do. As 
suggested by Cummins (1996b) our social institutions presuppose the capacity to 
understand and reason with permissions, obligations, and prohibitions and 
consequences arise if deontic reasoning is not followed. Further, deontic reasoning is 
assumed in child-rearing and social interactions in the form of permissions, promises, 
warnings or threats. The next section will outline deontological ethics, a philosophical 
theory of moral reasoning, otherwise known as deontology. 
 
1.5 Deontological Ethics 
Moral philosophy (or ethics) is concerned with understanding the nature of human 
values, of how individuals ought to live, and what should be considered as correct 
conduct. What constitutes a good moral life has been a central question for moral 
philosophers for several centuries. 
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A distinction is made in moral philosophy between teleological and deontological 
theories. Teleological theories consider moral behaviour in terms of its consequences. 
Arguably the most influential of such theories has been Utilitarianism (J.S. Mill, 
1861) which equates good consequences with happiness; hence Mill’s dictum, “The 
greatest happiness for the greatest number”. In contrast, deontological theories 
emphasise ones duties or obligations to perform certain actions and refrain from 
others, irrespective of consequences. Kant (1785/1991), who was influenced by the 
protestant orthodoxy of his day, stressed duties (“duty for duty’s sake”) and 
introduced the categorical imperative as a central concept of his ethical theory.  
 
A further distinction to be made is between theoretical and practical reasoning, as first 
suggested by Aristotle. The former is reasoning in the formal sense, for example 
reasoning with syllogisms, while the latter involves reasoning when a decision is to be 
made or an action followed. The selection task offers a good example for 
distinguishing between these two forms of reasoning. The abstract form of the 
selection task, as devised by Wason (1968), requires the individual to reason about a 
rule, that is to establish its truth status, and thus involves theoretical reasoning. In 
contrast the thematic versions of the selection task involve reasoning from a rule; that 
is, considering whether a rule is being adhered to, and therefore involves practical 
reasoning (Manktelow, 2004).   
 
Deontic reasoning is, therefore, a form of practical reasoning (Audi, 1989). Deontic 
logic attempts to formalise principles when reasoning with permissions, obligations 
and prohibitions. It is applicable to theoretical reasoning more readily than practical 
reasoning and has important differences from normative logic, the primary difference 
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being that deontic logic is not truth functional (see Chellas, 1980 for a review of 
deontic logics). 
 
1.6 Theories of Deontic Reasoning 
Five alternative theories that have attempted to explain deontic reasoning will be 
considered. The first is Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory proposed by 
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) in their seminal paper. An alternative evolutionary 
approach, Social Contract Theory (SCT) was offered by Cosmides (1989) which has 
sparked much debate and discussion. Manktelow & Over (1991; 1995) modified the 
Mental Models Theory (MMT) of Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) to incorporate 
personal preferences within deontic conditional statements. Probabilistic theories have 
also been offered as explanations of deontic reasoning. Oaksford & Chater (1994) 
adapted their influential Information Gain theory (IGT) to explain reasoning in 
deontic contexts. More recently, Evans, Handley & Over (2003) and Evans & Over 
(2004) have proposed a dual process theory of reasoning which has been applied to 
deontic reasoning. Each of these theories will be considered in turn. 
 
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) offered the first theory to explain the influence of content 
and the facilitation effect in the Wason selection task in terms of deontic reasoning. 
They identified a consistent feature in improved performance with versions of the 
selection task; facilitation was found when the task involved deontic rules. Cheng & 
Holyoak (1985) proposed specialised schemas for conditional permissions and later 
similar schemas were proposed for obligations (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 
1986; Politzer & Nguyen-Xuan, 1992). 
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In their paper Cheng & Holyoak (1985) reject two candidate theories of the time; the 
natural-logic view and the specific-experience view. The natural-logic view (e.g. 
Braine, 1978; Braine, Reiser & Rumain, 1984; Rips, 1983) developed from the 
inadequacies of formal logic as an explanation of reasoning (e.g. Henle, 1962; 
Inhelder & Piaget, 1958) suggests there are a set of natural inferential rules which 
apply across all reasoning contexts. The specific-experience view (e.g. Griggs & Cox 
1982; Manktelow & Evans, 1979; Reich & Ruth, 1982) holds that facilitation on the 
Wason selection task is due to ones memory of domain-specific experiences (i.e. 
postal or drinking rules). 
 
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) claim, however, that there are two findings that these 
theories cannot explain. Firstly, facilitation is not always assured when domain-
specific experiences would be expected to be involved (Manktelow & Evans, 1979) 
and facilitation has been observed with novel scenarios (D’Andrade, reported in 
Rumelhart, 1980). Secondly, there are differences in the card selections made by 
participants; with symbolic or abstract problems card selections match the terms 
mentioned in the rule (matching bias), whereas with realistic problems participants 
tend to select the p & q cards, therefore verifying the rule (verification bias). 
 
Pragmatic reasoning schemas are generalized, context-sensitive rules abstracted from 
personal experience of permissions and obligations. Such schemas are defined in 
terms of goals such as taking an appropriate action or making predictions about future 
events. 
 
 
 20
Cheng & Holyoak (1985) offer four production rules of the permission schema: 
 
Rule P1: If the action is to be taken, then the precondition must be satisfied. 
Rule P2: If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition need not be satisfied. 
Rule P3: If the precondition is satisfied, then the action may be taken. 
Rule P4: If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action must not be taken. 
 
When faced with an arbitrary rule it is unlikely that any of the permission rules will be 
evoked. However, a rule that does evoke the permission schema will afford the set of 
rules becoming available. The rules are not meant to be equivalent to propositional 
logic but there is a match between each rule and the four inference patterns of the 
material conditional. Rule 1 is associated with Modus Ponens; Rules 2 and 3 block the 
fallacies of Denying the Antecedent, and Affirming the Consequent, respectively; and 
Rule 4 corresponds to Modus Tollens. The permission schema is context-sensitive and 
the rules act as heuristics rather than logical inferences. Cheng & Holyoak were able 
to support their theory with a series of experiments, including an unfamiliar 
immigration regulation and one in which participants were given an abstract 
permission rule, such as “If one is to take action A, then one must first satisfy 
precondition P”; 61% of participants solved the abstract permission problem 
compared to only 19% solution rate for an abstract version of the selection task. 
 
A corresponding obligation schema was later proposed with its own set of production 
rules (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986; Politzer & Nguyen-Xuan, 1992): 
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Rule O1: If the precondition is satisfied, then the action must be taken. 
Rule O2: If the precondition is not satisfied, then the action need not be taken. 
Rule O3: If the action is to be taken, then the precondition may have been satisfied. 
Rule O4: If the action is not to be taken, then the precondition must not have been 
satisfied. 
 
Holyoak and Cheng (1995) modified their theory slightly by proposing that a 
conditional permission bestows a right to take a regulated action, while an obligation 
imposes a duty to take a particular action. The notion of rights and duties obviously 
iterates earlier philosophical writings. Holyoak and Cheng believe this 
complementarity of rights and duties to be consistent with other relationships 
represented in production systems, such as parent of and child of. Of course, deontic 
conditionals involve voluntary actions and people may violate their rights and duties. 
Whether rights and duties contribute to the coherency or parsimony of PRS theory is 
open to debate (see commentaries to Holyoak & Cheng, 1995). 
 
The Pragmatic Reasoning Schema theory has certainly been influential but has not 
gone without criticism. Manktelow & Over (1991) note that true permissions are 
optional and should contain the word, “may”, however, rules 1 and 4 of Cheng & 
Holyoak’s (1985) permission schema contain the modal, “must”, suggesting an 
obligation. One may also argue that PRS theory maintains the logicist perspective 
with its permission rules corresponding to inference patterns of the material 
conditional. Indeed, O’Brien (1995), a logicist himself, has endorsed a schema theory 
such as PRS as an essential element of a contemporary logic-based theory. 
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An alternative explanation to PRS theory was offered by Cosmides (1989; Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1989, 1992, 1994) who applied earlier ideas of evolutionary biologists 
(Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971) to the study of human 
reasoning. Known as Social Contract Theory (SCT) or Social Exchange Theory 
(SET), Cosmides proposes that our evolutionary past has provided humans with 
innate cheater-detection algorithms (also referred to as Darwinian algorithms) which 
are evoked in situations of social exchange and operate according to cost-benefit 
principles. More specifically, the belief is that because hominids have spent 99% of 
their evolutionary history as hunter-gatherers, a practice developed in the Pleistocene 
era, they have adapted to engage in social exchange, which Cosmides (1989, p.196) 
defines as, “cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit”. Few 
species have evolved the capacity for social exchange, however, it is this which is 
considered essential for cooperative social living. Thus, humans have evolved, 
“Darwinian algorithms – specialized learning mechanisms that organize experience 
into adaptively meaningful schemas or frames” (Cosmides, 1989, p.196). Once 
activated, the adaptive schema, “focus attention, organize perception and memory, 
and call up specialized procedural knowledge that will lead to domain-appropriate 
inferences, judgements and choices” (Cosmides, 1989, p.196). 
 
Social contract theory challenges the view that the mind comprises of relatively few 
domain-general mechanisms and argues for a greater number of special-purpose 
modules, such as cheater-detection algorithms. Cosmides also challenged Cheng & 
Holyoak (1985) on methodological grounds, claiming that their findings could be 
interpreted in terms of Tversky & Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic theory. 
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Cosmides (1989) reinterpreted the Wason selection task in terms of a cost-benefit 
structure involving the testing of a social contract rule. A standard social contract 
would take the form, “If you take the benefit, then you pay the cost”. In this instance 
the logically correct answer for card selections would correspond with the social 
contract answer when seeking to detect a violator, that is, the p and not-q cards 
(benefit accepted and cost not paid, respectively). Ingeniously, Cosmides included a 
switched social contract of the form, “If you pay the cost, then you take the benefit”. 
In this case the logically correct choice is again the p and not-q cards, however, the 
predicted response according to a social contract interpretation is the not-p and q card 
choices (cost not paid and benefit taken, respectively). Further, Cosmides used rules 
that would be both familiar and unfamiliar to participants. Over 70% of participants 
chose cards that supported the social contract theory with familiar and unfamiliar 
materials, including the predicted selections for a switched social contract rule. 
Hence, social contract theory has become a leading explanation for both the Wason 
selection task and for human reasoning generally. It has gained support from some 
quarters (e.g. Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992) and raises important questions about what 
evolutionary advantage there is in being able to reason and why and how such a 
cognitive capacity evolved in the first place. However, the theory has not gone 
unchallenged (see for example, Cheng & Holyoak, 1989). A major difficulty for 
social contract theory is explaining deontic reasoning in non-adaptive contexts. 
Manktelow & Over (1990) devised a precautionary rule, “If you clear up spilt blood, 
then you must wear rubber gloves” which produced a clear facilitatory effect. 
However, it is difficult to interpret such a rule as a cost-benefit relationship. In 
response, Cosmides & Tooby (1992) suggested Manktelow & Over had identified 
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another evolutionary module involving precautionary rules; a view consistent with the 
massively modular perspective of the human mind. 
 
The most influential theory of reasoning in the past decade has arguably been Mental 
Models theory (MMT). Originally applied to the comprehension of discourse and to 
syllogistic reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1975, 1983) mental models theory was more 
fully developed as a comprehensive theory of deduction by Johnson-Laird & Byrne 
(1991). Mental models theory is based on the earlier work of Craik (1943) who 
postulated that the mind derives small-scale models of external reality. A key 
difference between the two theorists is that Craik considers models as parallels or 
imitates of reality but not necessarily having the same structure as what they 
represent, whereas Johnson-Laird believes they are iconic, that is, the mental model is 
a mirror of what it represents. Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) proposed three 
cognitive stages to their theory comprising of stage 1 in which a mental model of the 
given premises is derived using ones general knowledge and knowledge of language, 
stage 2 where reasoners attempt to assert a conclusion from the given premises, and 
stage 3 in which alternative models (counter-examples) are sought in order to test a 
putative conclusion and if no credible alternative can be found the conclusion is 
proposed as being valid. Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) presented the mental models 
theory as an explanation of the major areas of deduction, including propositional 
reasoning, relational reasoning, and quantificational reasoning. In the decade and a 
half since their seminal monograph, Johnson-Laird and his many collaborators have 
used mental models theory to explain many other areas of thinking and reasoning, 
including spatial reasoning (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 1989), reasoning with 
conjunctives and disjunctives (Garcia-Madruga, Moreno, Carriedo, Gutierrez & 
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Johnson-Laird, 2001), propositional reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 
1992) and extensional reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi & 
Caverni, 1999). 
 
The mental models account of the selection task (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) is a 
modification of an earlier proposal by Johnson-Laird & Wason (1970) in which 
models replace truth tables. Presented with the cards in the selection task, participants 
are said to consider those cards that are explicitly represented in their models of the 
rule and they then select those cards for which the hidden value could have a bearing 
on the truth or falsity of the rule. For instance, given the rule “If there is an A on one 
side of a card then there is a 2 on the other side” and four cards: A, B, 2, 3 the 
interpretation of the rule will typically determine the selection of cards. If the rule is 
interpreted as a conditional then the following model will be derived: 
 [A] 2 
        … 
The [A] indicates that A has been exhaustively represented (i.e. A cannot occur in any 
other model), while 2 indicates a non-exhaustive representation. The ellipsis (…) 
denotes implicit information concerning alternative models. A conditional 
interpretation will result in only the A card being selected (although both the A and 2 
cards will be considered) because it alone has a hidden value that could bear on the 
truth or falsity of the rule. A bi-conditional interpretation of the rule yields the 
following model: 
 [A] [2] 
        … 
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Both the [A] and [2] are exhaustively represented but alternative models are possible 
if made explicit. With a bi-conditional interpretation both the A and 2 cards will be 
selected according to mental model theory. Only when the alternative models are 
explicitly fleshed out will the negative consequent, required to produce the logically 
correct solution, be represented. 
 
The mental model theory offers a parsimonious account of conditional rules used in 
some deontic contexts. The unfamiliar rule used by Cosmides (1989), “If a man has a 
tattoo on his face then he eats cassava root” given within a vignette about an 
anthropologist is interpreted by participants as meaning, “A man may eat cassava root 
only if he has a tattoo” according to model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, p. 
78). This re-interpretation yields the following models: 
 
 [eating cassava] tattoo 
 ¬ eating cassava [¬ tattoo] 
        … 
Here two models are derived due to ones general knowledge of permissions. The first 
model represents the interpretation of the given statement according to model theory 
where [eating cassava] is exhaustively represented and tattoo is not. The second 
model is the counterfactual where ¬ means not or negation and is intimated by our 
knowledge of permissions and obligations.  
 
In his more recent writings Johnson-Laird has presented mental models as only one of 
several strategies that individuals may employ when reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 2005; 
Johnson-Laird, Savary & Bucciarelli, 2000). 
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A limitation of mental model theory is its inability to deal with content and context 
effects (Bonatti, 1994; O’Brien, Braine, & Yang, 1994). Experimental studies 
conducted by Johnson-Laird and colleagues have often used abstract materials, devoid 
of real world knowledge. This has lead some to claim that at a deeper level mental 
models are no more than formal logical rules (Stenning & Oaksford, 1993). The 
theory has also been questioned in its handling of bias effects (Evans & Over, 1996a). 
 
A modified version of mental models theory proposed to explain deontic reasoning is 
that of Manktelow & Over (1991; 1995). Their theory is concerned with practical 
deontic reasoning (reasoning about actions) rather than theoretical deontic reasoning 
(reasoning about states of affairs). They start with the premise that one must ask why 
individuals reason or act as they do and to answer this Manktelow & Over adopt 
terms from decision theory – subjective utility and probability and benefits and costs 
(features not included in the original mental models theory). In any social dialogue or 
interaction one must consider personal preferences (subjective utilities) which may be 
influenced by moral, social or prudential reasons. Using an experimental paradigm of 
alternate perspectives (the experimental procedure is detailed in section 2.3 below) 
they were able to illustrate the benefits and costs of an outcome between an agent and 
actor. 
 
The theory of Manktelow & Over is a semantic one, in comparison with the schema 
theories of Cheng & Holyoak (1985) and Cosmides (1989) which are syntactic. 
However, Manktelow & Over do not completely reject schema theories and believe 
that a hybrid theory consisting of schemas and mental models may be possible. 
Mental models are the basic unit of their theory with mental models being devised 
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from pragmatic information as well as the semantics of the rules. Each party (agent or 
actor) will represent a different set of mental models based on the benefits and costs 
of the possible outcomes. For example, in an agent-actor dialogue, the agent may 
utter, “If you p, then you may q”. It is assumed that the actor must prefer q to not-q 
and the agent must prefer p to not-p. This state of affairs can be represented, thus: 
 
Agent’s Perspective     Actor’s Perspective 
p+ q +     p q+ + 
…       … 
 
The p+ denotes a benefit for the agent and q+ a benefit for the actor. The + to the right 
shows the overall utility for that particular outcome; the agent prefers outcomes where 
p is fulfilled, the actor prefers outcomes where q is fulfilled. The three ellipsis indicate 
implicit models that will only be fleshed out (made explicit) if the task demands it.  A 
cost, denoted by a negative sign (-), arises when one is cheated, from having one’s 
expectation unfulfilled or one’s authority defied. Thus, all mental models can be made 
explicit from both the agents’ and actor’s perspectives and their personal preferences 
defined. Given a deontic conditional statement, four outcomes are possible from each 
perspective, two positive (benefiting the actor &/or agent) and two negative 
(representing a cost to the actor &/or agent); in fact, only one scenario will result in 
both the actor and agent benefiting and that is when the p and q components of the 
statement are both made true (as shown in the example above).  
 
A key advantage of this approach is that the inclusion of personal preferences 
suggests why an individual would make a deontic statement in the first place. Further, 
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the approach makes a number of novel predictions, some of which have yet to be 
tested empirically. However, the theory has not subsequently been developed by 
Manktelow & Over or their collaborators and therefore remains speculative in a 
number of regards. For example, Manktelow & Over (1995) indicate that additional 
pragmatic factors could be incorporated in one’s reasoning by the addition of further 
columns representing benefits and costs. How this would work in practice and what 
effects the complexity of models would have on one’s reasoning is not explained. 
 
The fourth type of theory to be discussed in this section is dual process theories. Dual 
process theories of reasoning have a long history dating back to Aristotle. More recent 
proposals have been developed independently, yet share a number of similar features. 
Sloman (1996) proposed two systems of reasoning; associative and rule-based. The 
associative reasoning component is taken from James (1890) and is based on 
associative parallel processing systems (see McClelland & Rumelhart, 1986). The 
computational task of the associative system reflects the similarity and temporal 
structure of stimuli. The second system has rules as the basic form of representation 
which comprises of a number of guiding principles. Rules are abstractions that apply 
to all statements, having a well-specified, symbolic structure. There are different 
kinds of rules such as computer programmes, laws and rules of logic. 
 
Evans has been a key proponent of dual process theory for many years. Evans (1984; 
1989) proposed the heuristic-analytic theory to explain the common errors and biases 
people made when undertaking conditional reasoning tasks. The heuristic stage is 
described as pre-attentive and involves the unconscious process of selecting relevant 
information from the source material and from memory. It is the processing at this 
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stage which can lead to errors as participants are likely to be influenced by the 
salience of given information, linguistic factors and the effects of prior knowledge 
(Evans, 1984). Only if analytical processes are applied to the representation of a 
reasoning problem will logical competence be observed (Evans, 1989). Evans did not 
develop the analytic stage of his theory and the early emphasis was on the heuristic 
stage and its application to human bias in reasoning. 
 
The greatest influence on Evans and colleagues more recent theorising has been the 
research into individual differences in reasoning. Stanovich (1999) provided a 
monograph of individual differences in human reasoning which chronicled much of 
the work of Stanovich & West (1997; 1998). Stanovich & West (1997; 1998) took a 
novel approach to investigating reasoning by focusing on the minority of individuals 
who were able to produce logically correct solutions to the Wason selection task and 
other reasoning problems. They found such individuals to possess a logical 
competence that eluded the majority. Two systems were proposed by Stanovich 
(1999) to explain the differences in reasoning observed between individuals which 
were termed System 1 and System 2. The two systems are analogous to Sloman’s 
(1996) associative – rule-based theory and Evans’ (1984; 1989) heuristic-analytic 
theory. It is suggested that both systems have evolved with System 1 being observed 
in the brains of all higher mammals but only System 2 is to be found in humans. 
System 1 processing involves simple learning, such as conditioning, is influenced by 
heuristics and pragmatic knowledge and by content and context. Thus, belief-biased 
effects can be explained in terms of System 1 thinking. Inferences made using System 
1 tend to be drawn rapidly and automatically without conscious reflection. Inferences 
made using System 1 do not necessarily lead to logical errors, however, the solution is 
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likely to have been drawn on the basis of high probability or plausibility, rather than 
by logical reasoning. Stanovich (1999) proposes that System 2 evolved after System 1 
and is linked to language and involves reflective consciousness. Processing is explicit, 
conscious and analytic and operates via verbal working memory. System 2 is much 
slower than System 1 as processing is sequential. Stanovich (1999) and Stanovich & 
West (2000) provide evidence to suggest that System 2 processing correlates with 
intelligence, with those individuals having a high IQ being less prone to reasoning 
biases and more likely to make logically correct inferences. System 2 is a general 
human ability but it appears that some individuals have more of it than others.  
 
Evans & Over (1996b) proposed a similar theory of rationality in which the key 
processes were Rationality 1 and Rationality 2. This was a development of Evans’ 
previous work, with the two forms of rationality being equivalent to heuristic and 
analytic processes, respectively. In their most recent writings Evans, Over and their 
colleagues have adopted the System 1 / System 2 distinction into their theorising and 
have begun to develop dual processing theory in such areas as hypothetical thinking 
(Evans, Over & Handley, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004), causal conditional reasoning 
(Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley & Sloman, 2007) and deontic reasoning (Over, 
Manktelow & Hadjichristidis, 2004). Aspects of this work will be reviewed below. 
 
Finally, probabilistic theories of deontic reasoning will be considered. Oaksford & 
Chater (1994) reviewed the vast data from studies investigating the selection task and 
observed that the patterns of card choices could be predicted using a Bayesian 
analysis. This approach is influenced by J.R. Anderson’s (1990) rational analysis 
which distinguishes between normative and adaptive rationality. The former is 
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associated with rules of mathematics and logic, while the latter considers rationality 
as an organism’s adaptation to the environment; the rational analysis approach is 
concerned with adaptive rationality. 
 
According to Oaksford & Chater the selection task is approached by participants as a 
task involving gaining information by reducing uncertainty rather than as a logical 
reasoning task. Several assumptions are incorporated into this model, including the 
rarity assumption, which assumes that properties in causal relations are rare in the 
environment. Information gain is, therefore, inversely related to probability; the lower 
the probability of an event the more informative that event is. It is proposed that, 
when faced with the selection task, participants adopt one of two alternative 
hypotheses termed the dependence model (in which p depends on q) and the 
independence model (in which p and q are independent). The likelihood or prior 
probability for each hypothesis is taken to be 0.5. The hypothetical task of examining 
each card provides data allowing one to update their hypothesis (information gain or 
Ig). However, as the task is hypothetical in that participants never actually turn any 
cards, all possible outcomes must be considered; hence the measure taken is expected 
information gain E(Ig). A noise or error factor is included, resulting in the calculation 
of scaled expected information gain or SE(Ig) for each individual card. The 
combination of these factors produces scaled expected information gain’s in the 
ordering of p > q > ¬q > ¬p, which corresponds to the frequency of card selections 
with the abstract version of the selection task. 
 
For deontic versions of the selection task Oaksford & Chater (1994) refocus their 
probabilistic model away from rule testing and on to rule use. The dependence and 
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independence models are used to calculate expected utilities and participants are 
believed to use the rules to maximise expected utility. A small fixed cost is assumed 
for turning any card. Also, participants associate particular utilities with particular 
card combinations, depending on perspective and the rule. Oaksford and Chater use 
the terms enforcer and actor when referring to perspective effects. The enforcer’s goal 
is to discover rule violations, that is, where the actor performs the action without 
satisfying the condition. This is modelled by assigning a positive utility to instances of 
rule violation that is larger than the cost of turning over a card. The actor’s goal is to 
discover instances of unfairness, where the enforcer disallows the action even though 
the actor satisfies the condition. This is modelled by assigning a positive utility to 
uncovering instances of unfairness that is larger than the cost of turning a card. For a 
permission rule utility is incorporated in to the probability model by assigning greater 
weights to the not-condition (¬p) and action (q) card combination for the enforcer, 
and the condition (p) and not-action (¬q) card combinations for the actor. The 
probability of the independence model, P(MI), in the abstract task represents the 
probability of p and q being independent but in the thematic task P(MI) represents the 
probability that an individual is disobeying the rule. The card selections are modelled 
in the same way as for the abstract task except that expected utilities for each card is 
calculated and the rarity assumption is assumed not to hold for deontic rules. Card 
selections are indicated in the model by the greatest expected utility scores. With a 
permission rule, the model selects the not-condition (¬p) and the action card (q) for 
the enforcer perspective, and the condition (p) and not-action (¬q) cards for the 
perspective of the actor. Taking the findings from experiments involving deontic 
conditionals by Cheng & Holyoak (1985), Cosmides (1989), Gigerenzer & Hug 
(1992) and Manktelow & Over (1991) it has been found that, “(t)hese predictions 
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agree perfectly with the results of the studies indicated” (Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 
p.623). 
 
A number of criticisms have been levelled at Information Gain theory (see the 
commentaries of Almor & Sloman, 1996; Laming, 1996; Evans & Over, 1996a). 
Possibly, the most damning criticism is that the theory offers a statistical theory of 
reasoning but fails to provide a psychological explanation of the underlying cognitive 
processes (Evans & Over, 1996a; 1996b). Furthermore, how accurately any model of 
this sort can model performance is debatable. Girotto (1995) considers in detail the 
card selections made in a number of deontic tasks illustrating perspective effects and 
argues persuasively that performance is influenced by the rationale given to the 
participant with consistency of findings being far from perfect. 
 
Oaksford and Chater’s probabilistic approach to reasoning has been influential in the 
development of the recent probabilistic theory of Evans and colleagues (Evans, 
Handley, & Over, 2003; Evans, Over, & Handley, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004).  
 
In their theory of hypothetical thinking, Evans, Over & Handley (2003) have 
proposed three principles: 
Singularity: only one hypothetical possibility, or mental model may be 
considered at any one time; 
Relevance: the most relevant (most plausible or probable) model is considered 
in the given context; 
Satisficing: models are evaluated with reference to the current goal and 
accepted if satisfactory. 
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 Evidence for the singularity principle comes from studies involving hypothesis-
generating tasks in which it appears that participants hold but one hypothesis. For 
example, Bruner, Goodnow & Austin’s (1956) found children could only consider a 
single hypothesis when completing a concept learning task. Further, Wason’s (1960) 
finding with the “2, 4, 6” problem illustrated the difficulty individuals have in 
considering more than one hypothesis when undertaking a relatively simple cognitive 
task. The difficulty of reasoning with disjunctives is also taken as evidence for the 
singularity principle. A classic demonstration of this difficulty is Wason’s THOG 
problem (Wason & Brooks, 1979). 
 
Three factors determine the construction of the most plausible model, according to the 
relevance principle. These factors include the features of the task or environment, the 
current goal of the individual, and background knowledge. The principle is clearly 
influenced by the relevance theory of linguistic pragmatics and discourse 
comprehension developed by Sperber & Wilson (1986; 1995). Selecting what is 
perceived as the most relevant information can be manipulated by the instructions 
given while participants undertake a task. For example, with the truth table task false 
possibilities can be evoked by instructing participants to focus on particular cases 
(Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993; Evans, Legrenzi & Girotto, 1999). Thematic 
versions of the Wason selection task are further examples of how relevance is drawn 
from the content and context of the task. For example, studies of perspective effects 
with thematic selection tasks demonstrate how opposing roles may produce distinctive 
relevance.  
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The third factor, the satisficing principle, is taken from the writings of Simon (1982). 
The idea is that due to our limited information processing capacity we are unable to 
consider all possible options when making a rational choice or decision. Therefore, 
we are likely to opt for a satisfactory choice via the use of a suitable heuristic. 
According to Evans et al. satisficing occurs at the stage of explicitly evaluating 
models. The single model is considered as a suitable candidate for satisficing the 
current goal. If satisfactory, the model is accepted, if not it is rejected and an 
alternative is generated and evaluated. Evans et al. reject the notion of optimisation in 
normative decision-making theory and propose that decisions are most likely to be 
made using the satisficing principle, as Simon (1982) suggested. They also believe 
that reasoning is by default probabilistic and pure deductive reasoning extremely rare.  
 
The probabilistic element of their theorising has been developed in their suppositional 
theory, a form of hypothetical thinking (Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Evans & 
Over, 2004). It is proposed that a conditional statement of the form, If p, then q is 
interpreted as the probability of the consequent, given the antecedent (P(q|p)). This 
hypothesis is called the conditional probability hypothesis and is a view held by a 
number of philosophical logicians (see Bennett, 2003). An example from the Evans et 
al. paper will illustrate the conditional probability hypothesis. Take the statement:  
 
 If the car’s battery is dead then it will not start 
 
Knowing that the car’s battery is dead suggests a high probability that the car will not 
start and thus the P(q|p) is high. 
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The conditional probability hypothesis is one assumption of Evans et al.’s probability 
theory. A second assumption is that premises can be extended by pragmatic 
implicatures, that is, inferences may be invited by the content and/or context of an 
utterance. Evans & Over (2004) give the following statement as an example: 
 
 If you clean my car then you can borrow it tonight 
By pragmatic implication this statement is biconditional; if you do not clean the car 
then you cannot borrow it. 
 
A third assumption involves System 1 / System 2 thinking. System 1 has limited 
reasoning powers and a conditional statement, if consistent with one’s beliefs, would 
be taken to mean the subjective value of P(q|p). Only System 2 thinking adheres to the 
principles of deductive reasoning. 
 
The most influential theories of deontic reasoning, over the past two decades, have 
been reviewed in this section. The schematic theories of Cheng & Holyoak (1985), 
with their Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory, and Cosmides’ (1989) Social 
Contract Theory (SCT) sparked the theorising of the thematic selection task and 
introduced deontic reasoning to psychology. The Mental Models Theory (MMT) of 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991) is a more general theory of reasoning that has been 
particularly influential; modifications of the theory have also been proposed to 
explain deontic reasoning (Manktelow & Over, 1995). Dual process theories have re-
emerged, offering a more complete explanation of two cognitive systems; System 1 
reliant on reasoning with probabilities and System 2 that can reason logically 
(Stanovich, 1999; Evans & Over, 1996b). More recently, probabilistic theories of 
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reasoning have been proposed that have switched the emphasis from trying to explain 
logical competence (or lack of) to considering the interpretation of tasks as one 
involving possibilities or probabilities. Oaksford & Chater’s (1994) theory of 
Information Gain has been one such theory that has gained in stature as it extends its 
range of applications, including an explanation of deontic reasoning. An alternative 
probability theory has emerged from the work of Evans and colleagues into 
hypothetical thinking (Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Evans, Over & Handley, 2003; 
Evans & Over, 2004). There are, therefore, several candidate theories of deontic 
reasoning. 
 
The approach taken in this thesis is to adopt the probability theory of Evans and 
colleagues and to consider pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning as residing in 
System 1 thinking. Reasoning with pragmatic content typically involves satisficing 
and reducing cognitive load by using only relevant information. It is also proposed 
that judgements involving pragmatics are determined by the conditional probability 
hypothesis. Furthermore, this probabilistic approach will be applied to experiments 
involving judgement revision and conjunctive and disjunctive statements. 
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Chapter 2 
Pragmatics and Decision-Making 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Pragmatics has traditionally been the domain of linguists but is now having an 
increasing role in the study of reasoning. The relationship between the pragmatics of 
language and that of reasoning will be outlined before discussing specific pragmatic 
factors that have been found to influence deontic reasoning to date. Decision-making 
is another field that has traditionally been investigated separately from reasoning. 
However, there has been a gradual realisation that many reasoning tasks involve 
decision-making and situations requiring a decision or judgement include a reasoning 
element. Theories of decision-making will be described and an argument made for 
there being similar processes involved in reasoning and decision-making within the 
deontic domain. 
 
2.2 Pragmatics of Language 
The term pragmatics was introduced by Morris (1938) who also made the distinction 
between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Mey (1993, p.3) defines pragmatics, “as 
the science of language seen in relation to its users … as it is used by real, live people, 
for their own purposes and within their limitations and affordances”. Although many 
definitions of the term exist (see Levinson, 1983) most explanations agree that 
pragmatics, within a linguistic or reasoning context, involves acquired world 
knowledge in which the content of discourse may yield its effects.  
 
Possibly the most widely cited theory of pragmatics is that of Grice (1975) who 
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showed that formal logic does not correspond to natural language and yet everyday 
language provides statements that are just as precise as logic and are understood in a 
given context. In his theory of conversational implicatures Grice proposes maxims or 
principles which guide the meaning of spoken language. His maxims include, quantity 
(provide only sufficient information), quality (be truthful), relation (be relevant) and 
manner (be clear). There is experimental evidence for the use of these maxims 
(Newstead, 1989; 1995) and Evans & Over (2004) in their suppositional theory 
incorporated Gricean maxims in what they refer to as pragmatic implicatures. The 
research reported in this thesis assumes Grice’s principle of co-operation as integral 
between speaker and addressee.  
 
2.3 Pragmatic Effects of Deontic Reasoning 
Increasingly, the phrase pragmatics is being used within the domain of thinking and 
reasoning. Cheng & Holyoak (1985) were the first to refer to pragmatic effects in 
relation to deontic reasoning, suggesting the range of influences on the thinking of 
permissions and obligations is much greater than hitherto realised. Pragmatics have 
been included in models of analogical reasoning (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Keane, 
1990) and there is a growing body of research into the pragmatics of order effects 
(Feeney, Evans & Clibbens, 1996; Girotto, Mazzocco & Tasso, 1997; van der Henst, 
1999). A recent influential theory attempting to explain pragmatics is Relevance 
theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995) which has been applied to various pragmatic 
influences within thinking and reasoning (eg. Sperber, Cara & Girotto, 1995; Girotto, 
Mazzocco & Tasso, 1997; van der Henst, 1999). 
 
Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995) is an explanation of language 
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understanding but has been applied to reasoning. The theory develops Grice’s maxims 
and holds that a speaker’s utterance will always be relevant, even when statements 
appear to be unrelated. Manktelow (1999) offers the following example, “I’m going to 
watch TV tonight. You can borrow the car”. There may be a number of reasons why 
the second statement is relevant to the first; obviously the context and the relationship 
between speaker and addressee would provide the answer. Sperber and Wilson define 
relevance in terms of cognitive effect and effort; the greater the relevance of a piece of 
information the less cognitive effort is required. Thus, an inverse relationship is 
observed between these cognitive components. The theory has applications – Sperber, 
Cara, & Girotto (1995) used it as an explanation of the selection task; and Evans & 
Over (1996a) proposed their heuristic stage of reasoning (System 1) involved 
relevance. Relevance theory has inspired dialogue between researchers in linguistics 
and reasoning and has raised the profile of pragmatics as an important part of 
everyday reasoning, a crucial component of this thesis. 
 
Two pragmatic factors that have been found to be associated with reasoning in 
deontic contexts are perspective and probability. Perspective has been extensively 
studied usually within a deontic context of a selection task. The general finding is that 
when a participant is asked to play a role or take a particular perspective facilitation of 
predicted card selections is observed. Further, correct card selections can be 
manipulated by perspective and scenario. For instance, Manktelow & Over (1991) 
introduced the rule, if you tidy your room, then you may go out to play, which is 
spoken by a mother to her son. Participants are cued to the role of either the mother or 
the son and asked to detect any violation of this rule. Four cards are presented, room 
tidied (p card), room not tidied (not-p card), went out to play (q card), and did not go 
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out to play (not-q card). It is assumed that mother and son have personal preferences, 
that is, the mother would prefer a tidy room while the son would prefer to play out. 
Thus, those seeking a violation from the mother’s perspective are more likely to 
choose the not-p card (room not tidied) and the q card (went out to play), while 
participants taking the son’s perspective choose the p card (tidied room) and the not-q 
card (did not go out to play). Gigerenzer & Hug (1992) and to a lesser degree Politzer 
& Nguyen-Xuan (1992) have also demonstrated perspective effects with non-
normative, yet predictable selection card choices. 
 
The probability of violation has also been found to influence selection card choices. 
Kirby (1994) modified Griggs & Cox’s (1982) drinking-age rule, If a person is 
drinking beer, then they must be over 21 years of age, by having potential under-age 
drinkers of 4, 12 and 19 years. As predicted, participants were more likely to inspect 
the 19 year old than the 4 year old. Manktelow, Sutherland & Over (1995) introduced 
the Large Array Selection Task (LAST) which is ideal for the study of probability as 
it allows the use of several p, not-p, q and not-q cards. With the use of the 
immigration rule (Cheng & Holyoak,1985) it was found that travellers from the 
tropics were more likely to be checked for appropriate vaccinations than European 
travellers. It, therefore, appears that situations are assessed for their probability of 
outcome, something that was ignored with early selection task studies. 
 
Other research has shown that logically correct responses can be suppressed. Byrne 
(1989) used a number of scenarios, including the conditional, If she has an essay to 
write, then she studies late in the library. The rule was then modified by an additional 
statement such as, If the library stays open, then she will study late in the library. This 
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additional information facilitates or suppresses inferential reasoning, including the 
fallacies, denial of the antecedent (DA) and affirmation of the consequent (AC). 
Similar research was conducted by Stevenson & Over (1995) who introduced such 
conditionals as, If John catches a fish, he will have a fish supper. Additional 
statements were given, similar to Byrne’s e.g. If John catches a fish, he will have a 
fish supper. Probability was manipulated in further studies by the introduction of a 
qualifier, for example, John (always/ almost always/ sometimes/ rarely) catches a 
fish. The findings of these two studies were similar and as predicted, but the 
explanations differed - Byrne preferring the idea of suppression of a logical inference 
while Stevenson & Over used the notion of uncertainty i.e. the probability of the truth 
of a statement may be reduced by additional or probabilistic information. 
 
The current research programme extends the range of pragmatic factors influencing 
deontic reasoning and holds that reasoning, and thinking generally, is greatly affected 
by context and one’s world knowledge within a given context. 
 
2.4 Power of Source 
One extension to the pragmatic factors within this thesis is the power or authority of a 
message source. Power has traditionally been investigated by social psychologists 
within the field of social cognition. However, the study of power of source within a 
deontic reasoning context affords the opportunity to combine these traditionally 
disparate fields. 
 
The seminal work of Raven (French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965) identified six 
bases of power – reward, coercive, informational, expert, legitimate, and referent. 
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Such categories are not mutually exclusive when applied to an authority role as many 
high ranking individuals will exert most, if not all six types of influence. The research 
reported in this thesis involves a number of Raven’s power types within individuals of 
varying degrees of power across a range of scenarios. 
 
The emergence of power hierarchies in groups of unacquainted individuals has been 
investigated by monitoring conversations (Ng, Bell & Brook, 1993). This linguistic 
approach found those who spoke more and had a greater number of speaking turns 
were accorded a higher social ranking by the unacquainted group. 
 
One perspective of social power proposed by social cognition theorists is a power-
based schema theory (Rusk & Russell, 1988; Sande, Ellard & Ross, 1986) in which 
individuals pay particular attention to those who control one’s outcomes (i.e.utilities) 
(Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). This 
approach considers power as hierarchical with well-developed schemas for those 
holding most power and less-developed schemas for subordinates who have little 
control over outcomes (Rodin, 1987). A recent theory explaining deontic reasoning 
also considers hierarchical power. The theory of dominance hierarchies (Cummins, 
1996a, 1998, 2000) is an evolutionary theory suggesting individuals of high social 
ranking are more likely to influence and control the behaviour of others with 
violations expected of those from a low social rank. 
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2.5 Reasoning with Inducements 
Everyday discourse involves the use of inducements. Inducements include warnings, 
threats and promises which can be phrased as conditional sentences, conjunctive 
sentences and disjunctive sentences. When an inducement is made one must consider 
the felicity of the statement and judge the likelihood of action that may follow. Such 
considerations are an essential component of deontic reasoning. Fillenbaum (1976) 
suggests that inducements are purposive-causal. That is, a conditional statement of 
the form, "If p, then q" consists of q being offered on my part to get something done 
or not done with regard to p on your part. There are, of course, important differences 
between the forms of inducement. Most warnings are hypothetical of the form, "If you 
do/do not do X, then Y will happen" (Searle, 1969). Preferences and utilities may 
apply to promises; the promiser would prefer an act being done to not being done and 
the promisee would gain from what is being offered (Searle, 1969). Of course the 
concept of utilities is also an established component of deontic reasoning (Manktelow 
& Over, 1991; Oaksford & Chater, 1994). Searle (1969) also distinguished between 
sincere and insincere promises. An insincere promise is one in which the speaker does 
not intend to undertake the act promised. The detection of an insincere promise would 
constitute a violator-detection as proposed by social contract theory (Cosmides, 
1989). Individuals of low power are more likely to make insincere statements, that is, 
inducements they are unable to keep and this is one aspect of power relations 
investigated in this thesis. 
 
Fillenbaum (1975, 1976) was a pioneer of research with realistic inducements. The 
emphasis of his research was on the interpretation of conditional inducements with the 
finding that promises were more likely to be interpreted as a conjunctive, while 
 46
threats tended to be interpreted as a disjunctive. However, preference of interpretation 
does not result in the meaning of a given statement being lost. A threat will be 
recognized as such whether stated as a disjunctive or conjunctive. Evidence for this 
comes from Springston & Clark (1973) who considered and and or statements as 
pseudoimperatives, demonstrating how statements can be paraphrased. Possibly their 
best known example is of a threat, “Sit down or I’ll scream” which can be 
paraphrased as, “I’ll scream if you don’t sit down”. Inducements phrased as 
conditionals, conjunctives and disjunctives are investigated within this thesis to see if 
they have same illocutionary force as the work of Springston & Clark (1973) would 
suggest. 
 
A key advantage of studying inducements is that they tend to be more realistic and 
familiar compared to the traditional abstract materials and unfamiliar tasks frequently 
used in studying reasoning. More recent studies investigating inducements have 
emphasized this point (Evans & Twyman-Musgrove, 1998; Newstead, Ellis, Evans & 
Dennis, 1997; Newstead, Griggs & Chrostowski, 1984). The materials in the 
experiments of this thesis comprise of realistic, everyday statements embedded within 
familiar, highly contextual scenarios. 
 
2.6 Decision-Making Theories 
The normative theory of decision-making has been Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) 
theory which assumes that decision makers have clearly defined goals with all 
relevant information and evidence available to them. The aim of decision-making is to 
maximise one’s goals (or utility), which is achieved by making a trade-off between 
the probability of an outcome and its expected utility. 
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 SEU theory was introduced to psychology by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944, 
1947) but the components of the theory have a long history.  The first component is 
probability, which did not exist as a concept before 1660 (Hacking, 1975). Pascal 
(1670/1941) conducted the first calculations of probability and intimated at subjective 
utility, the second component of SEU theory, with the so-called Pascal’s wager; 
Pascal argued that the utility of believing in God and eternal life is greater than not 
following a religious life (interestingly, Pascal was offering a form of practical 
reasoning in suggesting how one ought to live one’s life). The notion of subjective 
utility was further developed by Bernoulli (1738/1954) who observed that subjective 
utility (or value) does not directly correspond to monetary value but rather the 
relationship is concave. Thus, the subjective value of a monetary gain is relative 
according to one’s current wealth. 
 
Beach (1997) makes the distinction between paradigms, theories and models which 
can help unravel the plethora of research studies and multitude of explanations in the 
decision making field. The dominant paradigm in decision making research is 
utilitarianism, the tenet that behaviour is motivated by the attainment of valued 
outcomes or goals. At the next level are normative theories, based on probabilities of 
events and subjective utilities. At the lowest level of this hierarchy are numerous 
normative models which attempt to capture decision making behaviour. Generic terms 
such as (behavioural) decision theory (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Slovic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1977) and (subjective) expected utility theory have encompassed a 
variety of normative models. 
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Normative models of decision-making include Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) 
theory (Savage, 1954), Expected Utility theory (Edwards, 1954) and Multiattribute 
Utility theory (MAUT) (Edwards & Newman, 1982; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 
1986). Descriptive models of probability, which aim to be a more accurate 
representation of human decision-making, have been devised and labelled, Rank-
dependent Utility theories (Lopes, 1996; Quiggin, 1982). Prescriptive models have 
also been developed, including Decision Analysis (or Cost-benefit Analysis) (Brown, 
Kahr & Peterson, 1974; Behn & Vaupel, 1982; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986) 
and Cost-effectiveness Analysis (Pliskin, Shepard & Weinstein, 1980). 
 
The computations required for calculating utilities and probabilities are beyond our 
cognitive capacities (Manktelow, 1999) and, therefore, human participants are found 
wanting when tested on these normative concepts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
Thus, SEU theory, and its various forms, is an inadequate account of human decision-
making from the perspective of the psychologist. The theory is said to be incomplete 
(Hastie, 2001) because the emphasis is on processes of inference rather than processes 
involving search. Theories have developed to the extent that clearly formulated 
axioms have been devised (de Finetti, 1937; Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971; 
Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) allowing detailed 
analysis of specific aspects of SEU theory. However, systematic investigation of 
probability and utility has shown that human participants regularly violate these 
axioms. 
 
Tversky (1969) demonstrated violation of the transitivity axiom using the scenario of 
University applicants. The axiom proposes that given a series of choices to an 
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individual, there should be a weak ordering, that is if option A is preferable to option 
B and option B is preferable to option C, then transitivity should be observed with 
option A being preferred to option C. Tversky found preference reversals with small 
differences between options being ignored or underweighed resulting in intransitivity 
of decision-making. 
 
Savage (1954) formulated the sure-thing principle which proposed that if option 1 is 
preferred to option 2 in situations of certainty, then option 1 should be preferred to 
option 2 when in a state of uncertainty. Violations of this axiom have been 
demonstrated when the uncertainty concerned having passed or failed an examination 
(Shafir, 1993; Tversky & Shafir, 1992) and in a number of other decision-making 
contexts (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). 
 
In sum, human reasoning lacks the cognitive ability to match the demands of a 
normative theory, such as SEU theory. When investigated experimentally, the axioms 
derived from normative theory are clearly violated. This suggests a theory of 
decision-making is required that reflects the judgements people make in real world 
contexts. An alternative model of decision-making will now be discussed that has 
greater relevance to the field of human reasoning. 
 
A related component of decision-making is quantitative judgement which involves 
evaluating the options prior to making a final decision. Quantitative judgements 
consist of ‘rating’ (assigning numbers or grades), ‘ranking’ (placing people or objects 
in order on some dimension), and ‘classifying’ (assigning people or objects to a 
group). Typically, judgement experiments involve providing participants with the 
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attributes of options from which they evaluate; thus, judgement tasks are viewed as 
measures of utility. Theories of quantitative judgement tend to be based on the 
statistical concept of multiple linear regression. A number of such theories have been 
proposed but the emphasis here shall be on the Lens model (Brunswik, 1952), and 
Information Integration theory (N.H. Anderson, 1981). 
 
Brunswik (1937, 1947, 1952) developed the Lens model to explain how perceivers 
use sensory cues to make inferences about the visual world. The model was adopted 
by Hammond (1955) and applied to the area of decision-making. The modelling 
techniques remain the same but the field is commonly known as Social Judgement 
Theory (SJT) when applied to decision-making and judgement-revision. Applications 
have been made to business, including policy making (Brehmer & Brehmer, 1988) 
and recruitment of salesmen (Roose & Doherty, 1976), psychology, including the 
performance of clinical psychologists (Hammond, 1955) and learning and inference 
(Klayman, 1988), medical judgements, including judging malignancy of ulcers 
(Slovic, Rorer & Hoffman, 1971; see Wigton, 1996 for a review) and general 
decision-making (Phelps & Shanteau, 1978; Brehmer, 1990). 
 
The Lens model proposes that for some perceptual target that needs to be identified or 
judgement that needs to be made, there will be a number of cues providing 
information concerning the target or judgement that are used to make one’s final 
decision. To illustrate the model, using an example provided by Beach (1997), a 
company may wish to identify the characteristics of a good salesperson. The 
identified characteristics would act as the cues in making decisions about prospective 
candidates, with cues given greater prominence or importance weighted more heavily. 
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Finally, the data is analysed using the statistical technique of multiple regression. A 
consistent finding is that the model performs better than the human judge (Goldberg, 
1970; Dawes, 1971, 1979; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Camerer, 1981). 
 
There are some interesting features of SJT that are relevant to contemporary 
theorising in the thinking and reasoning field. Brunswik emphasised functional 
probabilism, that is, an organism cannot know the environment with certainty and 
therefore, the relation between the organism and the environment must be considered 
in probabilistic terms. Such a view was counter to the approach of the day which 
emphasised general, univocal laws. Today, however, considering human behaviour in 
probabilistic terms is the norm (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Evans & Over, 2004). An 
adaptation of SJT has been Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) (Hammond, 1986, 
1996) which addresses the question as to why some tasks appear easy while others are 
difficult. A continuum is proposed from intuitive to analytical cognition. A task such 
as syllogistic reasoning involves the more demanding analytical cognition while a less 
cognitive demanding task, such as selecting candidates for graduate admissions, 
would involve intuitive cognition. The analytical-intuitive distinction has a number of 
parallels in the field of psychological reasoning (e.g. Evans, 1989; Evans & Over, 
1996b).  
 
Social judgement theorists, such as Doherty & Kurz (1996), admit that when making 
ratings participants may reduce the actual number of cues given to a cognitively 
manageable number. Thus, analytical cognition may be replaced by an intuitive mode 
of thought. This may also apply in situations involving logical or statistical problems 
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that are unfamiliar but whose content is familiar. Hence, SJT theorists emphasise the 
importance of task parameters. 
 
The Lens model and SJT take a positive view of human cognition, compared to 
research on logical reasoning and heuristics and biases. A further advantage of the 
approach is that multiple regression analysis is robust. However, the Lens model in 
particular has been criticised for being too simplistic and the appropriateness of 
multiple regression has been questioned. Multiple regression analysis presumes that 
cues are additive with a candidate accumulating an ever higher score as more positive 
cues are added. Further, cues are treated independently with multiple regression, when 
cues may in fact interact, that is be multiplicative. Modifications can be made to allow 
for multiplicative combination, however, the procedure is cumbersome and seldom 
works (Kort, 1968). Multiple regression also assumes a linear relationship and has 
difficulty with relationships that are curvilinear. The final disadvantage is that SJT 
techniques presume a single level of inference, from the cues to the decision, ignoring 
potential intermediate levels of the decision process (Beach, 1997). 
 
An alternative approach also employing multiple regression is Information 
Integration (N.H. Anderson, 1970). The decision maker is believed to integrate cued 
information either additively, multiplicatively or by averaging. An advantage of 
Anderson’s theory is that the cues need not be quantitative, they can be qualitative. 
When averaging, the decision maker gives each cue a value, adds the values of each 
cue and divides by the number of cues. N.H. Anderson (1981) successfully applied 
averaging to studies of impression formation. Additivity is observed when cues are 
added producing a linear relationship when plotted in a graph. Alternatively, 
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multiplicativity is observed in a fan representation when cues are multiplied. As with 
other multiple regression approaches, weights may be applied to cues which are then 
multiplied by the assigned values. The integration of information can be applied to 
situations requiring judgement revision and such an approach is taken in the research 
reported in this thesis. 
 
The theories of decision-making discussed above included a theory, SEU theory, that 
appears to be beyond the cognitive capabilities of humans. The Lens model offers a 
more viable explanation of human decision-making with its emphasis on 
environmental factors and also has the advantage of having similar features to theories 
of human reasoning. Information integration theory is also a viable contender, 
particularly when explaining judgement revision. 
 
2.7 Deontic Reasoning and Decision-Making 
Amongst the earliest theorists to propose that reasoning and decision-making were 
invariably linked was Evans, Over & Manktelow (1993). There may be distinctive 
differences between the two traditions which have resulted in separate fields of study, 
however, both reasoning and decision-making are components of rationality. As they 
state, “reasoning tasks usually involve making decisions” and “[i]n real-world 
situations the distinction between reasoning and decision-making is blurred” (Evans et 
al., 1993, p.166). There may be at least two forms of rationality, as suggested by 
Evans & Over (1996b); Rationality 1 and Rationality 2. The former allows one to 
achieve one’s goals, while the latter conforms to normative reasoning and decision-
making systems. Empirical studies of reasoning (e.g. syllogistic reasoning) and 
decision-making (e.g. gambling behaviour) have usually tested Rationality 2, whereas 
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experimental studies of deontic or practical reasoning, and everyday reasoning test 
Rationality 1, that is, they involve goal attainment. Practical reasoning, involving the 
inferring of actions that ought or may be taken in a given situation, is a particularly 
pertinent example of the association between reasoning and decision-making. Further 
similarities between the two fields are the pragmatic factors of probability, utility, and 
social perspective, traditionally areas of concern for decision-making but which have 
recently been found to influence deontic reasoning, as discussed above. Not 
surprisingly, Evans et al. reject normative accounts of decision-making, not least for 
their inadequacies at explaining personal preferences during practical decision-
making, preferring the notions of bounded rationality (Simon, 1983) and satisficing 
(Newell & Simon, 1972) in which the decision-maker finds an adequate solution, but 
not necessarily the optimal solution, within given resource constraints. Such a view is 
adopted in the thesis. 
 
Other theorists have also turned to theoretical aspects of decision-making for 
explanation. Oaksford & Chater (1994) now consider deontic versions of the Wason 
selection task as involving decision-making as utility must be incorporated into their 
Bayesian approach if their theory of information gain can adequately explain such 
tasks. 
 
The above review demonstrates there is much overlap between the research interests 
of those working in the field of reasoning and those in decision-making. Cross-
fertilisation of ideas, methods and theorizing has begun, however, there is much more 
potential and this thesis makes an attempt to develop on these modest beginnings.  
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2.8 Rationale to the Thesis 
The review of the literature in this and the previous chapter has shown the 
inadequacies of the normative approach to reasoning and decision-making. Such an 
approach assumes a logical capability beyond that observed in experimental research. 
Studies with syllogisms have shown many inconsistencies and biases in the reasoning 
of individuals with some syllogisms being solved readily in some contexts but not 
others. Syllogistic reasoning has been shown to be influenced by the subtleties of 
content, context and the understanding of the terms, All, Some, Some…not, and No.  
 
The abstract selection task is a simple yet effective means of demonstrating that the 
truth table for material implication is not held in the heads of individuals. The 
thematic versions of the selection task, however, have acted as a bridge between the 
normative approach and the more realistic endeavour of investigating everyday 
reasoning and decision-making. However, a realistic context per se does not guarantee 
logical reasoning on the selection task (Manktelow & Evans, 1979). Further, a 
complete explanation of the Wason selection task has eluded researchers for decades, 
which has led some to question whether it is a suitable means for the investigation of 
human reasoning and rationality. Thus, syllogistic reasoning and deductive reasoning 
on the Wason selection task are prone to biases and were, therefore, rejected as 
methods of studying reasoning and decision-making in this thesis. The distinction 
between deduction and induction is increasingly considered as fallacious (Manktelow, 
1999) and this afforded the opportunity to use a series of novel inferential reasoning 
and decision-making tasks throughout the experiments reported in this thesis. Evans 
(2002) has gone so far as to propose that the deductive paradigm is no longer the 
appropriate approach for studying the processes of reasoning and rationality. 
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Deontic reasoning as a discrete form of cognitive activity has been established for 
some time (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) and several intervening factors have been found 
to influence the conclusions drawn when undertaking such reasoning, in particular the 
perspective effect (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Manktelow & Over, 1991; Politzer & 
Nguyen-Xuan, 1992) and probability (Kirby, 1994; Manktelow et al., 1995; 
Stevenson & Over, 1995). Facilitation on thematic versions of the selection task, that 
is the selection of logically correct card choices, has also been demonstrated with 
these manipulations (Griggs & Cox, 1982; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Legrenzi, 
1972). This thesis explores further pragmatic influences of deontic reasoning, 
including scale of violation, mitigating and aggravating circumstances and power of 
source with the use of inferential reasoning and decision-making tasks. 
 
Several theories of deontic reasoning have now been proposed and established as 
leading contenders for explaining this important phenomenon, including Pragmatic 
Reasoning Schema theory (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), Social Contract theory 
(Cosmides, 1989), Mental Models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Manktelow 
& Over, 1995), Dual Process Theory (Evans & Over, 2004; Stanovich, 1999), 
Information Gain theory (Oaksford & Chater, 1994) and Probability theory (Over, 
Maktelow & Hadjichristidis, 2004). The investigation of pragmatic manipulations 
using inferential reasoning tasks will allow for the testing of these theories. The 
approach taken in this thesis assumes that reasoning and decision-making are 
associated and uses a simple procedure of sequential presentation to convert an 
inferential reasoning task to a decision-making task. Evans, Over & Manktelow 
(1993) were amongst the first to suggest the relationship between reasoning and 
decision-making using a dual factor theory. They proposed that much of everyday 
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reasoning and decision-making involves what they called Rationality 1, reasoning 
associated with one’s goals, rather than the more systematic and logical Rationality 2. 
With the development of dual process theory the terms, System 1 and System 2 are 
now preferred. The pragmatic factors investigated in this thesis are considered as 
direct manipulations of System 1 in which inferences will be drawn from personal 
experience and knowledge with the given, familiar context. 
 
The research reported in this thesis explores pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning 
using scenarios that would be familiar to most adults, such as employment rules and 
motoring offences. Rules were presented as if…then conditional statements, with the 
scenario elaborated to include rule violations. Participants made judgements of the 
seriousness of the violation on a verbal or numerical rating scale. Violations differed 
in type (e.g. speeding versus drink-driving), in scale (e.g. minor versus major) and in 
surrounding circumstances (e.g. mitigating versus aggravating). Judgement revision 
was investigated within the context of motoring violations by presenting details of the 
scenario serially. Violations are frequently used in deontic reasoning tasks, however, 
manipulations of scale have not been explicitly investigated before. 
 
The authority or the power of the source of a statement was also studied in both 
formal (employment and armed forces) and informal (family and health) settings. The 
power of source experiments were developed by embedding conditional statements 
within promises, threats and warnings and by the use of conjunctive and disjunctive 
statements. Finally, serial presentation of the power of source scenarios allowed for 
judgement revision to be investigated with inducements (i.e. promises, threats and 
warnings). This research is novel in a number of respects. The authority making a 
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statement or inducement has not been directly manipulated in previous studies. The 
paraphrasing of conditional statements to the conjunctive or disjunctive form 
investigates if similar judgement ratings are made irrespective of the type of 
statement; an approach not taken before. 
 
In sum, the rationale of the thesis was to investigate reasoning and decision-making in 
deontic contexts using inferential tasks. A simple manipulation from end-of-series to 
serial presentation allowed a reasoning task to be converted to one of judgement 
revision. An underlying assumption of the research was that reasoning and decision-
making are invariably linked, involving similar cognitive processes and susceptibility 
to the same pragmatic manipulations. The factors of scale of violation, circumstances 
and power were investigated using familiar social contexts in direct manipulation of 
System 1 thinking. 
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Chapter 3 
Scale of Violation in a Working Rule Scenario as a Pragmatic Factor of Deontic 
Reasoning 
 
3.1 Experiment 1: Rationale 
In this chapter it is proposed that scale of violation acts as a pragmatic factor within a 
deontic reasoning context. Two experiments are described in which scaled violations 
for a working hour rule are manipulated using deontic reasoning tasks. Two alternate 
methods of investigating scaled violations are the use of an inferential reasoning task 
and the large array selection task (LAST), as devised and implemented by 
Manktelow, Sutherland & Over (1995), and both are adopted in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2, respectively. We shall first consider the rationale for Experiment 1. 
 
An adapted version of Gigerenzer & Hug’s (1992) ‘day off’ rule provided the 
inferential reasoning task for Experiment 1. The ‘day off’ rule states, “If an employee 
works on the weekend, then that person gets a day off during the week”, and was used 
by Gigerenzer & Hug within a selection task to demonstrate bilateral perspective 
effects. That is, different card selections are observed when participants are asked to 
take either the perspective of an employee or the employer. Those taking the 
perspective of the employee were cued to the potential violation of the ‘day off’ rule 
by the employer and were more likely to select the p and not-q cards (i.e. the cards 
stating, “Worked at the weekend” and “Did not get a day off in the week”, 
respectively). Conversely, when cued to the perspective of the employer and the 
potential violations on the part of employees, participants were more likely to choose 
the not-p and q cards (i.e. the cards stating, “Did not work at the weekend” and “Took 
a day off in the week”, respectively). The ‘day off’ rule was one of several scenarios 
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used by Gigerenzer & Hug to disentangle two theoretical aspects of Cosmides’ (1989) 
Social Contract Theory: a rule as a social contract and the proposed cheater-detection 
algorithm. 
 
In the current research the ‘day off’ rule is used to investigate the effects of scaled 
violations. Research studies of rule transgression, typically conducted using a 
selection task, tend to consider violations as a binary relation, that is, as a violation or 
non-violation. Influential theories of deontic reasoning, particularly schema theories, 
appear to implicitly hold this view as the detection of a violation is represented as an 
all-or-none effect. However, an inferential reasoning task has the advantage that it is 
relatively easy to provide participants with graded options unlike the standard 
selection task which offers only four choice options. Admittedly, the inferential task 
changes the nature of the problem to that of a judgment or decision-making one. An 
inferential task can be said to involve an evaluation prior to making a judgment or 
decision whereas the selection task requires one to identify an exception to a rule; a 
violator in the context of deontic scenarios. Furthermore, an inferential reasoning task 
does not accord with a specific correct response, nor is it linked to a normative 
standard or theory, such as logic. Performance on the selection task has been 
associated with a number of factors, including individual differences, for instance if 
the individual has received training in formal logic and/or has a high I.Q. (Stanovich 
& West, 2000) or has training in mathematics (Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992). Thus, an 
alternative, non-traditional method was undertaken to investigate individuals’ 
reasoning with scaled violations within deontic contexts. 
 
Two hypotheses were predicted for this experiment: 
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1. The allocation of fines by participants would significantly increase as the scale 
of violation increased over Day 1 (1, 4, & 8 hours) for a working rule task. 
2. The allocation of fines by participants would significantly increase as the scale 
of violation increased over Day 2 (1, 4, & 8 hours) for a working rule task. 
 
3.2 Experiment 1: Method 
Participants 
Participants comprised of 13 part-time students attending an evening ‘A’ level 
Psychology class at Stafford Further Education College. Ten participants were female 
and 3 male with an age range of 16-47 years (median age 23 years). Two female 
participants declined to give their age. All participants were volunteers and had 
received no tuition in the area of thinking and reasoning. No further demographic 
details were obtained. 
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of an instruction sheet and eight individual employee work 
cards. The instruction sheet, given to each participant, was presented on A4 paper and 
provided a set of instructions for the task along with an example.  
 
The set of employee work cards were of A5 size with participants instructed to inspect 
each card individually. The employee cards consisted of 2 controls in which no 
violation of the rule had occurred, 3 cards showing a violation of the rule for Day 1 
(incremented for 1,4, & 8 hours over-worked), and 3 cards for violations of Day 2 
(incremented for 1, 4, & 8 hours worked on what should have been a day off). For a 
copy of the instruction sheet and materials see Appendix A1 (Experiment 1: 
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Materials). 
 
Design 
A within-participants design was implemented. Two independent variables (IV’s) 
were manipulated, scale of violation and day on which violation occurred. Scale of 
violation comprised of three levels, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours over-worked. Day of 
violation comprised of two levels, Day 1 and Day 2. A control condition was also 
employed in which no violation had occurred. Participants completed all conditions of 
the experiment. The dependent variable was the fine allocated to an employee by the 
participant. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was undertaken in one sitting with participants presented with an 
instruction sheet and a set of 8 employee cards. Participants were asked to read the 
instructions carefully, follow the given example and to ask any questions, if 
necessary. 
 
The instructions primed the participant to imagine that they were a Personnel 
Manager working for a local ambulance service. The ambulance service was said to 
be concerned that some employees were working over their scheduled hours, 
therefore, a new rule had been introduced and it was their task as Personnel Manager 
to investigate if the new rule was being adhered to. The rule stated, If drivers work for 
more than 8 hours in a day, then they must take the next day off. An example 
Employee Work Record card was shown in which the rule had been violated; the 
employee had worked over their scheduled hours on Wednesday (Day 1) and should 
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have taken the following day off. Participants were instructed that employees must be 
fined if the rule is violated and, as the Personnel Manager, it is their responsibility to 
determine the fine from a given range. The fines were incremented as follows:  
 
 £0 (No fine), £20, £40, £80, £160, £320 (One weeks’ wages) 
 
The working rule was applied to eight employees, whose details were presented on 
individual employee cards. Two cards acted as the control condition in which no 
violation of the working rule had occurred. One of the control cards showed the 
employee having worked their scheduled hours (i.e. 8 hours per day) and the other 
showed an employee working over-hours on one day and taking the following day off, 
thus complying with the given rule. The control condition also indicated if the task 
had been understood by the participants as no fine should be applied. 
 
Two experimental conditions were employed involving violations of the working rule. 
A violation required that an employee must work for more than 8 hours on Day 1 and 
to work for any number of hours on Day 2. Thus, the conjunction of working over 8 
hours on Day 1 and working for at least 1 hour on Day 2 must be observed for a 
violation to have occurred; if only one of these conditions were met then no violation 
was said to have occurred. 
 
The first experimental condition comprised of 3 employee cards representing potential 
violations of the rule on Day 1. These cards were incremented for 1, 4 & 8 hours 
over-worked and showed the employee having worked 9, 12, & 16 hours, 
respectively. The following day the employee should have taken the day off but the 
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work record clearly stated that they had worked an 8-hour day. The number of hours 
over-worked were also shown on the employee work record and an asterisk indicated 
that an employee had worked on what should have been a day off, and thus a violation 
of the rule had occurred. The purpose of the asterisk was to highlight the occurrence 
of a violation and prevent the task from being too cognitively demanding for the 
participant. Henceforth, this experimental condition is labeled, Day 1, reflecting the 
scaled number of hours worked above the contractual 8 hours and the potential 
violation if the employee were to work on the subsequent day. 
 
A second experimental condition comprised of 3 employee cards representing  
violations for Day 2, incremented for 1, 4 & 8 hours worked on what should have 
been a day off. Each of these cards showed the employee had worked for 10 hours on 
Day 1 and should, therefore, have taken the following day off. However, the working 
rule was violated because the three employees worked 1, 4 & 8 hours, respectively on 
what should have been a day off. The number of hours over-worked (2 hours) were 
clearly shown on the employee work card and an asterisk indicated the employee was 
working on what should have been a day off. This experimental condition is 
henceforth labeled, Day 2, representing the scaled number of hours worked on Day 2 
and the fact that a violation has occurred due to the employee having worked over 8 
hours on the previous day. 
 
Participants were asked to indicate the rate of fine on each of the eight individual 
employee work records, including no fine (£0). No time limit was set for the task. 
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3.3 Results 
For raw data see Appendix B1 (Experiment 1: Raw Data). The control condition, in 
which no violation occurred, produced fines on only two occasions and was, 
therefore, excluded from the analysis. One participant attributed £0 (no fine) to all 
employee work records, however, this was deemed acceptable and the data was 
retained for analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the mean fines and standard deviations for the two experimental 
factors; scale of violation and day of violation. It can be observed that there is an 
increase in mean fine as scale of violation increases for both Day 1 and Day 2, with 
the effect being much greater for Day 1. There is some variation in the dispersion of 
fines as shown in the standard deviation (S.D.). This is particularly the case for the 
Day 1 condition where the S.D. for 8 hours worked over is extremely high, reflecting 
the spread in participant fines from £0 - £320. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Day 1 hours worked over  Day 2 hours worked over  
  1 hour    4 hours    8 hours  1 hour    4 hours    8 hours  
Mean     17       42           92     18          23             28 
S.D.     11.1       30           89.3     15.2       22.9          22.4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.1: Mean fine and standard deviation (S.D.) for violations of working rule 
over 1, 4 & 8 hours worked over on Day 1 and Day 2 
 
Statistical analysis was undertaken on the data using SPSS (version 15). A two-way 
(2x3) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test for statistical 
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significance. The principle of homogeneity of variance was shown to be violated due 
to the differences in the S.D. scores. Further, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant for the scale of violation factor and for the interaction, scale x day. 
Therefore, the Greenhouse-Geisser Epsilon correction for degrees of freedom was 
used for reporting purposes. 
 
As predicted a significant difference was found for scale of violation (F(1,24) = 
11.086, p = 0.004). A significant, but unpredicted, effect was observed for the day of 
violation (Day 1 v. Day 2) (F(1,12) = 11.327, p = 0.006) and a significant interaction 
effect (scale x day) was also found (F(1,24) = 6.156, p = 0.025). 
 
The interaction effect is illustrated in Fig. 3.1 (below). At 1 hour violation similar 
rates of fines are observed for both days, but whereas Day 2 shows a negligible 
increase over 4 and 8 hours, Day 1 produces sharp rises for 4 hours and 8 hours 
worked over. Hence, participants appear to view the potential violation on Day 1 as 
more serious than the subsequent hours worked over on Day 2 when an actual 
violation has occurred. 
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Figure 3.1: Interaction effect showing mean fines allocated to employees for 
working 1, 4 & 8 hours over for Day 1 (red) and Day 2 (green) 
 
3.4 Experiment 2: Rationale 
Experiment 1 established scale of violation as an influential pragmatic factor within a 
deontic context when a task is embedded in an inferential reasoning task. The aim of 
Experiment 2 is to investigate whether the findings can be transferred to a deductive 
reasoning task. 
 
Scale of violation requires a series of graded options to be presented to participants 
and the large array selection task (LAST) allows this. Manktelow et al. (1995) used 
this technique with an adapted version of Cheng & Holyoak’s (1985) ‘immigration 
rule’. The rule stated, “If a person has ENTERING on one side of their immigration 
form, then they must have CHOLERA on the reverse side”. Participants were cued to 
the role of an immigration officer and asked to detect violators of the rule. A 
probabilistic variable was incorporated by including information that cholera was 
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more prevalent in the tropics and by including the country of origin of each 
immigrant. Note that Manktelow et al.’s participants were specifically primed to the 
increased probability of cholera being brought into the country; no such prime was 
given in this experiment. 
 
The LAST, therefore, affords the opportunity to consider whether the findings from 
an inferential task are transferable to a deductive reasoning task and to compare any 
performance differences between the two forms of task. 
 
Three hypotheses were predicted for this experiment: 
1. Card selections will significantly differ between the Control condition and 
potential violation on Day 1. 
2. Card selections will significantly differ between the Control condition and 
potential violation on Day 2. 
3. Card selections will significantly differ between the potential violation on Day 
1 and the violation on Day 2. 
The third hypothesis was proposed due to the finding in Experiment 1 of participant’s 
perceived difference between the potential and actual violation of Day 1 and Day 2, 
respectively. 
 
3.5 Experiment 2: Method 
Participants 
Forty-two full-time students attending Stafford Further Education College acted as 
participants. The participants comprised of 10 males and 32 females with an age range 
of 16-28 years (median age 18 years). Participants were randomly allocated to one of 
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three conditions; control, violation over Day 1, and violation over Day 2. One 
participant from each condition declined to give their age. The control condition 
comprised of 12 participants (4 male and 8 female) with an age range of 17-18 years 
(median age 18 years). The Day 1 experimental condition consisted of 19 participants 
(6 male and 13 female) with an age range of 16-20 years (median age 17 years). The 
Day 2 experimental condition comprised of 11 female participants with an age range 
of 17-28 years (median age 18 years). 
 
Materials 
The materials consisted of an instruction sheet and three large array selection tasks 
(LAST’s). The three large arrays included; a control array comprising non-
incremental cards; an experimental array consisting of graded p cards i.e. hours 
worked over on Day 1; an experimental array showing graded not-q cards i.e. hours 
worked over on Day 2. To view a copy of the instruction sheet and materials see 
Appendix A2 (Experiment 2: Materials). 
 
The instruction sheet primed the participant to the role of Personnel Manager with a 
local ambulance service, as in the previous experiment. The rule to be investigated 
stated, If drivers work for more than 8 hours on a Friday, then they must take 
Saturday as a day off. An example Employee Work Record was given, showing an 
employee having worked for 9 hours on a Friday and having taken the following day, 
Saturday, as a day off. The participant was instructed that their task was to inspect a 
set of Employee Work Records and to indicate, by placing a tick in the box placed 
below the employee record, if they wished to turn the employee card. The placing of a 
tick indicated a potential violation of the working rule. 
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The control group received an array consisting of 12 none graded employee work 
record cards. Three cards (the p cards) showed an employee having worked on Friday 
for 10 hours; three cards showed employees working Friday for 7 hours (the ¬p 
cards); a set of three cards showed employees taking Saturday as a day off (the q 
cards); and three cards represented employees working for 8 hours on Saturday (the 
¬q cards). 
 
The experimental condition 1 group had an array in which the hours worked varied 
over Day 1 (Friday). A set of 12 employee work records were displayed with the p 
cards showing three employees having worked 10, 12 & 16 hours on day 1 (Friday) 
and the ¬p cards stating three employees had worked 4, 5 & 7 hours on Friday. The 
three q cards displayed the employees as having taken Day 2 (Saturday) as a day off, 
and the ¬q cards showed three employees working for 8 hours. 
 
The array for experimental condition 2 comprised of 12 employee work records with 
graded hours worked on Day 2 (Saturday). The p cards showed the employees having 
worked for 10 hours on Day 1 (Friday) and the ¬p cards the employees working for 7 
hours on Day 1. The three q cards stated the employees had taken Day 2 (Saturday) as 
a day off and the ¬q cards showed three employees having worked for 2, 5, & 8 hours 
on Day 2. 
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A summary of the cards presented in each array of the three conditions is given 
below: 
Control Condition (none graded p or ¬q cards) 
   p cards  3 x 10 hours* 
   not-p cards 3 x 7 hours 
   q cards  3 x DAY OFF 
   not-q cards 3 x 8 hours* 
 
Experimental Condition 1 (graded p cards) 
   p cards  10, 12 & 16 hours * 
   not-p cards 4, 5  & 7 hours 
   q cards  3 x DAY OFF 
   not-q cards 3 x 8 hours * 
 
Experimental Condition 2 (graded ¬q cards) 
   p cards  3 x 10 hours * 
   not-p cards 3 x 7 hours 
   q cards  3 x DAY OFF 
   not-q cards 2, 5 & 8 hours * 
 
NOTE: * denotes potential violation of rule and, therefore, correct card selections; 
 
Design   
A between-participants design was employed with each of three conditions tested on a 
separate group of participants. A control group judged a set of non-incremental 
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employee work cards while two experimental groups of participants considered 
potentially violating employee cards. Experimental group 1 judged a set of 
incremental p cards representing three levels of a potential violation on Day 1 (10, 12 
& 16 hours worked on Day 1). Experimental group 2 judged a set of graded q cards 
representing three levels of potential violation (2, 5 & 8 hours worked on a Day 2). 
Hence, two independent variables (I.V.’s) were employed; graded p cards and graded 
q cards, representing potential violations for Day 1 and Day 2, respectively. The 
dependent variable was the selection of a card(s) by the participant, indicating a 
potential violation of the working rule. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups with each of the three conditions tested separately. 
Each participant received an instruction sheet and an array of 12 employee work 
record cards, both presented on A4 paper. Participants were asked to read the 
instructions and time was made available for questions and clarification, if required. 
As Personnel Manager it was the participant’s task to inspect the array of Employee 
Work Record cards to ensure that a given working rule had not been transgressed. 
Only one side of each employee work record was visible and, therefore, the 
participant’s task was to select those cards were they believed a potential breach of 
the rule may have occurred. 
 
The normative solution to the selection task and the LAST is the selection of the p and 
¬q cards and this is what was deemed correct in this instance, as these represented 
potential violations of the working rule. However, all card selections for each 
participant were recorded to allow a comparison across the three separate conditions. 
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3.6 Results 
For raw data illustrating the individual card selections of each participant see 
Appendix B2 (Experiment 2: Raw Data).  
 
Table 3.2 shows the percentage of card selections for each of the three conditions of 
Experiment 2. The percentages were derived by adding the number of card selections 
made by participants and dividing by the possible total number of cards. For example, 
for the control condition a total of 33 p-cards were selected by participants from a 
possible overall total of 36 (i.e. 12 participants x 3 cards). With unequal participant 
numbers across conditions, frequencies of card selections were not a feasible form of 
analysis. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         p card*         ¬p card        q card        ¬q card* 
Control        92                6                   58            58 
Day 1   88                0                   44            56 
Day 2             94                      0                   27            61  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3.2: Percentage card selections for each of the three conditions of 
Experiment 2; * denotes correct card choices 
 
The p card was the most selected card for all three conditions and the not-p card the 
least selected card. This finding is consistent with the majority of selection task 
observations. The not-q card, also considered a correct choice, was selected to a lesser 
degree but equally chosen was the q card. The incremental p cards (Day 1) show 
similar card selections to the baseline group but with the q card selected slightly less. 
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Day 2, which contained incremental not-q cards, produced the highest percentage 
rates of card selections for the p and not-q cards. However, the q card was selected 
less frequently.  
 
A series of complex Chi-square tests were conducted to compare card selections 
between the three conditions. Calculations were made using the Chi-square Calculator 
software (see Appendix D2 Experiment 2: Chi-square output). For Control x Day 1 x 
Day 2 a significant difference in card selections was found (X² = 20.74, df = 6, p < 
0.01). Further analysis revealed a significant difference between the Control and Day 
2 conditions (X² = 14.91, df = 3, p < 0.01). However, non-significant findings were 
observed for Control x Day 1 (X² = 6.39, df = 3, p = 0.10) and for Day 1 x Day 2 (X² 
= 4.39, df = 2, p = 0.20). 
 
These findings support the hypothesis that card selections will significantly differ 
between the Control condition and scale of violation on Day 2. However, the other 
hypotheses comparing the Control condition with scale of violation on Day 1 is not 
supported. Further, the observation of a perceived difference between potential 
violations on Day 1 and Day 2 in Experiment 1 was not repeated in this study. 
 
3.7 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 appear to suggest that participants’ judgments of 
violation are primarily influenced by the initial rule-breaking and by the scale of 
violation, but not by the scale of the subsequent violation. That is, working over the 
specified hours on Day 1 is judged an offence and the greater the violation the more 
serious the offence. However, the scale to which the rule is abused on the following 
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day (Day 2) is not judged as such a serious infringement. This was an unexpected 
finding and one that has not been reported in the literature before, indicating that 
human reasoning with violations is more complex than hitherto realised. 
 
The interaction effect shown in Figure 3.1 is of particular interest because it clearly 
shows the seriousness of the working rule transgression is judged to be the hours 
worked over on Day 1; the number of hours worked on Day 2, a day of rest, has a 
negligible effect on the perceived violation. This is surprising because a violation of 
the rule requires both overworked hours on Day 1 and hours worked on Day 2 and 
one might expect greater sensitivity to the numbers of hours worked on what should 
have been a day off (i.e. Day 2). A possible explanation for the increased fine 
observed in the Day 1 condition could be a primacy effect as discussed below. 
Alternatively, the understanding and interpretation of rules and their transgression 
may be a factor. This would suggest the cognitive processing of rules and violations is 
important, a view considered by Dominowski (1995) in relation to findings with the 
Wason selection task. A more complete understanding of this unpredicted finding 
would require a systematic investigation of the processes involved in the 
comprehension of everyday rules. 
 
For Experiment 2 only one significant result was obtained; scale of violation does not 
appear to influence card selections on a large array selection task. As the correct cards 
(p & not-q) tended to be selected by the majority of participants across conditions, it 
could be that the task is just too simple or else it omits an important element in 
studying judgmental behaviour. Alternatively, participants may be ignoring the 
subsequent violation i.e. the q and not-q cards because such a violation seems 
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unlikely, especially in the case of the employee working for 16 hours on day one, 
where it may seem highly improbable that the employee would arrive for work the 
following day. Such a view has some support from the finding that the p card is 
selected more frequently than both the q and not-q cards across all three conditions. If 
this suggestion has merit it could be compared to Kirby's (1994) finding that age 
determines the probability of an individual being checked for drinking alcohol and 
could suggest scale of violation is also a probabilistic factor in reasoning. 
 
Studies of deontic reasoning have relied on a number of manipulations and the 
experiments conducted here are no exception. A ubiquitous factor in thematic 
versions of the selection task that consistently elicits logical card selections is role 
playing. A wide range of roles have been used including, an anthropologist 
(Cosmides, 1989), mother and son (Manktelow & Over,1991), customs officer 
(Manktelow et al.,1995) and doorman (Kirby,1994). Perspective is a further factor 
that has been found to facilitate card selections, for example, Manktelow & Over 
(1991) used a mother and son scenario, and Gigerenzer & Hug (1992) used a variety 
of bilateral perspectives, including employee-employer within the ‘day off’ rule. Even 
deontic tasks with children have tended to include perspective and role-playing in the 
experimental situation (eg. Cummins, 1996a, 1996b; Girotto, Light & Colbourn, 
1988; Light, Girotto & Legrenzi, 1990). 
 
Participants in these experiments were cued to the role of a personnel manager but the 
bilateral perspectives of employee - employer were not investigated. Manktelow & 
Over’s (1991) notion of utility can be applied to the findings obtained in Experiment 
1. From the perspective of the personnel manager it is to their benefit to identify 
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violators; indeed in this instance it is one of their key roles. What is not made explicit 
in the working hour scenario is the benefit to the employee of working over hours on 
what should be a day off. From ones knowledge of working practices participants may 
have assumed that working over hours would result in the payment of overtime or that 
it was a genuine act of good will. Therefore, although one can ascribe benefits to each 
party, bilateral utilities are not made fully transparent in this particular context. 
 
Comparing Experiment 2 and Manktelow et al.’s LAST study there is a further 
noticeable difference in the instruction given to participants. Manktelow et al. cued 
participants to the high probability of cholera as a tropical disease. No such cue was 
used in this research which may contribute to the different findings with the LAST. 
There is also Evans’ (2002) view that the deductive paradigm may not be appropriate 
when dealing with particularly realistic content, as is the case here. 
 
As stated, Experiment 1 produces an unexpected finding in that scale of violation over 
Day 1 produced significantly greater fines than comparable violations over Day 2. 
There is no known theoretical reason for such a finding. One may speculate that what 
is being observed is a primacy effect, which has been investigated extensively in 
several areas of psychological literature. Within the field of impression formation, 
arguably the most researched in relation to this effect, three prime theories have been 
proposed to explain the prevalence of the primacy effect. N.H. Anderson (1974) has 
suggested attention decrement, that is, individuals attend to the initial information but 
fail to attend to subsequent information. This may apply here as participants are cued 
by the rule to the potential violation on Day 1. Alternative theories of the primacy 
effect include those of Asch (1946) who proposed that subsequent information is 
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made consistent with the primacy information and the suggestion of Luchins (1957) 
that recency information is discounted or dismissed. These latter two theories require 
participants to attend to the most recent material and we may expect discrimination in 
the levying of fines if attention was given to the violations over Day 1 and Day 2. 
Consideration of the findings in terms of a primacy effect, suggest that the hitherto 
unassociated areas of human reasoning and social cognition are not as mutually 
exclusive as the research literature would imply. 
 
In summary, scale of violation may be considered a further probabilistic variable, 
similar to the way in which Kirby (1994) uses age in the drinking-age rule and 
Manktelow et al. (1995) use country of origin within the immigration rule. However, 
a contrasting finding between the two experiments reported here was that the effect of 
scale of violation was only observed in the inferential task, and not when embedded 
within a LAST. A possible explanation for the non-significant findings with the 
LAST, a deductive reasoning task, is that participants may quite easily identify 
violators. However, to discern how the individual discriminates and reasons with 
scaled violations in more realistic, deontic contexts one must employ an inferential 
reasoning task. 
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Chapter 4 
Scale of Violation and Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances as Pragmatic 
Factors of Deontic Reasoning 
 
4.1 Experiment 3: Rationale 
The previous chapter found scale of violation to influence judgments made with a 
working hour rule when embedded within an inferential reasoning task. It seems 
reasonable to propose that scale of violation is a general pragmatic factor, applicable 
to a range of deontic contexts, and having varying effects on ones reasoning and 
decision-making. Amongst the best examples of deontic rules are transgressions of the 
law, such as motoring offences.  
 
Studies of deontic reasoning manipulate violations in various ways in order to test 
statements of permission and obligation. Most often a deontic task involves checking 
for violators (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 1989; Manktelow & Over, 1991). 
Other manipulations are possible, for instance, Kirby (1994) used scaled violation 
within a drinking rule context, however, this study involved only the potential of 
violation; for example, that a 19 year old may be drinking alcohol when the rule 
specifies that a person must be over 21 years old. Surprisingly, direct manipulations 
of scale of violation have not been reported in the literature. The experiments reported 
in this chapter use realistic transgressions, motoring offences, in which scale of 
violation is explicitly manipulated. 
 
In addition to the transgression itself, is the circumstances surrounding the violation, 
in particular mitigating and aggravating circumstances which are permissible as 
evidence in the court of law. It is expected that some circumstances will mitigate the 
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seriousness of a transgression, while others will increase the seriousness and 
associated penalties. There is evidence from the deductive reasoning literature 
showing how logically drawn conclusions can be suppressed when additional 
premises are provided (Byrne, 1989). Byrne used a familiar, everyday context 
(studying in a library) and one would expect that similar findings would be achieved 
with the use of violations presented within an inferential reasoning task. 
 
A number of experiments have demonstrated the non-monotonicity and defeasibility 
of conditional reasoning when alternative causes and disabling conditions (Cummins, 
1995; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Fairley & Manktelow, 1997; Fairley, 
Manktelow, & Over, 1999) are provided. According to truth-functional logic, if the 
premises of a conditional argument are true then the entailed conclusion must 
logically follow, that is, conditional reasoning is non-monotonic. Also, further 
information in the form of an additional premise cannot alter the valid conclusion, that 
is, the valid conclusion of a conditional is not defeasible. However, there is strong 
empirical evidence for the defeasibility of logically valid conclusions as shown by the 
work of Byrne (1989) and Stevenson & Over (1995). 
 
Cummins (1995) and Cummins et al. (1991) have investigated cases that influence 
deductions made in the process of causal reasoning, which they call, alternative 
causes and disabling conditions. Alternative causes are defined as, “a cause (other 
than the one cited in the causal rule under consideration) that is capable of evoking 
the effect cited in the rule” (Cummins, 1995, p.647). Similarly, a disabling condition 
is, “an event that could prevent an effect from occurring in the presence of a viable 
cause” (Cummins, 1995, p.647). 
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 Using causal rules presented in conditional, if …then, form, Cummins and colleagues 
set their participants two tasks: a generation task and a reasoning task. The generation 
task required the generation of alternative causes and disabling conditions for given 
causal conditional statements. For example, Cummins et al. (1991) used the following 
statements and asked participants to generate possible alternative causes: 
 
 Rule: If Joyce eats candy often, then she will have cavities 
 
 Fact: Joyce has cavities, but she does not eat candy often 
 
Write down as many circumstances as you can that could make this situation 
possible 
 
A second group were given a similar rule and asked to generate disabling conditions: 
 
 Rule: If Joyce eats candy often, then she will have cavities 
 
 Fact: Joyce eats candy often, but she does not have cavities 
 
Write down as many circumstances as you can that could make this situation 
possible 
 
It was predicted that some contexts involving causal conditional rules would afford a 
greater generation of alternative causes and disabling conditions than others. For 
instance, the examples given above should allow participants to generate alternative 
causes contributing to Joyce having cavities without eating candy, and reasons 
(disabling conditions) why Joyce may eat candy often but not have cavities. However, 
it may not be so easy to generate alternative causes and disabling conditions with 
other causal contexts. For instance, Cummins et al. (1991) cite the example, “If my 
finger is cut, then it bleeds”. In this case it would be difficult to generate disabling 
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conditions where one’s finger does not bleed when it is cut or alternative causes 
where one’s finger is bleeding without being cut. 
 
The findings of the generation task supported the hypothesis that context does indeed 
influence the number of alternative causes and disabling conditions that may be 
devised for causal conditional arguments. 
 
The reasoning task asked participants to consider a sample of causal arguments taken 
from the generation task and to determine an acceptance rating for the conclusion of 
the argument. The materials were selected on the basis of there having been many or 
few alternative causes and disabling conditions afforded to the conditional arguments 
during the generation task. Conditional arguments were then created using the four 
traditional forms of argument; Modus Ponens (MP), Modus Tollens (MT), 
Affirmation of the Consequent (AC), & Denial of the Antecedent (DA). As 
hypothesized, MP and MT arguments were more likely to be accepted as true if they 
were associated with few disabling conditions; that is, fewer counter examples could 
be generated to explain the causal rule. The fallacies (AC & DA) were only 
influenced by alternative causes; few alternative causes lead to greater acceptance of 
the given argument and many alternative causes increased the likelihood of rejection 
of the argument. Cummins (1995) was able to demonstrate the same effect with 
reversal causal arguments. Typically, causal arguments would be presented in the 
form of cause followed by effect: Cummins reversed this relationship (effect followed 
by cause) and observed a reversal of the results: MP & MT arguments were 
influenced by the number of alternative causes and AC & DA arguments were 
influenced by the number of disabling conditions. 
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 The studies of Cummins and colleagues demonstrate that with causal conditional 
arguments participants generate varying numbers of alternative causes and disabling 
conditions depending on the given context and furthermore, the acceptance or 
rejection of logical conclusions is dependent on the number of such causes and 
conditions. 
 
Fairley, Manktelow & Over (1999) developed Cummins’ work in three key ways: 
alternative causes and disabling conditions were applied to deontic contexts, 
additional requirements were included as a further potential modifying factor of 
causal reasoning, and materials were presented in the form of a either a Wason 
selection task or a large array selection task (LAST). The conditional precaution, “If 
you wear rubber gloves, you may clear up spilt blood” has been used effectively in a 
number of experiments investigating deontic reasoning (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; 
Manktelow & Over, 1990). Fairley et al. used a variation of this rule, “If you wear 
rubber gloves, you are protected from infection”, and embedded it in scenarios 
concerning hospitals. Participants were primed to either an alternative cause (effective 
antiseptics now exist reducing the need for wearing rubber gloves) or an additional 
requirement (protective overalls are required in addition to rubber gloves) and shown 
four card choices, representing the p, not-p, q, & not-q options of the precautionary 
rule. The modal card choices corresponded to the prediction that alternative causes 
would result in the greater selection of the not-p and q cards, while additional 
requirements would increase the selection of the p and not-q cards. This finding was 
shown with causal reasoning, however, as pointed out by Fairley et al. the card 
selections follow those of the so-called perspective effect observed in deontic 
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reasoning (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Fairley et al.’s interpretation of the findings 
were that alternative causes question the necessity of wearing rubber gloves, while 
additional requirements, act in a similar way to disabling conditions, by questioning 
the sufficiency of wearing rubber gloves. 
 
In a second experiment a LAST was used allowing for much stronger predictions. Not 
only would the alternative causes condition expect greater incidences of not-p and q 
card selections but also the card showing the alternative cause should be preferentially 
selected. Similarly with disabling conditions (Experiment 2 incorporated disabling 
conditions rather than additional requirements), the p and not-q cards were predicted 
to be the most frequently selected cards and the card naming the specific disabling 
condition was also predicted to be preferentially chosen. The predictions were 
supported using a novel conditional statement, “If you study hard, then you do well on 
tests” (the alternative cause stated, “You think that test can be unfair, because some 
students cheat when they take them”; the disabling condition stated, “You think that 
tests can be unfair, because some students feel terribly nervous when they take 
them”). 
 
Both Cummins et al. and Fairley et al. explain their findings in terms of sufficiency 
and necessity and although they disagree on the finer points of their respective 
theories (see Fairley & Manktelow’s, 1997 comments and Cummins’, 1997 reply) 
they are agreed that alternative causes affect the acceptance of an inference in terms 
of the necessity of a cause-effect relationship, whereas disabling conditions affect the 
inferences drawn in terms of the sufficiency of a causal relationship. 
 
 85
There is, therefore, strong evidence for the influence of alternative causes, disabling 
conditions, and additional requirements in deontic as well as causal contexts. Given 
these findings we might expect that aggravating and mitigating circumstances would 
also evoke an influence on conditional reasoning, particularly in the deontic domain. 
A general statement regarding the law may be stated in the following conditional 
argument, “If you commit a transgression of the law, then you are liable to a fine”. 
Aggravating circumstances would be predicted to increase the probability of the 
consequent coming true if the antecedent is true. Mitigating circumstances, however, 
would be expected to lower the probability of the consequent coming true if the 
conditions of the antecedent were met. There is strong evidence for doubtful premises 
and conclusions to be considered in probabilistic terms (George, 1995, 1997; 
Stevenson & Over, 1995). 
 
Two experiments were conducted using the context of motoring offences. The 
motoring offences of speeding and drink-driving were chosen because they are 
transgressions that would be familiar to most adults. The first experiment (Experiment 
3) involved participants considering the seriousness of either the speeding or drink-
driving offence when the circumstances, classified as mitigating, aggravating or 
neutral, were embedded. It was predicted that a significant difference would be 
observed in the ratings of seriousness between the type of circumstances for both the 
speeding and drink-driving violations. One may also expect the two offences, 
speeding and drink-driving, to be perceived quite differently. Therefore, a second 
hypothesis predicted a difference in the ratings between the two motoring 
transgressions. In the second experiment (Experiment 4) participants judged whether 
a motorist should, ought or must be fined given the transgression and the 
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accompanying circumstances. 
 
The following hypotheses were predicted for Experiment 3: 
1. A significant difference will be found between the circumstances (mitigating, 
neutral, and aggravating) surrounding the motor transgressions of speeding 
and drink-driving. 
2. A significant difference will be found between ratings of seriousness for the 
motoring offences of speeding and drink-driving.  
 
4.2 Experiment 3: Method 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduate students attending the University of Wolverhampton acted as 
participants. No details regards age, gender or demography were taken. Ten 
participants rated the seriousness of a speeding car driver while considering a set of 
circumstances. A further 10 participants rated the same set of circumstances but 
considered a car driver under the influence of alcohol. 
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of two A4 size booklets; one booklet related to a car driver 
driving above the legal speed limit and the other described a driver driving whilst over 
the legal limit of alcohol. 
 
The first page of the booklet provided standardized instructions for the task. The 
instruction was given to judge the seriousness of a motoring offence (either speeding 
or drink-driving) while considering additional circumstances. Seriousness was rated 
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on a scale of 1-10; 1 representing “not at all serious” and 10 “very serious”. An 
example of the motoring transgression was given along with an additional 
circumstance, that the driver was “late for an important sales meeting”. To avoid 
influencing participant ratings and suggesting socially desirable responses, two 
potential choices were shown; a response of 2 (classified as “not serious”) and 9 
(classified as “very serious”). 
 
The following pages of the booklet consisted of 36 circumstances that had been 
classified, prior to experimentation, as mitigating, neutral, or aggravating. The task for 
the participant was to rate the seriousness of driving above the legal limit or above the 
legal limit of alcohol under each of the 36 circumstances. See Appendix A3 
(Experiment 3: Materials) for copies of the two booklets used in this experiment. 
 
Design 
A mixed experimental design was employed in which offence was a between-
participants factor and circumstances a within-participants factor. Two levels of the 
transgression factor were used; speeding and drink-driving. The circumstances factor 
had three levels; mitigating, neutral and aggravating. The type of offence and set of 
circumstances acted as independent variables (I.V.’s) and the participants rating of 
seriousness acted as the dependent variable (D.V.). 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was undertaken in one sitting with 10 participants rating the speeding 
offence and a further 10 participants completing the drink-driving transgression. After 
reading the standardised instructions on the front of the booklet participants were 
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given the opportunity to ask questions in order to clarify the task. Each of the 36 
circumstances was rated by each participant with no time limit set for the task. 
 
The circumstances were classified under three headings prior to experimentation. 
Mitigating circumstances are situations that are expected to reduce the seriousness of 
an offence; neutral circumstances are considered unrelated to the transgression and, 
therefore, should have little or no impact on the rating of seriousness; and aggravating 
circumstances are expected to exacerbate an offence, thus increasing the culpability of 
the offender. While devising the circumstances consideration was given to a number 
of associated factors, such as driving conditions (e.g. visibility, conditions of road), 
time of day (e.g. 2am or 5pm, peak hour), situational factors (e.g. celebration, 
birthday), lateness (for work or aeroplane), characteristics associated with the driver 
(e.g. experienced or joy rider), and other circumstances (e.g. previous convictions or 
no previous convictions). Twelve circumstances were classified as mitigating, 12 as 
neutral and 12 as aggravating, providing a total of 36 circumstances. The 
circumstances were presented in a random order within each of the two booklets to 
avoid participants identifying the nature of the experiment. See Appendix A3 
(Experiment 3: Materials) to view the order of the circumstances as presented to 
participants in the booklets and Appendix B3 (Experiment 3: Raw Data) for a 
classification of the circumstances. 
 
Participants rated seriousness on a scale of 1-10 where 1 was described as “not at all 
serious” and 10 “very serious”. The rating acted as the score for that particular 
circumstance given the motoring offence. 
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4.3 Experiment 3: Results 
For raw data see Appendix B3 (Experiment 3: Raw Data). The task was completed 
satisfactorily by all participants and, therefore, all data was used in the analysis. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the mean total ratings of seriousness and standard deviations 
obtained for the two motoring offences and the three types of circumstance. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 OFFENCE   CIRCUMSTANCE 
    Mitigating Neutral Aggravating 
 Speeding  5.84 (1.44) 7.08 (1.38) 8.98 (0.81) 
 Drink-driving  9.00 (0.78) 9.44 (0.74) 9.67 (0.60) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4.1: Mean seriousness ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) for 
two motoring offences (speeding & drink-driving) across three conditions of 
circumstance (mitigating, neutral & aggravating) 
 
An increase in the mean total ratings for the speeding offence across mitigating, 
neutral and aggravating circumstances is observed, while the drink-driving offence, 
although also showing a linear increase, derives higher mean ratings which only 
slightly increment across type of circumstance. The drink-driving offence shows 
lower standard deviations across all types of circumstance compared to the speeding 
offence suggesting less variation in ratings of seriousness. In general, there is strong 
agreement amongst participants in their ratings of seriousness given the offence and 
accompanying circumstances. 
 
A two-way (2 x 3) mixed ANOVA was used to statistically test the hypotheses (data 
analysis was undertaken using SPSS version 15). As predicted a significant effect was 
observed for circumstances (F (2,36) = 91.427, p < 0.001) and for violation  
(F (1,18) = 24.121, p < 0.001). A significant interaction between circumstances and 
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violation was also found (F (2,36) = 39.829, p < 0.001). 
 
For descriptive statistics (see Appendix C3 Experiment 3: Descriptive Statistics) and 
for the SPSS output (see Appendix D3 Experiment 3: SPSS Output). 
 
4.4 Experiment 4: Rationale 
Experiment 3 has shown a significant difference in the ratings of seriousness across 
three types of circumstance for two motoring transgressions. The following 
experiment employed an inference task in which participants were presented with the 
scale of a motoring violation and the circumstances, either aggravating or mitigating, 
associated with the transgression. The number of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances were reduced to eight each with the neutral circumstances excluded. 
The task for the participant was to judge whether the motorist committing the 
violation should be fined. The judgement was made following the presentation of all 
relevant information, that is, end-of-series (eos) (cf. Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Three 
predictions were made for the speeding and drink-driving violations: A major offence 
would lead to greater levels of fine compared to a minor offence and aggravating 
circumstances would lead to greater rates of fine than mitigating circumstances. Given 
the observed difference between the two motoring violations in Experiment 3 it was 
further predicted that drink-driving would be awarded significantly greater fines than 
the speeding transgression. Formally, the hypotheses can be stated thus: 
1. A major offence will receive significantly higher fines than a minor offence 
for both speeding and drink-driving. 
2. Aggravating circumstances will receive significantly higher fines than 
mitigating circumstances for both speeding and drink-driving violations. 
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3. An offence of drink-driving will receive significantly higher fines than that of 
speeding. 
 
4.5 Experiment 4: Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduate students attending the University of Wolverhampton acted as 
participants. In total 36 females and 21 males participated with three individuals 
declining to give their gender. The age range was 18-50+ years (median 22 years) 
with three participants declining to give their age and one participant describing their 
age as 50+. 
 
Each participant was assigned to one of six experimental conditions with a total of 10 
participants per condition. The first condition was a control condition involving a 
speeding violation and 5 females and 4 males participated. Their ages ranged from 19-
33 years (median age 28 years) with one participant declining to give their gender or 
age. The second condition involved a minor speeding offence and comprised of 5 
females and 4 males wit an age range of 18-31 years (median age 21 years). One 
participant did not provide details of gender or age. Condition three involved a major 
speeding violation and had 4 females and 6 males as participants, with an age range of 
19-39 years (median age 22 years). The fourth condition was a control for a drink-
drive violation and had 9 female participants with an age range of 18-42 years 
(median 19 years). One participant failed to provide details of gender or age. A minor 
drink-driving offence acted as the fifth condition which included 9 female participants 
and 1 male participant. Their age range was 18-37 years (median 23.5 years). The 
final condition consisted of a major drink-driving offence and included 4 female and 6 
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male participants with an age range of 20-50+ years (median 24.5 years). 
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of six separate booklets, one for each of the four 
experimental conditions and two control conditions. The booklets were of A4 size and 
included an instruction sheet with an example of the task. The example was similar 
for all conditions, except the offence related to either speeding or drink-driving. The 
example for speeding will suffice to illustrate the given example: 
 
STATEMENTS 
1. If a car driver travels above the legal speed limit and is stopped by the police, 
then s/he is liable to a fine. 
2. A car driver travels above the legal speed limit and is stopped by the police. 
3. The driver is traveling down a narrow lane. 
 
The following page comprised of a given statement regards either a speeding or drink-
driving offence to which the participant was required to respond. Subsequent pages 
comprised of the same motoring transgression but also included an additional 
circumstance. Eight mitigating and eight aggravating circumstances were employed 
and it was the task of the participant to judge whether the motorist should be fined 
given the offence and the circumstance. The judgement was made using a nine point 
scale with all 16 circumstances requiring a response. 
 
For the control conditions it was stated that the driver travels above the legal limit 
(30mph) or has drunk above the legal limit (2.5 pints) but the specific speed or 
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amount drunk is not given. However, for the minor and major conditions the actual 
speed and amount of alcohol consumed was specified. For the minor speeding 
violation the driver was stated as traveling at 35mph in a 30mph zone. The equivalent 
minor drink-driving offence specified that the driver had drunk 2.5 pints of alcohol, 
when the legal limit is 2 pints. The corresponding major offences had the driver 
traveling at 60mph for the speeding violation and having drunk 5 pints for the drink-
driving transgression.  
 
The circumstances used in the experiment are listed below: 
 Mitigating   Aggravating 
 Late for plane   Late for party 
 Experienced driver  15 year-old joy-rider 
 No convictions  Disqualified 
 2 am    5 pm 
 Visibility good  Visibility poor 
 Road empty   Rain & fog 
 Doctor on-call   Driver in accident 
 Wife in labour   Teacher 
 
See Appendix A4 (Experiment 4: Materials) for a copy of the booklets used in each of 
the six conditions. 
 
Design 
A mixed experimental design was employed comprising of three factors; type of 
violation, scale of violation, and circumstances. Type of violation was a between-
participants factor with two levels (speeding and drink-driving); scale of violation was 
also a between-participants factor and had three levels (minor, major, and control); 
circumstances was a within-participants factor with three levels (mitigating, 
aggravating and baseline). Three independent variables (I.V.’s) were manipulated, 
type of violation, scale of violation, and additional circumstances. The dependent 
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variable (D.V.) was the rating of whether the driver should be fined selected from a 9-
point scale. 
 
Procedure 
A total of 60 participants were tested in small groups or individually with 10 
participants recruited for each of the six conditions. Each participant received one of 
the six booklets at random and was asked to read the instruction sheet. The 
opportunity was given for participants to ask questions in order to clarify the nature of 
the task. 
 
The initial response was for participants to rate whether the offence (speeding or 
drink-driving) should result in a fine, prior to the introduction of mitigating or 
aggravating circumstances. This response acted as the baseline condition for the 
circumstances factor, allowing for a comparison with the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances.  
 
Each participant considered only one type of offence (speeding or drink-driving) and 
only one level of scale of violation (minor, major, or control) but rated the 
transgression in terms of all 16 additional circumstances. 
 
Participants made their judgements using a 9-point scale. Responses were made by 
ticking a box beside the response option. More than one response was acceptable, 
however, participants were requested to indicate their order of preference by 
numbering their responses (1 = first, 2 = second etc.). 
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The list of options as presented in the materials is shown below: 
 (i) the driver should be fined 
 (ii) the driver ought to be fined 
 (iii) the driver may be fined 
 (iv) the driver must be fined 
 (v) the driver should not be fined 
 (vi) the driver ought not be fined 
 (vii) the driver may not be fined 
 (viii) the driver must not be fined 
 (ix) none of the above 
 
If option (ix) none of the above was chosen, the participant was asked to provide an 
explanation. No time limit was set to complete the booklet. 
 
The scoring of the responses was as follows, with the participants first choice taken as 
their score when more than one response was selected: 
 Response    Score 
 the driver must be fined  2  
 the driver should be fined  3 
 the driver ought to be fined  4 
 the driver may be fined  5 
 the driver may not be fined  6 
 the driver ought not be fined  7 
 the driver should not be fined  8 
 the driver must not be fined  9 
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 none of the above   Penalty > fine 1; Penalty < fine 10 
 
The list of responses in the materials differed from the scoring scale to avoid leading 
the participant to a particular judgement and to avoid a response bias. For those 
responses of none of the above, the explanation was considered; a score of 1 was 
assigned if the statement suggested the driver should be more than fined (e.g. a 
number of participants proposed a custodial sentence) and for those statements 
indicating something less than a fine a score of 10 was given (e.g. a police escort was 
proposed by more than one participant). If a suggested penalty did not fit the scoring 
system a value of zero (0) was assigned, which occurred with 8 responses in the 
overall data set. 
 
4.6 Experiment 4: Results 
For raw data see Appendix B4 (Experiment 4: Raw Data). All participants completed 
the task satisfactorily and all data was included for analysis except for the eight 
occasions when the explanation given could not be scored. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the mean and standard deviation scores for the two motoring 
violations across, mitigating, aggravating, and baseline circumstances and minor, 
major and control conditions. There are several noticeable findings; major offence is 
judged more serious than a minor offence across all conditions; the control conditions 
in which the scale of violation is not specified tend to fall between the major and 
minor conditions, however, this is not consistent; the baseline conditions in which 
circumstances are not included consistently score between mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, as shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the only exception being the drink-
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driving condition with a major offence. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    BASELINE (no circumstances) 
    Control Minor  Major 
      Offence Offence 
 Drink-driving  3.2 (1.69) 2.9 (1.29) 2.8 (2.30) 
 
 Speeding  3.63 (1.16) 5.4 (1.78) 3.6 (1.17) 
 
 
    MITIGATING CICUMSTANCES 
    Control Minor  Major 
      Offence Offence 
 Drink-driving  3.8 (1.96) 3.5 (0.90) 2.4 (1.21) 
 
 Speeding  5.1 (1.03) 6.0 (1.44) 4.9 (1.55) 
 
    AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
    Control Minor  Major 
      Offence Offence 
 Drink-driving  2.5 (1.09) 2.6 (0.77) 1.8 (0.83) 
 
 Speeding  3.0 (0.68) 4.1 (0.93) 2.7 (0.65) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4.2: The mean scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the two 
motoring offences, Drink-driving & Speeding, across violation (control, minor 
offence & major offence) and circumstance (baseline, mitigating & aggravating). 
The scores show ratings of seriousness; the lower the score the more serious the 
offence is considered 
 
The drink-driving offence with aggravating circumstances is considered the most 
serious, as observed by the lowest score. That is, on average participants believe the 
motorist must or should be fined. Mitigation with a drink-driving offence is observed 
to a degree; participants believe the motorist should or ought to be fined in the control 
and minor offence conditions. Mitigation does not, however, occur with the major 
offence. Baseline ratings, where no circumstances are given, tend to fall between 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, with participants suggesting the drink-
driving motorist should be fined and the speeding motorist ought to or may be fined. 
The speeding offence is considered more serious when coupled with aggravating 
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circumstances; participants believing the motorist should or ought to be fined. A 
speeding offence with mitigating circumstances is considered the least serious of all 
presented offences with participants proposing the motorist may or may not be fined. 
It is interesting to note that the majority of mean scores are relatively low. There were 
individual participants who stated that the motorist should not or must not be fined, 
however, on average, most offences were considered serious and participants 
suggested the motorist should receive a fine. 
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Figure 4.1: Mean scores for Drink-driving across circumstances (baseline, 
mitigating & aggravating) and violation (control, minor & major) 
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Figure 4.2: Mean scores for Speeding across circumstances (baseline, mitigating 
& aggravating) and violation (control, minor & major) 
 
 
Statistical analysis of the data was undertaken using a 3-way (3 x 2 x 3) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Data analysis was undertaken using SPSS version 15. 
For the within-participants factor of circumstances Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was 
found to be significant indicating that the principle of homogeneity of variance had 
been violated; the values from the Greenhouse-Geisser test is, therefore, given. 
Circumstances showed a significant difference (F (2,87) = 36.367, p < 0.001); the 
circumstances x violation interaction was also found to be significant (F(2,87) = 
5.982, p = 0.006). No significant effects were found for circumstances x scale 
interaction (F(3,87) = 0.902, p = 0.452) and circumstances x violation x scale (F(3, 
87) = 1.2, p = 0.315). For the between-participant factors violation was significant 
(F(1,52) = 25.055, p < 0.001) and scale of violation was significant (F(2,52) = 4.565), 
p = 0.015) with no interaction effect between violation x scale (F(2,52) = 1.705, p = 
0.192).  
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4.7 Discussion 
The hypotheses for Experiment 3 are supported; significant differences were found 
across scale of violation (major / minor / control), circumstances (mitigating / 
aggravating / baseline) and type of motoring offence (speeding / drink-driving). 
 
The experiment shows clear differences in the participants' perception of the two 
offences. Drink-driving is considered much more serious than speeding, major 
offences are considered more serious than minor offences and circumstances can 
either mitigate or aggravate a motoring violation. These results are generally as 
predicted with the exception being the contrasting finding between the two forms of 
transgression. As shown in the mean scores presented in Table 4.2 the speeding 
violation shows a consistent trend of minor, control and major in terms of lowest to 
highest rating of fine. The control condition is most similar to the major offence, 
suggesting that when no speed is given (control condition) participants assume a 
major violation has occurred. The trend is less consistent with the drink-driving 
offence, in this case the control condition is more similar to the minor condition, 
across all circumstances, suggesting that without the scale of offence participants 
assume a minor violation has been committed. Presumably, the participants believe 
that few drivers would deliberately flout today's strict drink-driving laws but may risk 
drinking slightly over the legal limit. 
 
The baseline conditions, in which no circumstances are stated, allow a comparison 
with the conditions incorporating mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The 
mean scores (see Table 4.2) show a consistent trend in the judgement of a fine, from 
mitigating, baseline to aggravating. This is as predicted; mitigation reduces the judged 
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fine in relation to the baseline, while aggravation increases it. Similar observations are 
made with the drink-driving scenario except for the major offence. Overall, these 
findings show the modifying effect the inclusion of circumstances has on ones 
reasoning.  
 
Current theories of deontic reasoning cannot fully accommodate the findings of this 
experiment. For instance, Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory (Cheng & 
Holyoak, 1985) suggests all permissions and obligations are the same. This is clearly 
not the case as it was found here that drink-driving was never condoned, although one 
could say it was mitigated, even when a minor offence had been committed. 
Cosmides (1989) may be able to explain the evolutionary advantage of detecting a 
speeding motorist or drink-driver in terms of taking a prohibited benefit but has 
greater difficulty explaining how circumstances modify the perception of a cheater. 
Clearly, all cheaters are not the same; a drink-driver may be excused if they happen to 
be a doctor on an emergency call. Mental models theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
1991) and adaptations of it (e.g. Manktelow & Over, 1995) would also require 
revision to accommodate the findings presented above. 
 
A further difficulty for mental models theory, and possibly other theories as well, is 
the mean ratings of seriousness for the control groups (as noted above). If individuals 
are using mental tokens, as mental models theory suggests, then how can participants 
assign a value to these tokens as these set of results has found? Weightings may be 
needed to accommodate such findings. 
 
If scale of violation is considered a probabilistic factor then a theory such as 
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Information Gain (Oaksford & Chater, 1994) or Suppositional Theory (Evans, 
Handley & Over, 2003) may provide a better explanation. Circumstances may also be 
explained in terms of Evans & Over’s (2004) conditional probability hypothesis; the 
probability of a motorist receiving a fine is increased when aggravating circumstances 
are involved and decreased with mitigating circumstances. 
 
There was found to be some variation both between aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances and within a particular circumstance. Speeding, particularly the minor 
offence, was readily mitigated. The only circumstances to reliably mitigate in the case 
of drink-driving were doctor on call and wife in labour. However, mitigation was not 
universal, some participants considered a doctor drink-driving as an aggravating 
circumstance and rated the offence as serious (see Appendix B4 Experiment 4: Raw 
Data). This can be related to Green, McClelland, Muckli & Simmons (1999) who 
used a scenario of a mugging in which little sympathy was given to the victim 
because they had used an alternative route home when the assault occurred. 
 
This experiment supports the findings of Experiment 1 reported in Chapter 3, as scale 
of violation is again found to be a modifying factor to deontic reasoning. However, 
this study goes further by demonstrating that not all violations, nor scale of violations, 
are perceived on equal terms. Circumstances can also interact with an offence altering 
the perceived seriousness of a violation. These findings once again emphasise that 
content of deontic scenarios must be given as much credence as the processes of 
reasoning. 
 
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances must be added to the growing list of 
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modifying factors found to influence deontic reasoning. Adding a circumstance to a 
conditional statement alters the drawn inference in predictable ways, similar to the 
effects of additional premises (Byrne, 1989; Stevenson & Over, 1995), alternative 
causes and disabling conditions (Cummins, 1995; Cummins et al., 1991; Fairley et al., 
1999), and additional requirements (Fairley et al., 1999). There is also the possibility 
that motoring offences belong to a superordinate class, such as “transgressions of the 
law” but that has not been investigated here and must wait for further research. 
Judgements, in these instances, were made following the presentation of all 
information, however, in the real world events usually unfold serially and one is 
required to revise their beliefs as subsequent information comes available. This is to 
be investigated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Judgement Revision with Motoring Violations 
 
5.1 Rationale 
The previous experiments reported in this thesis have established that scale of 
violation, type of transgression and surrounding circumstances all contribute to 
modifying one’s reasoning with deontic conditional statements. They are pragmatic 
factors as they relate to real world knowledge in familiar social contexts; working 
rules and motoring transgressions. Experiments 1, 3 and 4 were similar in requiring a 
judgement to be made after all relevant information had been given. However, in the 
real world events usually unfold serially allowing for a revision of judgement. The 
experiment reported in this chapter takes such an approach, thus affording the 
opportunity to forge an alliance between the fields of reasoning and decision-making. 
 
The proposal that reasoning and decision-making are linked is not new but progress in 
forging associations between the two fields has been slow. Evans, Over & Manktelow 
(1993) believe the two fields to be concerned with rationality and suggest that 
reasoning tasks, particularly deontic reasoning involves the making of decisions. 
Manktelow & Over (1995) have been particularly forceful in pressing for a decision-
theoretic approach to deontic reasoning. 
 
Two fundamental concepts of decision-making are subjective probability and 
subjective utility and the combination of the two gives subjective expected utility 
(SEU) theory. Probabilities and utilities are fundamental to reasoning with deontic 
statements as reported extensively in the literature (see Manktelow, 1999 for a 
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review). However, subjective expected utility is a normative theory that proposes 
axioms beyond the cognitive abilities of human reasoning. For this reason, while 
adopting components of a decision-theoretic approach, Evans et al. (1993) reject the 
normative account of decision-making. 
 
A simple manipulation to convert a deontic reasoning task into a decision-making task 
is to present material serially. This method is adopted here and was influenced by 
Hogarth & Einhorn (1992) who reviewed 60 belief revision studies. Interestingly, in 
their review only a minority of studies used serial presentation, a response mode they 
labeled step-by-step (sbs). 
 
Serial (sbs) presentation of material has not been done before using deontic materials, 
however, there are studies that use a similar procedure. Byrne (1989) and Stevenson 
& Over (1995) used additional premises, alternative causes and disabling conditions 
have been manipulated in several studies (Cummins, 1995; Cummins, Lubart, 
Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Fairley, Maktelow & Over, 1999) and Fairley et al. (1999) 
used additional requirements. Any one of these studies could have presented the 
material step-by-step presumably with the same effects of modifying drawn 
conclusions. 
 
One advantage of a judgement revision task is that it allows for several independent 
variables to be manipulated with the same participant. For example, an established 
finding in the decision-making literature is that costs are weighed more heavily than 
benefits (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). Similar findings have been obtained 
with deontic reasoning tasks. For instance, Manktelow & Over (1991) designed a 
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thematic selection task involving a bingo scenario in which a prize (benefit) did not 
produce a facilitation effect. However, when costs are manipulated facilitation occurs 
much more readily. Kirby (1994) adapted Griggs & Cox (1982) drink-age rule and 
included three manipulations to the standard task. The rule stated, “If a person is 
drinking beer, then the person must be over 21 years of age”. Participants were cued 
to the role of a pub doorman who is given one of the three tasks; don’t check as the 
management do not want to upset customers and they will be fired if they do so; don’t 
miss as the management are concerned about illegal drinking and they will be fired if 
they miss a guilty person; and check as the management are concerned about illegal 
drinking and they will receive a bonus for catching under-aged drinkers. The 
conditions involving a cost produced significantly more card selections compared to 
the standard task. 
 
The findings with aggravating circumstances and major violations reported thus far in 
this thesis may be analogous to costs and mitigating circumstances and minor 
offences may have similarities to benefits. Certainly, response patterns show 
similarities; aggravating circumstances and major violations produce greater ratings 
of seriousness than mitigating circumstances and minor transgressions. A judgement 
revision task will allow a more detailed investigation of this proposal. 
 
Presenting information serially also ensures the task is clearly framed. In the context 
of reasoning and decision-making, Legrenzi, Girotto & Johnson-Laird (1993) have 
called this focusing. Relevance is of course a related concept (Sperber & Wilson, 
1986, 1995) and a judgement revision task would be expected to make the most 
relevant information explicit. Inferential reasoning tasks as used throughout this thesis 
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do not require logical or normative (System 2) thinking; this is a further reason for 
rejecting the normative SEU theory. Reasoning and judgement revision with tasks 
involving transgressions of law very much encourage System 1 thinking. 
 
In summary, the experiments reported in Chapters 3 and 4 have established the 
significance of a number of pragmatic factors, including scale of violation, the nature 
of an offence and surrounding circumstances. Experiment 4, reported in Chapter 4, 
demonstrated how pragmatic factors interact to influence an individual’s decision. 
Decisions, in these instances, were made following the presentation of all information 
i.e. end-of-series (eos); in the real world, however, events usually unfold serially and 
one is required to revise their beliefs as subsequent information becomes available, 
that is, step-by-step (sbs) (cf. Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). The following experiment 
presents the details of motoring offences in series (sbs) in order to plot the revision of 
an individual’s judgements. The following hypotheses were predicted: 
 
1. Significantly higher fines will be given to a drink-driving violation compared to a 
speeding offence. 
2. A major motoring violation will receive significantly higher fines compared to a 
minor motoring violation. 
3. Motoring violations involving aggravating circumstances will receive significantly 
higher fines compared to motoring offences with mitigating circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 108
5.2 Experiment 5: Method 
Participants 
Forty eight full-time students attending Stourbridge College of Further Education 
acted as participants. The participants comprised of 37 females and 11 males, with an 
age range of 16-20 years (median age 17 years).  
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of A5 size booklets containing one speeding and one drink-
driving scenario. The first page of the booklet provided instructions and an example 
of the task. The instructions stated: 
 For this task you are required to read the details of two court cases involving 
 motorists. For each motoring offence a series of details will be presented on 
 successive pages. There will be three pages for each case. As the details 
 emerge you will be required to decide which level of fine you would impose 
 on the motorist, based on the information you have been given up to that 
 point: the minimum fine is £0 (no fine) and the maximum fine is £100 (max. 
 fine). 
 
An example was then given: 
 For example, if you are told that a motorist has been charged with driving 
 with undue care and attention, you may wish to levy a fine of £50, and you 
 would  do so by circling the appropriate figure, as shown below: 
£0 £10 £20 £30 £40 £50 £60 £70 £80 £90 £100 
(no fine)         (max. fine) 
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The details of each offence were presented over three pages as the type of violation, 
scale of violation and additional circumstance were presented in-series. 
 
Following the instructions and example, the participant was presented with the type of 
offence (speeding or drink-driving) and the task of deciding if the motorist should be 
fined. The rate of fine was determined a scale of £0 (no fine) to £100 (maximum fine) 
in increments of £10. The subsequent page developed the offence by describing it as a 
minor or major violation with the participant having the option to revise their initial 
fine. The next page presented the additional circumstance (either mitigating or 
aggravating) and the participant was offered the opportunity to revise their rate of fine 
once again. 
 
An example of the materials is given below: 
 
 Rating 0 (R0): A motorist is speeding 
 Rating 1 (R1): The motorist was traveling at 60 mph in a 30 mph zone 
 Rating 2 (R2): The motorist is disqualified from driving 
 
Rating 0 (R0) is the initial judgement, rating 1 (R1) refers to the first revised 
judgement, and Rating 2 (R2) is the second revised judgement. 
 
Having completed one scenario, participants were required to complete a second, 
contained within the same booklet. The type of motoring offence (speeding / drink-
driving) was counter-balanced reducing the possibility of a response bias or learning 
effect. See Appendix A5 (Experiment 5: Materials) for copies of the materials used in 
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Experiment 5. 
 
Design 
A mixed experimental design was employed with three factors having two levels 
each; type of violation (speeding and drink-driving), scale of violation (minor and 
major), and circumstances (mitigating and aggravating). The independent variables 
(I.V.’s) were type of offence, scale of violation, and circumstances and the dependent 
variables (D.V.’s) were the three fines (R0, R1, R2). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually or in small groups and assigned to two of the 
experimental conditions at random. That is, each booklet contained one speeding and 
one drink-driving scenario, hence, two conditions of the experiment. 
 
The motoring violations were speeding and drink-driving as used in previous 
experiments. The two levels of scale of violation for speeding were 35mph (minor) 
and 60mph (major) and for drink-driving the minor offence was 2.5 pints of alcohol 
and the major violation 5 pints. The number of circumstances were reduced to four; 
two mitigating - the motorist’s wife is in labour and the driver is a doctor on call, and 
two aggravating - the motorist is a 15 year-old joy-rider and the motorist is 
disqualified from driving. These circumstances were used as they had proven the most 
powerful in the previous experiment (see Chapter 4). 
 
The task was introduced by having participants read the instructions on the front 
cover of the booklet and providing the opportunity for any questions. An example of 
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the task was also provided on the front page. Participants were specifically instructed 
not to look-ahead or turn the pages of the booklet, until they had completed the task 
on the current page. 
 
The task involved judgement revision with an initial rating and two subsequent 
revised ratings. The initial rating was made of the type of offence; speeding or drink-
driving. The participant was to judge whether the motorist should receive a fine for 
their transgression using a scale from £0 (no fine) to £100 (maximum fine), 
incremented in intervals of £10. On completion of this judgement the respondent was 
requested to turn the page.  
 
The subsequent page presented the violation as either a minor or major offence. The 
participant was asked to make a second judgement regards fining the motorist given 
the additional information. Finally, the circumstances, either mitigating or 
aggravating, associated with the motoring incident were introduced and the 
respondent made a second revised judgement.  
 
A second motoring scenario was then introduced on the following page of the booklet. 
The task was as before consisting of an initial judgement, followed by two revised 
judgements. No time limit was set for the completion of the experiment. 
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5.3 Experiment 5: Results 
All participants completed the task satisfactorily and, therefore, all data was used for 
analysis. For raw data see Appendix B5 (Experiment 5: Raw Data).  
 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the mean fines and standard deviations levied by participants 
for each condition of the speeding and drink-driving offence. A number of noticeable 
differences can be identified; drink-driving receives higher overall fines than 
speeding; minor offences are given lower fines than major violations for both 
speeding and drink-driving; and mitigation is shown with both motoring 
transgressions, although mitigation is condoned to a greater extent with speeding than 
drink-driving. Scores of standard deviations are high across all judgements, indicating 
much individual variation between participants. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SPEEDING 
 R0  R1  R2 
 Speed  35 mph Aggravating 
 42 (12.67) 23 (16.58) 73 (26.05) 
 
 Speed  35 mph Mitigating 
 51 (28.43) 27 (24.62) 18 (17.12) 
 
 Speed  60 mph Aggravating 
 43 (18.64) 57 (21.88) 90 (15.95) 
 
 Speed  60 mph Mitigating 
 47 (22.70) 59 (19.75) 21 (17.82) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.1: Mean fines and standard deviations (in parentheses) levied against a 
speeding motorist as the information is presented in series; speeding violation 
(R0), major or minor offence (R1) and aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
(R2) 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DRINK-DRIVING 
 R0  R1  R2 
 Drink  2.5 pints Aggravating 
 82 (19.46) 59 (25.03) 88 (17.49) 
 
 Drink  2.5 pints Mitigating 
 82 (24.43) 73 (23.09) 43 (42.50) 
 
 Drink  5 pints  Aggravating 
 79 (16.21) 83 (9.85) 80 (20.00) 
 
 Drink  5 pints  Mitigating 
 83 (15.45) 79 (16.76) 48 (40.86) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.2: Mean fines and standard deviations ( in parentheses) levied against a 
drink-driver as the information is presented in series; drink-driving violation 
(R0), major or minor offence (R1) and aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
(R2) 
 
The data was analysed statistically using a three-way (type of violation x scale of 
violation x circumstance) (2 x 2 x 2) between-participants analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). Data analysis was undertaken using SPSS version 15.  
Three dependent variables were measured corresponding to the initial judgement (R0) 
and two revised judgements (R1 and R2). We shall consider the findings in terms of 
each judgement. 
 
For judgement R0, a significant difference was observed between the type of 
violation, drink-driving and speeding (F(1,88) = 74.502, p < 0.001). 
 
For judgement R1, scale of violation (major v minor) was significant (F(1,88) = 
34.105, p < 0.001) and scale x violation interaction was also significant (F(1,88) = 
4.907, p = 0.029). 
 
For judgement R2, a significant difference was found between mitigating and 
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aggravating circumstances (F(1,88) = 85.235, p < 0.001). A significant interaction 
was also found between circumstances x violation (F(1,88) = 4.896, p = 0.03), 
however, no interaction effect was observed for circumstances x scale (F(1,88) = 0, p 
= 1.00). The interaction between violation x scale x circumstances also produced a 
non-significant result (F(1,88) = 1.49, p = 0.225). 
 
A series of post hoc t-tests were undertaken to ascertain where judgements were 
significantly revised. Table 5.3 summarises the results of such an analysis where R0 
represents levied fine for offence (speeding or drink-driving), R1 levied fine for scale 
of violation (major or minor) and R2 levied fine for the circumstance (aggravating or 
mitigating). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   R0 v R1  R1 v R2 
 
Sp/35/Mit  p<0.01   N.S. 
Sp/35/Agg  p<0.01   p<0.001 
Sp/60/Mit  N.S.   p<0.01 
Sp/60/Agg  p<0.001  p0.01 
Dr/2.5/Mit  N.S.   p<0.05 
Dr/2.5/Agg  p<0.05   p<0.02 
Dr/5/Mit  p<0.05   p<0.05 
Dr/5/Agg  p<0.01   N.S. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5.3: Significance findings for post hoc t-tests 
R0 v R1 = offence (speeding or drink-driving) versus scale of violation (35/60 
mph or 2.5/5 pints)  
R1 v R2 = scale of violation versus circumstance (mitigating or aggravating).  
 
The results show that in the majority of cases subsequent information produces a 
significant revision in a participant’s judgement. The major exceptions are R1 v R2 
for both Sp/35/Mit and Dr/5/Agg. A possible explanation is that, in the case of the 
former, R1 (35mph) has a low rate of fine, therefore, a mitigating circumstance (R2) 
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will not significantly alter the rate of fine, that is, there is a floor effect. In the case of 
the latter, R1 (5 pints) has scored a near maximum rate of fine, and therefore, an 
aggravating circumstance does not increase the rate of fine, that is, a ceiling effect is 
observed.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
The aim of the experiment reported in this chapter was to investigate judgement 
revision in serially presented information. The predicted hypotheses have been 
supported; drink-driving received significantly greater fines than a speeding violation; 
major offences receive higher fines than minor transgressions; and aggravating 
circumstances are given higher fines than mitigating circumstances. The post hoc t-
tests also produce predictable findings with significant revisions of judgement 
occurring in most cases. The exceptions may also be accounted for because a 
speeding offence of 35 mph coupled with mitigating circumstances would be 
expected to attract lower fines, and conversely a major drink-driving transgression 
with aggravating circumstances would be expected to attract a high rate of fine. 
However, there are two inconsistent findings, the revision from a speeding violation 
to a major (60mph) violation, and drink-driving violation to a minor (2.5 pints) 
offence. This inconsistency cannot be easily explained and may require further 
investigation. 
 
Many of the findings are consistent with those of Experiment 4 (see Chapter 4). For 
example, using the mean scores above it can be observed that the initial judgement of 
speeding (R0) receives an average fine that falls between the minor and major 
offences, suggesting that participants are anticipating a serious violation. The major 
 116
offence (60 mph) increases the rate of fine but it by no means reaches the maximum 
level; only when such a violation is coupled with an aggravating circumstance is a 
near-maximum level of fining observed. With the drink-driving violation the 
observations are quite different. Much higher rates of fine are observed from the 
initial judgement of offence; even the minor offence receives relatively high fines and 
mitigation, although observed, does not occur to the extent observed in the speeding 
condition. Participants may be able to forgive a driver for speeding while his wife is 
in labour but find it much more difficult to forgive a driver who has drunk over the 
legal limit. Similar findings were observed in Experiment 4, although of course the 
tasks are quite different; one involving a judgement of whether a motorist should be 
fined and the other requiring a specific fine to be levied. 
 
Caution should be given to some aspects of the experiment and to some findings. The 
rating scale used a range of fines from £0 - £100. This scale may not be appropriate, 
particularly when one considers that under current law drink-driving carries an 
automatic driving ban and may result in a custodial sentence. An alternative rating 
scale, more consistent with current sentencing, may have been more appropriate. 
Several significant results reported in Table 5.3 achieve a probability value of <0.05 
which may be indicative of a type 1 error. However, these results occur with the 
drink-driving violation only and in cases were revised judgements may not be 
expected, for example, minor violation (2.5 pints) with mitigating circumstances. It is 
likely that in a replicated study the same results would not be observed, however, the 
finding is interesting because it supports the view that not all violations are perceived 
the same. 
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This experiment has also shown how serial presentation of material can successfully 
transform a deontic reasoning task into a judgement revision task suggesting a similar 
method could be applied to research with additional premises (e.g. Byrne, 1989) and 
disabling conditions (e.g. Cummins, 1995, Cummins et al., 1991). It can also be 
argued that serial presentation ensures the most important information is attended to, 
that is, relevance holds (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 1995). 
 
Major transgressions and aggravating circumstances may be likened to the utility of a 
cost as they increase a response (in this case a fine), while minor transgressions and 
mitigating circumstances decrease a response. Of course transgressions and 
circumstances are not costs and benefits, in terms of subjective utilities, but they may 
evoke similar cognitive processes. 
 
The findings of this experiment also support Evans et al.’s (1993) and Oaksford & 
Chater’s (1994) claims for a decision-theoretic approach to reasoning. Scale of 
violation and associated circumstances may be suitable candidates for probabilistic 
variables within such an approach, and the results do support this notion. Revised 
judgements can be considered as revised probabilities. 
 
In terms of a theoretical explanation of the findings a number of theories can be 
considered. Schema theories, such as Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) and Social Contract Theory (SCT) (Cosmides, 1989) have 
not proposed how one’s schema may be revised as subsequent information becomes 
available. Indeed, PRS theory is unlikely to be able to explain judgement revision, 
other than to propose the evocation of an alternative permission or obligation schema. 
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Cosmides’ SCT theory suggests a cheater detection algorithm is evoked when a social 
contract has been violated, however, at what point does the Darwinian algorithm 
become operational in a judgement revision task involving serially presented material. 
It is possible that major and minor violations and aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances could be conceived of as costs and benefits (as discussed above), 
however, the theory would require substantial amendment to accommodate a range of 
pragmatic factors. 
 
Mental models theory (MMT) (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) would also require 
modification to accommodate judgement revision and the pragmatics of violations. 
Indeed Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002) have included a component to deal with 
context, which they call pragmatic modulation. This allows potentially inconsistent or 
fallacious models to be rejected. However, this adapted version of MMT has its critics 
for lacking psychological evidence (Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005). It is unlikely that 
the revised mental models theory would be able to explain the findings reported in 
this thesis as the research of Johnson-Laird and colleagues rely invariably on abstract 
and arbitrary content. 
 
A more appropriate explanation of the findings reported in Experiment 5 is to assume 
that judgement revision in these familiar contexts involves System 1 thinking and the 
revision of one’s decision involves revised probabilities, as suggested in the 
suppositional theory of Evans and colleagues (Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Evans 
Over & Handley, 2003). With revised judgements, the P(q|p) would change as 
subsequent information is made available. For instance, knowing a motorist drives 
above the legal speed limit (p) and is liable to a fine (q) indicates the probability of 
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the motorist being fined, given they travel above the legal limit. Given further 
information regards actual speed and surrounding circumstances, judgements are 
revised on the basis that the probabilities have changed; major offence and 
aggravating circumstances will increase the probability of a fine and a minor offence 
and mitigating circumstances decrease the probability. This theory offers a more 
parsimonious explanation and can account for many of the findings reported in this 
and previous chapters. However, the precise mechanism for integrating pragmatic 
context and framing the relevant content is not specified in the theory. 
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Chapter 6 
Power of Source as a Pragmatic Factor of Deontic Reasoning 
 
6.1 Rationale 
Thus far, scale of violation and mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been 
shown to be influential pragmatic factors within the deontic contexts of a working 
rule and motoring violations. These effects have been demonstrated with inferential 
reasoning tasks and a task requiring judgement revision. A further pragmatic factor is 
to be explored in this chapter, that of power of source. Mitigation and aggravation 
may be universal concepts, applying to everyone. However, power or authority is 
associated with ones role or rank and is a hierarchical concept. Only if you have a 
particular role or position with responsibility can you have power. Power is therefore 
not universal but is held in degrees. In short, power of source may be an additional 
pragmatic factor but one quite distinct from those covered thus far in this thesis. 
 
It seems reasonable to expect that the power or authority of an individual making a 
conditional statement or conveying information will determine the perceived felicity 
of that statement and whether a given action will follow. Indeed, there is evidence 
from previous research for the effectiveness of power as a pragmatic factor (Ray, 
Reynolds & Carranza, 1989). However, the emphasis of Ray et al.’s research was on 
the reasoning of disjunctives with the aim of establishing whether the preferred 
reading was inclusive or exclusive. Thus, the influence of power was secondary and 
the results were inconclusive, which may have been due to the authority figures used 
in the scenarios. For example, one source of power was a shop assistant which may be 
a case where the felicity is brought into question. A shop assistant may not be 
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perceived as holding sufficient authority to assert a felicitous inducement and make 
their statement true. 
 
Power is not a unitary concept as Raven (French & Raven, 1959, Raven, 1965) 
realised by suggesting six types of power – reward, coercive, informational, expert, 
legitimate, and referent. A number of these power types are incorporated in the 
scenarios used in the experiments reported in this chapter. For instance, a medical 
consultant would have expert power, parents use reward as a form of power over their 
children, and even those of lower status may exert coercive or informational power, 
such as the receptionist who prevents you seeing the bank manager. 
 
Power has been explored extensively by researchers in the field of social cognition. 
For example, Bochner & Insko (1966) found a message from a Nobel Prize winner 
was more influential than the same message from a less prestigious source. Social 
psychological studies have shown the detrimental effects of low power status. Groups, 
such as children (De Paulo & Coleman, 1986, 1987), low-ranking individuals and 
historically women (Hacker, 1951) have served low ranking positions with little 
control over the outcomes of others. Keltner and colleagues have considered how 
one’s relative power influences exhibited behaviour with those of higher status having 
increased rewards and freedom, resulting in approach-related tendencies while those 
with reduced power show inhibited behavioural tendencies (Keltner, Gruenfeld & 
Anderson, 2003). 
 
Fewer studies have been reported in the thinking and reasoning literature, however, 
similar results have been reported. For instance, Stevenson & Over (2001) explored 
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conditional reasoning and found experts were more likely to be believed and to 
introduce uncertainty into an argument than novices. The first experiment reported in 
this chapter uses conditional statements within deontic contexts. 
 
Power has been the central theme of at least one theory of deontic reasoning. 
Cummins (1999, 2000) considers power and dominance relations as a driving force of 
human evolution which is observed in social hierarchies. Cheater detection, as 
proposed by social exchange theory (Cosmides, 1989), is more likely to be observed 
in individuals of low status. 
 
However, the theory of dominance hierarchies has been questioned (Chater & 
Oaksford, 1996) and a probabilistic account of power may be more appropriate. 
Evans, Handley & Over (2003) reviewed probabilistic accounts of conditional 
reasoning and suggested conditional statements of the form, if p then q, can be 
considered in terms of degrees of belief and represented as the probability of the 
consequent given the antecedent (P(q│p)). Historically, probabilistic reasoning has 
been investigated using abstract materials (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and this 
trend continues to the present day (see for example, Evans et al., 2003; Oaksford, 
Chater & Larkin, 2000; and Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). However, a number of 
studies have investigated the pragmatic richness of everyday reasoning using thematic 
materials (Oaksford et al., 2000; Stevenson & Over, 1995), realistic inducements 
(Evans & Twyman-Musgrove, 1998; Newstead, Griggs & Chrostowski, 1984) and 
deontic conditionals (Over, Manktelow & Hadjichristidis, 2004).  
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The power or authority of the speaker (agent) making a conditional deontic statement 
has not been manipulated before although related studies do exist (e.g. Stevenson & 
Over, 2001; Ray et al., 1989). The first experiment to be reported in this chapter 
investigated the power of a message source with conditional statements across two 
forms of scenario – informal (family and medical) and formal (armed forces & 
employment). It is predicted that a significant trend will be observed in relation to 
power and the likelihood of action. In all cases an individual of higher social rank is 
predicted to be rated as more likely to make a given conditional statement true than an 
individual of lower social rank. A further prediction can be made regards the form of 
scenario; a formal scenario in which rank, authority and power of its members is 
institutionalised may show greater effects of power than informal scenarios where 
institutionalised authority is absent. 
 
The hypotheses can be stated formally as follows: 
1. A significant effect of power will be observed across individuals of high, medium 
and low power. Further, the predicted difference will demonstrate a significant trend. 
2. A significant difference will be observed in likelihood ratings of action between 
formal and informal power scenarios. 
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6.2 Pilot Study: Method 
Prior to experimentation a pilot study was undertaken to obtain scaled power relations 
within a number of social contexts. 
 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduate students attending the University of Wolverhampton acted as 
independent judges rating the power or authority of 21 individuals within seven social 
contexts. No details regards gender or age of judges was recorded. 
 
Materials 
A three page booklet containing instructions with an example followed by 21 
individual roles were used as the materials. The instructions introduced the task which 
was to rate individual roles within seven social contexts for power or authority on a 5-
point scale. The example used a Grandmother and showed a rating of medium power 
with the statement,  
 
If you were asked to rate the Power (influence or authority) of a Grandmother and 
you believed she had a medium degree of power, then you would tick the medium box, 
as shown below: 
Please rate the POWER of a Grandmother: 
 High    Medium   Low 
 [  ]  [   ]  [9 ]  [   ]  [   ] 
 
The seven social scenarios were: Family, Education, Armed Forces, Medical, 
Employment, Football Team, and Legal. Three individual roles associated with each 
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scenario were chosen with some consideration given to the potential hierarchical 
power. For example, the Family scenario had the roles of Father, Uncle and Brother. 
See Appendix A6a (Pilot Study: Materials) for a copy of the booklet used in this pilot 
study. 
 
Design 
A within-participants design was used with all participants completing all ratings of 
individual authority within seven social contexts. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually or in small groups. After consenting to 
participate in the ratings study participants were asked to read the instructions and 
example. Time was given for any questions to clarify the nature of the task. The task 
involved rating individual roles for power or authority on a 5-point scale, where 5 
represented high power/authority and 1 low power/authority. The 21 individual roles 
were presented randomly within the booklet and no mention of the social categories 
was made to participants. All 21 roles were judged using the same scale and no time 
limit was set for the completion of the task. 
 
The ratings of each role by the 20 participants was totalled giving a minimum possible 
score of 20 and a maximum possible rating of 100. 
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Results 
Table 6.1 shows the total ratings of power for each individual within each of the seven 
social contexts. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCENARIO   ROLE 1  ROLE 2  ROLE 3 
 
 
FAMILY  FATHER  UNCLE*  BROTHER 
   76   48   56 
 
 
EDUCATION  HEAD   PREFECT  FELLOW 
TEACHER     PUPIL 
88   51   49 
 
 
ARMED FORCES SERGEANT  CORPORAL  CADET 
   82   75   36 
 
 
MEDICAL  CONSULTANT G.P.   STRANGER** 
   87   81   41 
 
 
EMPLOYMENT MANAGING  SUPERVISOR COLLEAGUE 
   DIRECTOR 
   87   77   53 
 
 
FOOTBALL  MANAGER  CAPTAIN  TEAM PLAYER 
TEAM   81   70   51 
 
 
LEGAL  SOLICITOR  LEGAL  FRIEND 
      SECRETARY 
   82   57   71 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.1: The total ratings of power for individuals for seven scenarios. Twenty 
participants (N=20) were asked to judge all 21 individuals for power on a 5-point 
scale (ranging from High – Medium – Low). The minimum possible score was 20 
and the maximum possible score was 100. 
 
NOTE: * The Uncle was designated as the individual having Medium power.  
** Stranger in the medical scenario was replaced with Receptionist as it was 
considered a more appropriate role for a medical scenario. 
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From the ratings four scenarios were chosen as the materials for experimentation.  
Three individuals were identified as representing high, medium and low power within 
informal (family & medical) and formal (armed forces & employment) social 
contexts. Formal social contexts differ from informal in respect of institutional power 
invested in higher ranking roles; the power associated with informal scenarios is not 
institutional. Table 6.2 shows the roles assigned to high, medium and low power to 
the scenarios of family & medical (informal) and armed forces & employment 
(formal). 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Scenario    Power of Source 
    High  Medium Low 
Family (informal)  Father  Uncle  Brother 
Medical (informal)  Consultant G.P.  Receptionist 
Armed Forces (formal) Sergeant Corporal Cadet 
Employment (formal)  Managing  Supervisor Colleague 
    Director 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.2: Assigned power of source, from rating of judges, for high, medium 
and low power within informal (family & medical) and formal (armed forces & 
employment) scenarios 
 
 
6.3 Experiment 6: Method 
Participants 
Participants comprised of 10 undergraduate students attending the University of 
Wolverhampton. Six participants were female and four male with an age range of 19-
35 years (median age 19.5 years). Participants completed all conditions of the 
experiment. 
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Materials 
The materials comprised of a single A4 size booklet containing four social scenarios. 
Two scenarios were classified as formal (Armed Forces and an Employment 
hierarchy) and a further two as informal (Family and a Medical hierarchy). Power of 
source was embedded within each scenario using individuals of differing status. 
 
The front page of the booklet provided instructions and an example of the task. The 
instructions stated,  
 
 Inside this booklet you will find a series of statements. Each statement involves 
 one person asking another to undertake some action. Given the statement and 
 the person who makes it, you must judge the likelihood that the individual  will 
 act. 
 
The example involved a permission spoken to a young girl, 
 
 “If you run an errand for me, then you can watch T.V.” 
 
The participant was then asked to consider the likelihood that the girl would run the 
errand given that the statement had been made by the young girl’s mother. The 
judgement involved ticking one of five options presented in a Likert scale, from Very 
likely to Very unlikely. For the example, the Likely option was ticked with the 
statement: 
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 If you believe it is likely that the young girl will run the errand, you would tick 
 the likely box as shown above. 
 
All statements were to be completed with a single judgement per statement. 
 
On the following four pages, conditional statements were presented for each of the 
scenario types with participants judging the likelihood of an individual acting, given 
that a conditional statement was made by individuals of differing status. Each 
scenario appeared on a separate page with the three levels of power randomized. For 
example, with the informal family scenario participants were presented with the 
following statement: 
 
 Spoken to a boy: "If it is the weekend, then you may go to the cinema" 
 
Participants had to judge the likelihood of the boy going to the cinema, given that the 
statement had been made by the boy's father (high power), uncle (medium power) or 
brother (low power). Judgements were indicated on the Likert scale shown below: 
 
 
 
 Very likely  [ ] 
 Likely   [ ] 
 Unsure   [ ] 
 Unlikely  [ ] 
 Very unlikely  [ ] 
 
 
See Appendix A6b (Experiment 6: Materials) for a copy of the booklet used in this 
experiment. 
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Design 
A within-participants design was used with two factors; power of source and 
formality of scenario. Power of source had three levels, high, medium and low while 
scenario had two levels, formal and informal. Power of source and formality of 
scenario acted as independent variables (I.V.’s) and ratings of likelihood was the 
dependent variable (D.V.). 
 
Procedure 
The 10 participants completed all four conditions of the experiment and were tested 
individually. After consenting to taking part in the experiment the participants were 
asked to read the instructions on the front page of the booklet. The opportunity was 
given for questions to clarify the nature of the task 
 
The task for the participant was to judge the likelihood of action by one individual 
given a statement made by another individual within a particular social context. The 
target statement for the Family scenario involved a conditional permission spoken to a 
boy: 
 
 If it is the weekend, then you may go to the cinema 
 
The participant was informed that it was the weekend and were asked to judge the 
likelihood of the boy going to the cinema, given that the statement was made by three 
individuals of varying power; brother, uncle, and father classified as having low, 
medium and high power status, respectively. Three individual judgements were made 
on the 5-point Likert scale, one for each level of authority. 
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The task was repeated for the three additional scenarios. The Medical scenario 
comprised of the statement: 
 
 With your illness, you may only drink alcohol in moderation 
 
The participant was asked to judge the likelihood that the patient would drink alcohol 
in moderation given that the statement was made by a Receptionist, General 
Practitioner (GP) or Consultant; these three individuals representing low, medium and 
high power, respectively. 
 
The Armed Forces scenario used a statement regards a potential recruit: 
 
 If you are thinking of joining the army, then you may visit the barracks 
 
The conditional statement was said to be made by either a Cadet, Corporal or 
Sergeant (representing low-high power of source). The likelihood judgement was 
made on whether the potential recruit would visit the barracks using the Likert scale. 
 
The final scenario involved an Employment context which used the conditional 
statement: 
 
 If you want to improve your skills, then you may attend a training course 
 
The three levels of authority were Colleague, Supervisor and Managing Director 
(MD) representing low, medium and high power, respectively. A judgement was 
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made on whether the employee would attend a training course given the authority of 
the individual making the statement. 
 
The order in which the scenarios were presented in the booklet was randomised as 
were the ordering of the power instantiations. The Family and Medical scenarios were 
classified as informal and the Armed Forces and Employment scenarios as formal. 
The latter contexts contain a strict hierarchical structure of power supported by 
organizational rules or rules of law; such a hierarchy does not exist in more informal 
contexts. Each scenario included a conditional statement, except for the Medical 
context. A conditional statement could have been derived, such as: 
 
 If you have your illness, then you may only drink alcohol in moderation 
 
However, this statement seemed clumsy and, therefore, the wording was changed to 
fit a more natural style of spoken prose. 
 
Responses were scored on a 5-point scale; Very likely scored 5, Very unlikely scored 
1. No time limit was set for the participant to complete the experiment. 
 
6.4 Results 
For raw data see Appendix B6b (Experiment 6: Raw Data). The experiment was 
completed satisfactorily by all participants and all data was retained for analysis.  
 
The mean likelihood ratings of action and corresponding standard deviations are 
given in Table 6.3. A consistent trend is observed with the likelihood of action 
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increasing as a function of power, except for the Armed Forces scenario where the 
trend is slightly reversed for the medium and high power sources (Corporal and 
Sergeant, respectively). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    
Scenario   Mean Ratings and standard deviations ( ) 
    Low  Med  High  
Family    3.2 (0.99) 3.6 (0.95) 4.3 (0.41)  
Medical   2.4 (1.17) 4.2 (0.57) 4.8 ().32)   
Armed Forces   2.6 (0.84) 4.3 (1.06) 4.2 (0.63) 
Employment   3.2 (0.63) 4.2 (0.42) 5.0 (0.00) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.3: Mean judgement ratings of action and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) following a conditional statement from a source of low, medium & 
high power within informal (Family & Medical) and formal (Armed Forces & 
Employment) scenarios.  
 
The initial inferential statistics conducted on the data comprised of a two-way (2 x 3) 
within-participants analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis was undertaken 
using SPSS (version 15). Mauchly’s Test revealed that sphericity had been violated 
for the power factor and, therefore, reported values use the Greenhouse-Geisser test. 
A significant effect was found for power (F(2,38) = 51.458, p < 0.001) but not for 
scenario (F(1,19) = 1.717, p = 0.206). A non-significant effect was also found for the 
power x scenario interaction (F(2,38) = 0.496, p = 0.613). 
 
To test the prediction of a trend from low to high power in the likelihood of action a 
series of Page’s Trend tests were calculated by hand. Significant trends were obtained 
for all scenarios: Family, L = 131, p < 0.01; Medical, L = 138, p < 0.01; Armed 
Forces, L = 132.5, p <0.01; Employment, L = 138 (k = 3, n = 10 in all cases). 
However, there is a deviation in the trend for Armed Forces as medium and high 
power were reversed. 
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6.5 Experiment 7: Rationale 
Experiment 6 established power of source as a pragmatic factor in deontic reasoning 
contexts, however, the formality of the given context did not significantly differ 
between formal and informal scenarios. The aim of Experiment 7 was to investigate 
the generality of power of source as a pragmatic factor of deontic reasoning. To this 
end, the experiment was broadened in two respects: firstly, the semantic domain was 
extended from permissions to inducements, specifically promises, threats and 
warnings and secondly, the syntax of the given statements was generalized from 
conditional to conjunctive and disjunctive statements. 
 
Much of the research investigating inducements has focused on interpretation. There 
has been extensive debate, without agreement, as to whether disjunctive statements 
are preferentially interpreted as inclusive or exclusive (Braine & Rumain, 1981; 
Hurford, 1974, Lakoff, 1971; Newstead, Griggs & Chrostowski, 1984; Pelletier, 
1977). Inducements are used in a radically different way in the current experiment by 
investigating whether the authority of a given statement has the same influence when 
expressed as a promise, threat or warning as they appeared to have been when 
expressed as a conditional in the previous experiment. The extension to disjunctive 
and conjunctive statements is novel as previous studies of deontic reasoning have 
almost exclusively concentrated on conditional, if…then, rules. 
 
There is some evidence to support the proposal that power of source can be applied to 
inducements. In a comprehensive series of experiments Ohm & Thompson (2004) 
investigated conditional reasoning using realistic materials embedded in inducements. 
A speaker who was perceived to have control over consequences or outcome was 
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considered more likely to change the addressee’s behaviour. In the scenarios used by 
Ohm & Thompson many include powerful speakers, including a professor, 
policeman, judge and parent and also individuals with less status, for instance, a 
brother and work colleague. 
 
Newstead, Ellis, Evans & Dennis (1997) also considered the control a speaker has 
over outcomes. They used conditional statements, including causal (e.g. if the lorry is 
heavier than the legal limit then the alarm bell will ring) and deontic (e.g. if you wash 
the car then I’ll let you borrow it tonight). In a series of experiments judgements of 
truth and falsity and judgements involving the four conditional inferences (Modus 
Ponens, Modus Tollens, Denial of the Antecedent and Affirming the Consequent) 
were taken. The findings demonstrated that deontic conditionals produced higher rates 
across all inferences compared to non-deontic conditionals. This would suggest that 
deontic reasoning tasks provide ideal contexts in which power relations will be 
observed. 
 
Researchers have defined inducements in various ways. Newstead, Ellis, Evans & 
Dennis (1997) considered promises and threats as both kinds of inducements but 
considered warnings as a form of advice. For this reason, the inducements used in this 
experiment are carefully defined. Threats can be represented as a conditional, 
conjunctive or disjunctive statement; however, disjunctives involve a negative 
antecedent. Promises can be represented as a conditional and conjunctive statement 
but not as a disjunctive. Newstead et al. (1984) did present promises as disjunctive 
statements but they were options between two choices rather than a requirement for 
action before the promise is fulfilled. A warning may be represented as a 
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precautionary conditional statement of future negative consequences for the addressee 
(Fillenbaum, 1976) or alternatively a conditional warning may be spoken from one 
individual to another stating that, if you p, then negative q will result from an external 
agent. Warnings are usually hypothetical (Searle, 1969) emphasising precaution on 
the side of the addressee to a potential negative consequence with the consequence 
likely to come from an external agent. 
 
Searle (1969) distinguished between sincere and insincere promises. This relates to 
the felicity of the statement. An insincere promise is one which the speaker does not 
(or cannot) fulfill. The essential feature of a promise is that it is an obligation to 
perform a particular act, arguably more so than threats and warnings. In addition, a 
promise must be non-defective, the thing promised must be something that the 
promisee wants done, and the promiser must be able to fulfill the offer. The 
inducement must have a point. There is no sense in offering something that was to be 
done anyway (this may apply to parents and politicians). The parent who promises 
their child, "If you are well behaved this week, I will take you on holiday" is making a 
defective promise if the holiday had been booked months previously. The sincerity 
and defectiveness of an inducement is particularly relevant to the authority of the 
individual making that inducement. 
 
Promises, threats and two types of warning were presented within the formal and 
informal scenarios introduced in Experiment 6. It was hypothesized that ratings of 
action would follow a trend from high to low power and this prediction was expected 
to hold across all types of inducement and for each syntactical form. In formal terms, 
the hypothesis predicted: 
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1. A significant trend will be observed from low to high power across formal and 
informal scenarios. 
 
6.6 Experiment 7: Method 
Participants 
Forty eight undergraduate students attending the University of Wolverhampton acted 
as participants. Thirty three participants were female and 15 male with an age range 
of 18-35 years (median age 20 years). Twelve participants were assigned to each of 
four experimental conditions; Threat, Warning, Promise (agential) and Promise 
(external). 
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of four separate A4 size booklets, relating to four types of 
inducement; threat, warning, promise (agential) and promise (external). Participants 
completed one booklet only. 
 
The first page of each booklet provided instructions and an example. The instruction 
read,  
 
 Inside this booklet you will find a series of statements. Each statement involves 
 one person warning / threatening / promising another (the appropriate 
 inducement was inserted for each condition). 
 
 138
The example scenario used in all conditions involved a young girl and homework but 
the wording differed to match the context of the inducement. The statement for each 
of the inducement types used in the task examples is given below: 
 
 Threat: Finish your homework, or I will punish you 
 Warning: Finish your homework, or your teacher may punish you 
 Promise (agential): Finish your homework and I will give you a treat 
 Promise (external): Finish your homework and your teacher will give you a 
 treat 
 
The instructions then stated: 
  
 Given that the [inducement] is made by the young girl’s Mother, how likely is 
 it that the girl will finish the homework? 
 
A 5-point Likert scale was shown with the Likely selection checked (see below). 
 Very likely  [  ] 
 Likely   [9] 
 Unsure   [  ] 
 Unlikely  [  ] 
 Very unlikely  [  ] 
 
Hence, the task for the participant was to judge the likelihood of action, given the 
source of the inducement.  
 
The following pages introduced one of the four inducements, presented as a statement 
spoken by one individual to another. Threats and warnings were stated as a 
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disjunctive (‘or’ statements) while the two forms of promise were stated as 
conjunctives (‘and’ statements).  
 
The four types of inducement were Threat, Warning, Promise (agential) and Promise 
(external). Each inducement was set in a series of social contexts containing three 
levels of power – high, medium and low. The social scenarios and levels of power 
included: Family (Father, Uncle, Brother), Medical (Consultant, GP, Nurse), Armed 
Forces (Sergeant, Captain, Cadet), Employment (Managing Director, Supervisor, 
Colleague). 
 
Using the family scenario as an example each of the four conditions can be illustrated. 
For the conjunctive promise (external source) condition the participant was given the 
following statement: 
A boy is promised: “Mow the lawn and your mother will give you your 
pocket money” 
 
 
Three measures were then taken of the likelihood of the boy mowing the lawn given 
that the statement was made by the Father, Uncle and Brother of the boy. 
The statements for the further three conditions were as follows: 
 
Conjunctive promise (agential source) condition: 
 
A boy is promised: “Mow the lawn and I will give you your pocket 
money” 
  
Disjunctive warning condition: 
 
A boy is warned: “Mow the lawn or your mother may not give you your 
pocket money” 
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Disjunctive threat condition: 
 
A boy is threatened: “Mow the lawn or I will not give you your pocket 
money” 
 
See Appendix A7 (Experiment 7: Materials) for the full set of materials used in this 
experiment. 
 
Design 
A mixed experimental design was employed with two factors; type of inducement and 
power of source. The inducement type comprised four levels – threat, warning, 
promise (agential) and promise (external) and was a between-participants factor. 
Power of source had three levels – low, medium, and high and was a within-
participants factor. 
 
Procedure 
Each of the four inducement types was operationally defined as follows: 
Warning: a statement uttered by an agent to a receiver in which a negative 
consequence is asserted should a specific action be followed; the consequence being 
administered by an external agent. 
 
Threat: a statement uttered by an agent to a receiver in which a negative consequence 
is asserted should a specific action be followed; the consequence being administered 
by the agent. 
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Promise (agential): a statement uttered by an agent to a receiver in which the 
consequence is positive should a specific action be followed; the consequence being 
delivered by the agent. 
 
Promise (external): a statement uttered by an agent to a receiver in which the 
consequence is positive should a specific action be followed; the consequence being 
delivered by a third party. 
 
Using the family scenario as an example each of the four conditions can be illustrated. 
For the conjunctive promise (external source) condition the participant was given the 
following statement: 
 
A boy is promised: “Mow the lawn and your mother will give you your 
pocket money” 
 
 
Three measures were then taken of the likelihood of the boy mowing the lawn given 
that the statement was made by the Father, Uncle and Brother of the boy. 
 
The statements for the further three conditions were as follows: 
 
Conjunctive promise (agential source) condition: 
 
A boy is promised: “Mow the lawn and I will give you your pocket 
money” 
  
Disjunctive warning condition: 
 
A boy is warned: “Mow the lawn or your mother may not give you your 
pocket money” 
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Disjunctive threat condition: 
 
A boy is threatened: “Mow the lawn or I will not give you your pocket 
money” 
 
 
Inducements may be stated using alternative conjunctive and disjunctive statements. 
For instance, a warning or threat may be stated as a conjunctive by changing the 
syntax of the statement. A boy may be warned, “Don’t mow the lawn and your 
mother may not give you your pocket money”. However, the statement seems rather 
clumsy compared to the disjunctive form. Similarly with threats, such as, “Don’t mow 
the lawn and I will not give you your pocket money”. The double negatives are most 
likely to result in the statement being transformed to an active conditional clause 
(“Mow the lawn and I will give you your pocket money”). In both cases, the 
disjunctive appears the more natural form of expression and was, therefore adopted 
for this experiment. Promises are not naturally stated as disjunctives. As mentioned 
above Newstead et al. (1984) devised disjunctive promises such as, “We will either go 
shopping on Friday or have a meal together on Saturday”. This statement was 
couched in a scenario involving a promise but actually involves a choice between two 
positive actions. This kind of disjunctive choice was not adopted in the current 
experiment and, therefore, promises were confined to conjunctive statements only. 
 
Participants judged likelihood of action on the same Likert scale as employed in the 
previous experiment (see Section 6.2), with very unlikely scoring 1 and very likely 
scoring 5. Thus a high score indicated expected action given the inducement of 
warning, threat or promise. 
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6.7 Results 
For raw data see Appendix B7 (Experiment 7: Raw Data). All participants completed 
the experiment satisfactorily and all data was used for analysis. 
 
Mean ratings for likelihood of action for each type of inducement and level of power 
are given in Table 6.4 below. The mean likelihood ratings follow the predicted 
directions for all cases except the armed forces scenario within the disjunctive 
warning condition. For all cases there is a substantial difference in the likelihood 
ratings between the low and medium power of source, however, when comparing the 
medium and high power sources the difference is less pronounced, particularly for the 
armed forces scenario. This may reflect the respondent’s uncertainty regards the 
commands of hierarchy within the armed forces, as reported in the previous 
experiment. Overall, however, the ratings follow those found in Experiment 6 and 
suggest that the influence of power with conditional statements can be applied to 
inducements expressed as conjunctive or disjunctive statements. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Disjunctive Threats 
   Power of Source 
 
   Low   Med   High  
 
Family   2.17 (0.63)    3.75 (0.45)   4.75 (0.45) 
Medical  2.75 (1.06)  3.75 (0.97)  4.25 (0.62)  
Armed forces  2.42 (1.24)  4.42 (0.65)  4.67 (0.49) 
Employment  2.00 (0.60)  4.00 (0.85)  4.83 (0.39)  
 
Disjunctive Warnings 
   Power of Source 
 
   Low   Med   High  
 
Family   2.25 (0.97)  3.08 (1.31)  4.58 (0.67) 
Medical  2.50 (1.17)   3.50 (1.17)  4.17 (0.72) 
Armed forces  3.33 (0.78) 4.67 (0.49)  4.50 (0.52) 
Employment  1.92 (0.54)   3.92 (0.79)   5.00 (0.00) 
  
Conjunctive Promises (agential) 
   Power of Source 
 
   Low   Med   High  
 
Family   1.92 (0.90)   4.00 (0.95)  4.42 (0.51)   
Medical  2.67 (0.89)  3.08 (1.00)   3.42 (1.08)  
Armed forces  2.58 (1.00)  4.33 (0.65)   4.42 (0.67) 
Employment  1.42 (0.67)   4.08 (0.51)   4.75 (0.45) 
  
Conjunctive Promises (external) 
   Power of Source 
 
   Low   Med   High  
 
Family   1.75 (0.87)  2.75 (1.22)   4.33 (0.49)  
Medical  2.67 (1.23)  3.17 (1.53)  3.67 (1.23)  
Armed forces  2.75 (0.97)  4.00 (0.74)  4.08 (1.16)  
Employment  2.75 (0.87)  3.92 (1.08)   4.83 (0.39)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.4: Mean likelihood ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) for 
different levels of power of source (low, medium, high) for the four different 
statement types (threat, warning, promise agential & promise external) and four 
scenarios (family, medical, armed forces & employment) 
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The statistical analysis of the data comprised of a series of Page’s trend tests, 
conducted by hand, across scenarios for each inducement type. In all cases significant 
findings were obtained; Family Threat, L = 166, p < 0.001; Medical Threat, L = 
158.5, p < 0.001, Armed Forces Threat, L = 160.5, p < 0.001; Employment Threat, L 
= 166, p < 0.001; Family Warning, L = 163.5, p < 0.001; Medical Warning, L = 
160.5, p < 0.001, Armed Forces Threat, L = 158.5, p < 0.01; Employment Threat, L = 
166.5, p < 0.001; Family Promise (agential), L = 164, p < 0.001; Medical Promise 
(agential), L = 153.5, p < 0.05, Armed Forces Promise (agential),  L = 161, p < 0.001; 
Employment Promise (agential),  L = 166, p < 0.001; Family Promise (external), L = 
166.5, p < 0.001; Medical Promise (agential), L = 154.5, p < 0.05, Armed Forces 
Promise (agential),  L = 156.5, p < 0.01; Employment Promise (agential),  L = 158.5, 
p < 0.01; k = 3, n = 12 in all cases. 
 
In only the armed forces scenario is the predicted trend violated, occurring with the 
inducements of both warning and threat. These findings demonstrate consistent 
significant trends in likelihood ratings across the levels of power and further 
establishes the authority of a message source as a prominent pragmatic factor of 
deontic reasoning. 
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6.8 Experiment 8: Rationale 
Experiment 8 develops the previous two experiments by exploring the hypotheses that 
a statement from a high power source is both more credible and has a higher 
probability of being made true than a statement from a low power source. A high 
power source is more likely than a low power source to be able to grant a benefit for 
compliance or levy a sanction in the case of transgression. Further, an individual of 
higher ranking may also be perceived as offering a more felicitous message, which 
may apply particularly to warnings and external promises where rewards and 
sanctions are outside of their individual control but where their perceived knowledge 
and wisdom allow them to more accurately predict the actions of others. For these 
reasons, direct control of rewards and sanctions (in the case of threats and agential 
promises) and perceived wisdom in predicting the actions of others (in the case of 
warnings and external promises), one can hypothesise that a message from a high 
power source will be rated as more credible and be more likely to make the 
consequent of their statements true compared to a source of lower rank.  
 
Thus far it has been speculated that the findings with pragmatic factors of deontic 
reasoning may be explained by the probabilistic theory proposed by Evans and 
colleagues (Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Evans, Over & Handley, 2003; Evans & 
Over, 2004). The next experiment provides a direct test of this proposal by having 
participants give probability estimates of possible actions, using a method devised by 
Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley & Sloman (2007). Over et al. used conditional 
statements such as, “If the cost of petrol increases (p), then traffic congestion will 
improve (q)” and asked participants to estimate the probabilities of the four possible 
outcomes; p & q are true (TT), p is true & q is false (TF); p is false & q is true (FT), 
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and both p & q are false (FF). They found strong evidence in support of the 
conditional probability hypothesis with both a truth table task and a causal reasoning 
task. The conditional probability hypothesis states that a conditional statement, if p 
then q, is interpreted as the conditional probability of q, given p (P(q|p)) and can be 
calculated using probability estimates of truth and falsity, as in the following formula: 
 P(q|p) = P(TT) / [P(TT) + P(TF)] 
 
Over et al. also found a small effect in support of the delta-p rule hypothesis, which 
considers conditional statements as the difference between the conditional probability 
and the probability of q, given not-p (P(q|p) – P(q|¬p)). Using their technique for 
estimating probabilities, the delta-p rule can be calculated using the following 
formula: 
 P(q|p) – P(q|¬p) = P(TT) / [P(TT) + P(TF)] – [P(FT) / [P(FT) + P(FF)] 
 
Independent studies have supported the conditional probability hypothesis (Oberauer 
& Wilhelm, 2003; Ohm & Thompson, 2006). The research of Ohm & Thompson is 
particularly relevant as it applied the conditional probability hypothesis to 
inducements. They used conditional inducements and tips, similar to Newstead et al. 
(1997), and had participants judge the truthfulness of the conditional inducements and 
also the behavioural effectiveness (whether the inducement would bring about a 
change in behaviour). They predicted that conditional inducements and advice would 
be evaluated in terms of the conditional probability hypothesis (P(q|p)) but only to a 
degree. The pragmatic richness of inducements, they suggest, involves the 
representation of speech acts (Searle, 1969); the speaker utters q in order to increase 
or decrease the likelihood of the addressee performing p. This representation results in 
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instances of not-p being evoked. In fact, Ohm & Thompson appear to be suggesting 
that an inducement, e.g. “if you tidy your room, then you can play out”, intuitively 
produces a response in the addressee to ask, “What happens if I don’t tidy my room?” 
Such a view increases the relevance of not-p and can be evaluated using P(q|¬p) 
providing a measure of behavioural effectiveness.  
 
Ohm & Thompson’s predictions were supported in their findings; judgements of the 
truth of conditional inducements were predicted using the conditional probability 
hypothesis, while behavioural effectiveness correlated with the probability of q, given 
not-p. Interestingly, no correlation was observed between perceived truth and 
behavioural effectiveness, which Ohm & Thompson admit is counter-intuitive. They 
suggest that the majority of their statements were considered to be truthful and 
propose that a relationship may be found if they had included more conditionals with 
low truth values. Power of source is one means of manipulating both the perceived 
truth and perceived behavioural effectiveness of conditional inducements; high power 
should produce high truth and behavioural effectiveness, low power should be 
associated with low truth and behavioural effectiveness values. Indeed, many of the 
statements used by Ohm & Thompson involved power relations but they were not 
directly manipulated or made explicit. 
 
The following experiment provides an opportunity to directly test the conditional 
probability hypothesis which thus far has been conjectured to be a possible 
explanation of pragmatic factors associated with deontic reasoning. Conditional and 
conjunctive phrased inducements comprising of threats, warnings, and two forms of 
promise were judged for likelihood of action. Previous studies have tended to classify 
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inducements into two groups: promises and threats forming one group and tips and 
warnings forming another (Fillenbaum, 1975, 1976; Newstead et al., 1997; Ohm & 
Thompson, 2006). Newstead et al. (1997) found much stronger effects with threats 
and promises on truth table and inference tasks. For this reason, a difference may be 
observed in the probability ratings of the inducements in this experiment. 
Inducements stated as conjunctive statements have not been used before in this type 
of experiment and, therefore, it will possible to test for any differences between 
conditional and conjunctive inducements. 
 
The four scenario types (Family, Medical, Armed Forces, and Employment) are 
maintained in this experiment and although no significant differences between formal 
and informal scenarios were obtained previously, it was decided to test for significant 
effects because this experiment includes additional independent variables in which 
differences may emerge. 
 
The credibility of the source of the message was also measured. It is proposed that 
manipulations of power of source will influence credibility ratings with individuals of 
high power expected to receive significantly higher credibility ratings compared to 
individuals of low power.  
 
Finally, probability estimates will allow the calculation of conditional probability 
(P(q|p)) and the probability of q, given not-p, (P(q|¬p)); a high power source will be 
associated with high P(q|p) compared to a low source of power and a low source of 
power should produce high P(q|¬p) estimates compared to a high source of power. 
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From the estimates of P(q|p) and P(q|¬p) the delta-p statistic can be derived which is 
predicted to be greater for high power. 
 
Formally, the hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
1. A high power source will be perceived as having significantly greater credibility 
compared to a low power source. 
2. A significant difference will be observed in the credibility ratings of inducement 
types. 
3. A significant difference will be observed in the credibility ratings for type of 
scenario. 
4. Probability estimates of action will show significantly greater P(q|p) values for a 
high power source compared to a low power source. 
5. Probability estimates of action will show significantly greater P(q|¬p) values for a 
low power source compared to a high power source. 
6. The delta-p statistic, (P(q|p) – P(q|¬p), will be significantly greater for a high power 
source compared to a low power source for both conditional and conjunctive 
inducements. 
 
6.9 Experiment 8: Method 
Participants 
Participants comprised of 72 undergraduate students attending University College 
Northampton, with an age range of 18-60 years (median age 25 years). In one sitting 
33 participants completed four experimental conditions containing conditional 
statements and in another sitting 39 participants completed four conditions containing 
conjunctive statements.  
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Design 
A mixed experimental design was employed with four factors; social context, form of 
statement, type of inducement, and power of source. The social context factor 
comprised of four levels – family, health, armed forces and employment scenarios. 
The form of statement factor had two levels; conditional and conjunctive statements. 
Type of inducement consisted of four levels; threat, warning, promise (agential) and 
promise (external). The factor of power of source had two levels; high and low power. 
The independent variables (I.V.’s) for this experiment were scenario, statement form, 
type of inducement and power of source. The dependent variables (D.V.’s) were the 
credibility judgements and the probability estimates of possible outcomes of a 
message given its source. 
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of eight 10 page booklets, one for each experimental 
condition. The front page of each booklet introduced the task which stated,  
 
Inside this booklet you will find a series of statements. Each statement involves one 
person making a threat, warning, or promise to another person. Given the statement 
and the person who makes it, you are asked to judge the credibility of the statement 
and to estimate the probable outcome. 
 
Participants were asked to complete all statements in the booklet. 
The following page provided an example of the two tasks. The example concerned a 
young girl and her homework and, although the wording varied according to the type 
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of inducement, the same example was used for each experimental condition. The 
example was introduced as follows: 
 
The following statements involve one person [threatening, warning, promising] 
another. Given the statement and the person who makes it, you are asked to judge the 
credibility of the statement and to estimate the probable outcome. 
 
A target statement then followed which varied according to the type of inducement. 
For the conjunctive conditions the statements read: 
Threat: Don’t finish your homework and I will punish you 
Warning: Don’t finish your homework and your teacher will punish you 
Promise (agential): Finish your homework and I will give you a treat 
Promise (external): Finish your homework and your teacher will give you a treat 
 
The conditionals statements for each condition were as follows: 
Threat: If you don’t finish your homework, then I will punish you 
Warning: If you don’t finish your homework, then your teacher may punish you 
Promise (agential): If you finish your homework, then I will give you a treat 
Promise (external): If you finish your homework, then your teacher will give you a 
treat 
 
One task for the participant was to judge the credibility of the statement, given the 
individual who makes it. The instruction read: 
Given that the [threat, warning, promise] is made by the young girl’s Mother, how 
credible do you believe the statement to be? 
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The credibility scale ranged from 1-10 where 1 was designated NOT AT ALL 
CREDIBLE and 10 VERY CREDIBLE. In the example the rating of 8 was circled and 
an explanation of the rating given: 
If you judge the statement to be credible (that is, the mother means what she says) 
then you might choose to circle 8, as shown above 
 
An example of the second task then followed. The instructions stated: 
Now consider the four possibilities that might occur following the statement. In each 
case estimate, in percentages, how probable you think each one is. Make sure all 
four estimates add up to 100% 
 
The four possible outcomes were given with examples of percentage estimates. The 
wording of each example was consistent with the type of inducement and form of 
statement. The following is the example probability estimates for the warning 
inducement presented in the conjunctive form: 
 
The young girl does not finish her homework and the teacher does punish her        
 ….35%.... 
 
The young girl does not finish her homework and the teacher does not punish her        
 ….20%.... 
 
The young girl does finish her homework and the teacher does punish her        
 ….5%.... 
The young girl does finish her homework and the teacher does not punish her        
 ….40%.... 
 
The participant was reminded that the probability estimates must total 100%. At this 
stage, before completing the experimental tasks, participants were asked if they 
clearly understood the task and the opportunity was given to ask any questions. 
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The next eight pages presented the materials for the participant to complete and 
comprised of four scenarios (Family, Medical, Armed Forces, and Employment) with 
individuals of low and high power embedded within each scenario. One of the eight 
booklets was completed by each participant comprising of one type of inducement 
(threat, warning, promise (agential) or promise (external) and one form of statement 
(conditional or conjunctive). The presentation of the scenarios within each condition 
was randomised to eliminate any order or learning effects. 
 
The statements for each scenario used within each of the eight conditions is given 
below: 
Conditional Threats 
Family: A boy is threatened: If you do not mow the lawn, then I will not give you your 
pocket money 
Medical: A patient is threatened: If you don’t stop drinking alcohol, then I will refuse 
to treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is threatened: If you don’t complete the training, 
then I will have you thrown out of the army 
Employment: An employee is threatened: If you do not work the extra shift, then I will 
have you fired 
 
Conditional Warnings 
Family: A boy is warned: If you don’t mow the lawn, then your mother may not give 
you your pocket money 
Medical: A patient is warned: If you don’t stop drinking alcohol, then the Health 
Service may refuse to treat you 
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Armed Forces: An army volunteer is warned: If you don’t complete the training, then 
the General may throw you out of the army 
Employment: An employee is warned: If you don’t work the extra shift, then the 
company may fire you 
 
Conditional Promises (agential) 
Family: A boy is promised: If you mow the lawn, then I will give you your pocket 
money 
Medical: A patient is promised: If you stop drinking alcohol, then I will treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is promised: If you complete the training, then I 
will have you in my squad 
Employment: An employee is promised: If you work the extra shift, then I will pay you 
double time 
 
Conditional Promises (external) 
Family: A boy is promised: If you mow the lawn, then your mother will give you your 
pocket money 
Medical: A patient is promised: If you stop drinking alcohol, then the Health Service 
will treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is promised: If you complete the training, then the 
General will have you in his squad 
Employment: An employee is promised: If you work the extra shift, then the company 
will pay you double time 
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Conjunctive Threats 
Family: A boy is threatened: Don’t mow the lawn and I will not give you your pocket 
money 
Medical: A patient is threatened: Stop drinking alcohol and I will treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is threatened: Don’t complete the training and I 
will have you thrown out of the army 
Employment: An employee is threatened: Don’t work the extra shift and I will have 
you fired 
 
Conjunctive Warnings 
Family: A boy is warned: Don’t mow the lawn and your mother may not give you your 
pocket money 
Medical: A patient is warned: Don’t stop drinking alcohol and the Health Service 
may refuse to treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is warned: Don’t complete the training and the 
General may throw you out of the army 
Employment: An employee is warned: Don’t work the extra shift and the company 
may fire you 
 
Conditional Promises (agential) 
Family: A boy is promised: Mow the lawn and I will give you your pocket money 
Medical: A patient is promised: Stop drinking alcohol and I will treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is promised: Complete the training and I will have 
you in my squad 
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Employment: An employee is promised: Work the extra shift and I will pay you 
double time 
 
Conditional Promises (external) 
Family: A boy is promised: Mow the lawn and your mother will give you your pocket 
money 
Medical: A patient is promised: Stop drinking alcohol and the Health Service will 
treat you 
Armed Forces: An army volunteer is promised: Complete the training and the 
General will have you in his squad 
Employment: An employee is promised: Work the extra shift and the company will 
pay you double time 
 
Each statement was followed by the ratings of credibility and probability estimates 
that the participant completed. See Appendix A8 (Experiment 8: Materials) for copies 
of the booklets used in this experiment. 
 
Procedure 
In this experiment, participants were presented with one of four inducements, in either 
the form of a conditional or conjunctive statement, and were required to rate the 
credibility of the statement given its source and to make probability estimates of 
possible outcomes.  
 
The four inducement types; threat, warning, promise (agential) and promise (external) 
were operationally defined as in the previous experiment. Two forms of syntactical 
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inducement were employed, the conditional and conjunctive. Since promises cannot 
be expressed as a disjunctive, this syntactical form was omitted from this experiment. 
The social scenarios also remained the same as those used in the previous experiments 
reported in this chapter (family, armed forces, medical & employment), however, the 
levels of power were reduced to two (high and low) with the intermediary power 
source omitted.  
 
Separate booklets were devised for conditional and conjunctive statements and for 
each of the inducement types. Thus, there were eight conditions employed: 2 forms of 
statement with 4 forms of inducement (see Materials section for details). Two 
judgements were required of the participant: first a rating of the credibility of the 
statement, given that it is made by a source of high or low power. The credibility 
rating was made on a ten-point scale, where 1= not at all credible and 10= very 
credible. The second task was to estimate, in percentages, the probabilities of the four 
possible outcomes, presented as truth functional possibilities (TT, TF, FT, FF). 
 
To emphasise the truth or falsity of the antecedent and consequent, and to aid the 
reading of syntactically similar material, key terms were underlined. Participants were 
asked to estimate the likelihood of each outcome by assigning a percentage to each of 
the four possible outcomes; participants were reminded that the total estimates should 
equal 100%. All participants completed the tasks across all scenarios and for both 
cases of high and low power but for only one form of inducement. The ordering of 
scenario and power of source was randomised. No time limit was set for the 
completion of the two tasks. 
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6.10 Results 
For raw data see Appendix B8 (Experiment 8: Raw Data). The experiment was 
completed satisfactorily by all participants and all data was retained for analysis. 
 
Statistical analysis of the credibility data comprised of a three-way (2 x 2 x 4) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis was undertaken using SPSS (version 
15). Mauchley’s Test revealed that sphericity had been violated with the within 
participants factor of scenario and for the interaction of power x scenario, therefore, in 
these cases Greenhouse-Geisser values are reported. Significant effects were found 
for power of source (F(1,62) = 269.69, p < 0.001) and type of scenario (F(3, 186) = 
10.811, p <0.001). The interaction between power of source and type of scenario was 
also significant (F(3,186) = 28.213, p < 0.001). No significant effects were found for 
form of inducement (F(7,62) = 0.987, p = 0.449) or for the interactions between 
power of source x type of inducement (F(7,62) = 0.927, p = 0.493) and type of 
scenario x form of inducement (F(21, 186) = 1.094, p = 0.358). The interaction of 
power of source x type of scenario x form of inducement also showed no significant 
effect (F(21,186) = 1.151, p = 0.299). 
 
In terms of the predictions for this experiment, hypotheses 1 and 3 are duly supported; 
a high power source is perceived as having greater credibility compared to a low 
power source and credibility ratings for the type of scenario did significantly differ. 
However, hypothesis 2 was not supported as no significant difference was observed in 
the credibility ratings of inducement form. 
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Conditional probability responses were analysed by comparing the probability 
estimates assigned to each of the four possible outcomes (TT, TF, FT, FF), for both 
conditional and conjunctive inducements. Conditional and conjunctive statements 
were analysed separately with data collapsed across type of inducement and form of 
scenario. Table 6.5 shows the mean probability estimates and standard deviations of 
the four possible outcomes, given the status of the speaker who makes the utterance 
for both conditional and conjunctive inducements. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Logical Cases (Possible Outcomes) 
 TT TF FT FF 
Conditional Inducements 
Low Power 28.27 (10.27) 21.82 (9.14) 10.43 (6.02) 39.78 (10.12) 
High Power 39.20 (16.94) 12.60 (6.69) 7.10 (4.84) 41.26 (16.36) 
Conjunctive Inducements 
Low Power 30.14 (8.28) 22.37 (11.42) 10.82 (6.09) 36.88 (11.23) 
High Power 42.25 (15.38) 12.29 (6.89) 8.21 (4.88) 37.22 (15.03) 
TT = true antecedent & true consequent; TF = true antecedent & false consequent;  
FT = false antecedent & true consequent; FF = false antecedent & false consequent 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.5: Mean probability estimates and standard deviations (in parentheses) 
of the four possible outcomes for conditional and conjunctive statements made 
by a high or low power source 
 
In estimating the probability of outcomes we are particularly interested in the 
situations in which the antecedent is true because this is were an authority figure can 
exert their influence. We would, therefore, expect to observe a greater probability for 
the TT case for a high power source than a low power source because a figure of 
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authority is more likely to make the consequent true. Conversely, the TF case is more 
likely to produce higher probability estimates from a low power source because they 
are less able to make the consequent true.  
 
From the estimated probabilities the conditional probability was calculated using the 
formula: P(q|p) = P(TT) / [P(TT) + P(TF)]; the probability of q, given not-p was also 
calculated: P(q|¬p) = [P(FT) / [P(FT) + P(FF)]; and the delta-p statistic was derived 
using the formula:  
P(q|p) – P(q|¬p) = P(TT) / [P(TT) + P(TF)] – [P(FT) / [P(FT) + P(FF)] 
 
The mean and standard deviations of these calculations are shown in Table 6.6. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 P(q|p) P(q|¬p) P(q|p) – P(q|¬p) 
Conditional Inducements 
Low Power 0.544 (0.202) 0.214 (0.129) 0.331 
High Power 0.741 (0.160) 0.168 (0.126) 0.576 
Conjunctive Inducements 
Low Power 0.581 (0.154) 0.237 (0.150) 0.353 
High Power 0.757 (0.152) 0.227 (0.176) 0.533 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 6.6: Mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) of P(q|p), 
P(q|¬p), and P(q|p) – P(q|¬p) for conditional and conjunctive inducements made 
by a high or low power source 
 
 
Correlated t-tests were used to test for a difference between the two sources of power. 
For conditional probability ratings (P(p|q)) significant results were obtained for both 
conditional (t = 5.252, df = 32, p > 0.001) and conjunctive inducements (t = 5.254, df 
 162
= 38, p < 0.001). Ratings of P(q|¬p) produced a significant difference for conditional 
inducements (t = 2.322, df = 32, p < 0.05) but not for conjunctive inducements (t = 
0.024, df = 38, p > 0.05). The delta-p calculations were found to produce significant 
differences for both conditionals (t = 5.982, df = 32, p <0.001) and conjunctives (t = 
4.181, df = 38, p < 0.001).  
 
All significant results were in the predicted direction and supported the hypotheses, 
with one exception. Hypothesis 4 was supported with significantly greater P(q|p) 
values being attributed to a high power source compared to a low source of power and 
this effect was observed for both conditional and conjunctive inducements. The  
delta-p estimates were also significantly greater for a high power source compared to 
a low power source, thus supporting hypothesis 6; a finding observed with both 
conditional and conjunctive inducements. For hypothesis 5, probability estimates of 
P(q|p) were significantly greater for a low authority source compared to a high 
authority source for conditional inducements only; conjunctive inducements produced 
no significant difference. 
 
For SPSS output, see Appendix D8 (Experiment 8: SPSS Output). 
 
6.11 Discussion 
The three experiments reported in this chapter demonstrate the influence of power of 
source as an additional pragmatic factor when reasoning with deontic statements. 
Experiment 6 showed that the authority of an individual making a conditional 
statement influences the perceived likelihood of action, across low, medium and high 
power sources. This finding was repeated across a range of scenarios, however, the 
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predicted difference between formal and informal social contexts did not hold; it 
appears that a powerful source will wield their influence whatever the formality of the 
social situation. 
 
The findings of Experiment 7 demonstrate just how general power of source is in 
deontic contexts. The experiment extended the syntactic form, to conjunctive and 
disjunctive statements and extended the type of inducement by incorporating 
promises, threats and warnings. Significant trends were found in the predicted 
direction; the likelihood of an inducement being made true increased with perceived 
authority. Only the Armed Forces scenario showed anomalies in predicted trends, 
occurring with the inducements of warning and threat. 
 
Experiment 8 tested the conditional probability hypothesis that participants are 
considering the probability of an individual making the consequent (q) of a statement 
true, given its antecedent (p) with power of source as an intervening variable. 
Inducements made by an individual of high social rank were rated as more credible 
than if made by an individual of low social rank. No statistical difference was 
observed between statements presented as conditional or conjunctive inducements, 
suggesting both syntactic forms evoke deontic reasoning. 
 
Estimates of the probability of outcomes provided a method for directly assessing the 
conditional probability hypothesis. From the probability estimates, P(q|p) and P(q|¬p) 
were derived with the former showing higher mean values for a high power source 
and the latter higher mean values for a low power source, as predicted. Significant 
findings were obtained for both conditional and conjunctive inducements with one 
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exception; no difference was observed in the P(q|p) estimates between high and low 
sources of power for conjunctive inducements. The delta-p value was also calculated 
and predicted to be significantly higher for high ranking power compared to low 
power. A significant effect was observed with both conditional and conjunctive 
inducements.  
 
Overall, this provides good support for the conditional probability hypothesis, with 
the only anomaly being the P(q|¬p) measure for conjunctive inducements. Over et al. 
(2007) found the strongest predictor of performance on their tasks to be the 
probability of q, given p (P(q|p)) with the delta-p rule (which includes P(q|¬p) in its 
calculation) only having a marginal influence. According to the conditional 
probability hypothesis statements made by low power sources should increase the 
number of generated counter examples which will be manifested in the P(q|¬p) 
measure. This was observed (see Table 6.6), however, the high power source for 
conjunctive inducements also produced a relatively high P(q|¬p) value resulting in a 
non-significant effect. 
 
There may be an explanation for the non-significant result with the conjunctive 
probability estimates of q given not-p. Ohm & Thompson (2006) found high truth 
values assigned to the majority of inducements they used in their research; 
Experiment 8 also found relatively high conditional probability estimates for low 
power. It, therefore, appears that listeners will assume a message is true, as suggested 
by Grice’s maxim of quality and that may include a message from a low power 
source. Indeed, low ranking individuals may provide felicitous statements, 
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particularly when expressed as a tip or warning. Only when the message or source of 
the message is questioned does the process of generating counter examples begin. 
 
Of course there may be occasions when an individual of low rank has sufficient 
authority to make a true assertion, for example when stating a warning or giving 
advice. This would raise the question of the felicity of the utterance and may suggest 
why warnings are often classed as a separate class of inducement from promises and 
threats. This will require further experimentation to isolate any additional pragmatic 
factors that may be in operation. 
 
The findings reported here can be contrasted with those of Ray et al. (1989) who 
failed to capture any effects of power. As suggested previously (see section 6.1) Ray 
and colleagues were not directly investigating power relations and the authority 
figures used in their scenarios are questionable. The experiments reported in this 
chapter show how the influence of power can be manipulated to produce significant 
effects. Similarly, with previous studies of inducements (Newstead et al., 1997; Ohm 
& Thompson, 2006) some of their findings may be associated with the power 
relations involved in the social scenarios employed. 
 
The social scenario and the roles of individuals within it bring to the fore a number of 
other pragmatic issues. For instance the anomalies observed in the ratings of the 
armed forces scenario in Experiments 6 and 7 may be explained in terms of 
participants being unable to distinguish between the ranks of Sergeant and Corporal, 
either because both ranks are considered to hold significant power given the strict 
hierarchical structure of the armed forces, or else ignorance of which is the higher 
 166
ranking officer. It could, therefore, be argued that the Armed Forces scenario did not 
sufficiently capture the power differences in rank with the statements used. The 
Armed Forces scenario may be at the opposite extreme to the contexts used primarily 
by Ray et al. (1989); within the Armed Forces, all offices of rank have the ability to 
make a statement true. 
 
In sum, the experiments reported in this chapter have shown that power of source is a 
further pragmatic factor that has broad generality. A range of social contexts 
encompass power relations and much of our discourse involves inducements. 
Inducements themselves can be expressed as conditional, conjunctive and disjunctive 
statements which appear to be understood equally well. The suppositional reasoning 
theory of Evans and colleagues (Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Evans, Over & 
Handley, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004) offers a better explanation of the findings as it 
emphasises the probabilistic nature of reasoning. This theory would suggest that 
System 1 is active when reasoning with inducements and the pragmatics of power. 
Participants are determining the probability of the consequent of a statement being 
made true, and this is most likely when the source of the statement is of high social 
rank. The findings, therefore, support a growing body of research suggesting 
reasoning, including deontic reasoning, is probabilistic. 
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Chapter 7 
Judgement Revision with Power of Source and Inducements 
 
7.1 Rationale 
Power of source has been shown to be a pragmatic factor of deontic reasoning. The 
experiments of the previous chapter demonstrated the generality of an authority 
source influencing the acceptance of conditional statements, inducements, and 
conjunctive and disjunctive assertions. An utterance made by a high power source is 
perceived as having more credibility than an utterance from a low source of power. 
Further, the probability of outcomes is perceived to be controlled by a high ranking 
individual to a greater extent than a low status individual, as shown with measures of 
conditional probability (P(q|p)). There is also evidence to suggest that when 
considering a statement by a low power source the number of counter-examples 
increases, particularly with conditional inducements, as shown in the measure of the 
probability of q, given not-p (P(q|¬p)). This chapter develops the pragmatic factor of 
power of source by embedding it in a judgement revision task. 
 
The proposal that reasoning and decision-making are invariably linked has gained 
gradual credence. Evans, Over & Manktelow (1993) suggested both reasoning and 
decision-making are concerned with rationality. Studies with thematic versions of the 
selection task involved features associated with decision-making, such as probability 
(Kirby, 1994; Manktelow, Sutherland & Over, 1995) and utility (Manktelow & Over, 
1991). The realisation that a common feature of many reasoning tasks was the 
involvement of deontic reasoning processes (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) also increased 
the credibility of the argument that reasoning and decision-making were associated. 
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Deontic reasoning involves permissions and obligations which are not truth functional 
like indicative logical reasoning tasks, and allow the inclusion of probabilities. Thus, 
Oaksford & Chater (1994) and Manktelow & Over (1995) called for a decision-
theoretic approach to deontic reasoning. 
 
Theoretically, developments have moved in the direction of a probability theory of 
reasoning. Oaksford & Chater (1994) proposed a Bayesian theory to explain the 
findings with the selection task, called Information Gain theory. They have extended 
their probabilistic theory to explain a number of related areas, such as conditional 
reasoning (Oaksford, Chater & Larkin, 2000) and syllogistic reasoning (Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999).  
 
Inspired by the work of Oaksford and Chater, Evans and colleagues have developed a 
separate probabilistic theory. The suppositional theory (Evans, Handley & Over, 
2003; Evans, Over & Handley, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004) proposes that utterances 
are considered in terms of the probability of the antecedent (p) and the consequent (q), 
in particular the conditional probability i.e. the probability of q, given p (P(q|p)). 
Support for the theory is steadily growing and has been used to explain a number of 
phenomena, including indicative conditionals (Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003; Over, 
Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley & Over, 2007), inducements (Ohm & Thompson, 
2006) and causal and diagnostic conditionals (Evans, Handley, Hadjichristidis, 
Thompson, Over & Bennett, 2007). Experiment 8, reported in the previous chapter, 
provided a test of the theory in relation to power of source with positive results. 
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The empirical investigation and theoretical developments in decision-making and 
judgement revision has produced two distinct approaches; heuristics and linear 
models (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). The heuristics approach is based on the view that 
human cognitive capacity is limited and therefore simple heuristic are employed when 
making decisions (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC research Group, 1999; Kahneman, 
Slovic & Tversky, 1982). The approach of Kahneman, Tversky and their collaborators 
has been to show that human reasoning and decision-making does not meet the 
standards of normative theories (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). Gigerenzer’s 
approach has been to obtain evidence for proposed heuristics, such as take-the-best 
(TTB) (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). This idea has intuitive appeal, however, a 
difficulty for the approach is predicting under what environmental conditions 
heuristics will be employed. 
 
The linear models approach to judgement and decision-making has been influenced 
by the work of Brunswik (1952) and assumes the decision-maker can hold all 
information. This information, or environment cues, are combined and weighted to 
produce a rational judgement or decision. Several linear models have been proposed 
(Dawes, 1979; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975; Keeney & Raiffa, 
1976). The advantage of this approach is that the inclusion of environmental cues 
allows for the weighting of information in terms of content and context. A 
disadvantage is that linear models are based on algebraic calculations and, therefore, 
assume a degree of System 2 thinking. However, the two approaches, heuristics and 
linear models, are not mutually exclusive as many theorists today believe it to be 
perfectly reasonable to assume that judgement and decision-making can involve both 
processes (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2007). 
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An additional manipulation is to be incorporated in to the experiments of this chapter 
which relate to a further proposal for explaining the range of mediating pragmatic 
factors influencing reasoning in everyday contexts. Fairley & Manktelow (2004) and 
Manktelow & Fairley (2000) suggest everyday reasoning contexts invoke 
superordinate principles (or Super P’s). Such principles are drawn from one’s 
personal knowledge and experience and capture the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a particular outcome. An example taken from Manktelow & Fairley 
(2000, Experiment 1) will illustrates their idea.  
 
A familiar conditional statement was set in syllogistic form, “If you study hard, you 
do well in exams”. Knowing that a student has studied hard, one would make the 
logical modus ponens conclusion that the student will do well in exams. However, a 
number of disabling conditions may influence the sufficiency of the deduction drawn 
(for instance, that the student arrived late for the exam or is very nervous). Similarly, 
with the denial of the antecedent (DA) argument form the statement, “If you study 
hard, you do well in exams” and if then informed, “You do not study hard”, then a 
common but logically fallacious conclusion may be drawn, “You do not do well in 
exams”. With this form of argument, alternative causes were shown to influence the 
necessity of the drawn deduction (for instance, if told that the student cheated or was 
intelligent). A control condition was also introduced in which irrelevant factors were 
stated (for instance, the student wore blue socks or was friendly). 
 
In the conditional arguments above Manktelow and Fairley suggest “doing well in 
exams” may be interpreted as a Super P of the form, “ways of passing an exam”. 
Studying hard may be a pre-requisite for passing exams, however, one’s knowledge of 
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such contexts may provide a set of circumstances (alternative causes) whereby the 
outcome is made true. Similarly, past knowledge and experience will make one aware 
of possible disabling conditions, whatever preparations may have been undertaken, 
resulting in failure. 
 
In a further experiment (experiment 3) Manktelow and Fairley used Manktelow & 
Over’s (1991) well known conditional statement, “If you tidy your room, then you 
may go out to play”. Alternative antecedents were introduced in the form of, “tidying 
the living room” or “washing the dishes” which resulted in the participants believing 
that the conditions had been satisfied to make the conclusion true, that is, the child 
could go out to play. Disabling conditions such as, “watching TV” or “phoning a 
friend” were considered as negations of the antecedent and, therefore, the outcome of 
going out to play was not made true. Irrelevant factors, such as “completed 
homework” or “made a cake” made no direct impact on the conclusion drawn. Thus, a 
general Super P appears to be in operation in this context, that of “helping around the 
house”. In sum, alternative causes (antecedents) are those factors that satisfy Super P, 
while disabling conditions (antecedents) are those that prevent Super P from being 
satisfied. 
 
Manktelow & Fairley (2000) modified their sufficiency / necessity theory when 
explaining superordinate principles by couching their explanation in probabilistic 
terms. They suggest that alternative causes increase the probability that an event will 
follow in the absence of the cause and, therefore, undermine necessity while disabling 
conditions and additional requirements both decrease the probability that an event will 
follow the cause, that is, they undermine sufficiency. The experiments reported in 
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Manktelow & Fairley (2000) provide strong evidence for the existence of 
superordinate principles in both the causal and deontic domains and their revised 
theory is more consistent with current thinking and the approach taken within this 
thesis. 
 
In the experiments of Manktelow and Fairley, Super P’s were inferred from 
subordinate statements; they did not use explicit superordinate statements. In the 
following experiment superordinate conditional statements will be compared with 
typical, non-superordinate, if…then statements. This will allow for a better test of the 
proposal for superordinate principles within the domain of deontic reasoning. Power 
of source seems a suitable context in which to expect superordinate principles to exert 
an influence; an individual with authority should be more influential with both general 
and superordinate conditional statements.  
 
Judgement revision was demonstrated within the context of motoring offences in 
Experiment 5 of this thesis (see Chapter 5). Judgements were revised in predictable 
directions when information concerning the nature of offence, scale of violation, and 
accompanying mitigating or aggravating circumstances was presented in series (i.e. 
step-by-step, cf. Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). In particular, significantly revised 
judgements were most likely to be observed when a contrast effect was present, for 
example, a minor scale of violation followed by aggravating circumstances (i.e. 35 
mph – disqualified driver). It is predicted that in the current experiment similar effects 
will be observed within the context of inducements; in the scenarios used scale of 
violation and power of source will provide the subsequent information for revised 
judgements. 
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In sum, the following experiment involves judgement revision within the context of 
three types of inducement (threat, warning and promise). Two scenarios are utilised; 
inducements uttered within a family setting to a teenage son and inducements made to 
employees within a company. A further manipulation is the form of statement spoken 
to the teenage son or employee in order to measure perceived differences between a 
general superordinate statement and a more specific non-superordinate utterance. A 
superordinate statement refers to misbehaviour or well behaved within the family 
context and misconduct and excellent behaviour within the company scenario. The 
non-superordinate statements relate to lateness within the family setting and time-
keeping within the context of a company. Three judgements of likelihood are 
measured; the initial rating, given the inducement and the behaviour of the teenager or 
employee; a second judgement, given the scale of violation (for threat or warning) or 
rate of compliance (for promise); a third rating, given the authority of the individual 
making the initial statement. Scale of violation was categorised as major or minor and 
power of source as high or low. 
 
It was predicted that if utterances comprise of a hierarchical structure with 
superordinate principles encompassing many specific statements a difference would 
be expected in the perception of such statements which would be reflected in the 
likelihood ratings of action. A difference is therefore predicted between superordinate 
and non-superordinate statements. A difference is also expected between a major and 
minor violation (or compliance) with likelihood ratings of action increasing for major 
transgressions. Power of source is predicted to result in a high power source 
producing greater likelihood judgements of action than a low power source. Formally, 
the hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
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1. A significant difference in the likelihood ratings of action will be observed between 
superordinate conditional statements and non-superordinate statements. 
2. A major transgression (compliance) will produce greater likelihood judgements of 
action compared to a minor transgression (compliance). 
3. A high power of source will produce greater likelihood ratings of action compared 
to a low power source. 
 
7.2 Method 
Participants 
Participants comprised of 457 post-16 students attending Stourbridge College of 
Further Education and undergraduate students attending the University of 
Wolverhampton. A further 18 participants were not used in the final analysis because 
they had not completed all judgement revision tasks. Of those completing the required 
tasks 154 were males (age range 18 - 45 years) and 303 females (age range 16 - 46 
years). All participants were unpaid volunteers and allocated to one of 48 conditions. 
 
Materials 
The materials comprised of A5 size booklets containing one of 48 conditions. The 
first page provided instructions for the task and an example. The instructions stated: 
 For this task, you will be presented with a statement that is spoken by one 
 individual to another. Given the statement you must judge the likelihood of 
 action. Further details will be given on subsequent pages and you will have 
 the option of revising your decision. 
 
 
An example then followed: 
 
 For example, given the following statement spoken to a girl: 
 “Finish your homework and I will take you to the cinema” 
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 Given the girl enjoys the cinema, how likely is it that she will finish her 
 homework? 
 
 Very Likely  [   ] 
 Likely   [9 ] 
 Unsure  [   ] 
 Unlikely  [   ] 
 Very Unlikely  [   ] 
 
 If you believe the girl is likely to finish her homework, you would tick the 
 Likely box, as shown above. 
 
 Please turn each page in turn and make your judgement before moving to the 
 next page. 
 
The details of each inducement was presented over three pages with the inducement 
given first, followed by the scale of violation or compliance and finally the authority 
of the individual making the statement, either of high or low power. 
 
An example of the materials used for the judgement revision task is given below (this 
example is for the non-superordinate condition with family scenario and threat 
induction): 
 
 A family is concerned about their teenage son who is repeatedly arriving home 
 late in the evening. In an attempt to improve his time-keeping a threat is made 
 to ground the teenager if he arrives home after 11pm during the following 
 month. 
 
 The teenage son is given the following threat: “If you arrive home after 
 11pm during the following month, then I will ground you” 
 
 The teenage arrives home after 11pm during the following month 
 
 How likely is it that the teenager will be grounded? 
 
 Very likely  [   ] 
 Likely   [   ] 
 Unsure  [   ] 
 Unlikely  [   ] 
 Very Unlikely  [   ] 
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The above was Rating 0 (R0), prior to any revision of judgement. The first revised 
judgement was labelled R1 (Rating1) and detailed the scale of violation. For the 
example above a minor violation was for the teenager to arrive home 10 minutes late; 
a major violation, arriving home 3 hours late. Rating (R2), the second revised 
judgement, involved information about the source of the initial inducement, either an 
individual of high or low authority (for the example above, father was used as high 
power and younger brother as low power). Each judgement involved assessing the 
likelihood of action on a 5-point Likert scale, as shown above. For the family threat 
example, participants were judging the likelihood of the teenager being grounded. 
 
For the full set of materials see Appendix A9 (Experiment 9: Materials). 
 
Design 
A between-participants design was employed with three factors having two levels 
each; principle (superordinate and non-superordinate), scale of violation/compliance 
(major and minor), and power of source (high and low). The factors of inducement 
and scenario were collapsed following the non-significant findings of the previous 
experiments. The independent variables for this experiment were, therefore, principle, 
scale of violation/compliance and power of source. Three dependent variables were 
measured, the initial judgement of likelihood given the inducement (R0), the revised 
judgement of likelihood of action given scale of violation/compliance (R1), and the 
second revised judgement given the power of the message source. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested in large groups, ranging in size from 20 – 100, and randomly 
assigned to one of 48 conditions. The conditions of the experiment comprised 
principle (superordionate / non-superordinate), inducement (threat, warning, promise), 
scenario (family, company), scale of violation/compliance (major / minor) and power 
of source (high / low); hence, 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 48. 
 
The superordinate condition for the family threat and warning scenarios referred to 
misbehaviour, while the promise condition referred to behaving well. The non-
superordinate family conditions referred to arriving home late. Thus, the 
superordinate conditions used a general reference of behaviour, the non-superordinate 
conditions used a specific behaviour reference, lateness. Similarly for the company 
scenario, superordinate threats and warnings referred to misconduct, while the 
promise refers to excellent behaviour; non-superordinate threats and promises involve 
arriving late for work and the promise refers to excellent time-keeping. 
 
Three inducement types were used, threat, warning and promise (agential). The 
promise made by an external agent was not used for this study. Each inducement was 
stated as a conditional, if…then, statement with disjunctives and conjunctives being 
omitted. 
 
The scenarios of Family and Company were employed with company being a 
variation on the employment scenario used in previous experiments. The scenarios of 
Armed Forces and Medical were not employed. 
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Scale of violation comprised of major and minor. For non-superordinate threats and 
warnings for the family scenario, a major violation involved a teenager arriving home 
3 hours late; a minor offence arriving home 10 minutes late. Similarly for the 
company scenario, the employee arriving 10 minutes late for work constituted a minor 
violation and 3 hours late a major violation. Promises were stated in terms of 
compliance with the family scenario giving the inducement: 
 
 If you arrive home before 11pm for the following month, then I will give you 
 an increase in your allowance 
 
A major compliance to this promise was that the teenager arrives home every evening 
for a month; a minor compliance was for the teenager to arrive home before 11pm 
most evenings. The company scenario involved a similar inducement concerning 
time-keeping with the employee described as arriving on time every day or most days, 
representing a major and minor compliance, respectively. 
 
For the superordinate conditions the family scenario referred to misbehaviour when 
uttering a threat or warning, with the major violation being the teenager taking £20 
without asking and a minor violation the teenager taking £1 without asking. The 
superordinate promise for the family context was expressed in terms of the teenager 
being well behaved for the coming month with a major compliance being an 100% 
improvement in the teenager’s behaviour, a minor compliance a 50% improvement. 
The company threats and warnings, for the superordinate conditions, related to 
misconduct with the major violation being that the employee had stolen money and a 
minor offence the employee had taken an envelope belonging to the company. The 
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superordinate promise in the company context referred to excellent behavioural 
conduct, with high compliance being the employee won the Employee of the Month 
award and minor compliance the employee was nominated for the award. 
 
The power of source remained constant across all conditions. For the family scenarios 
Father was used as the high power source and Younger Brother the low power source. 
The company scenario had the Managing Director as the high power source and 
Supervisor as the low source of power. 
 
Each participant was given one of 48 booklets to complete. Each booklet was of A5 
size and comprised four loose-leaf pages with text printed on one side only. 
Participants were asked to read the first page of the booklet which provided 
standardised instructions and an example to illustrate the forthcoming task (the same 
example was given in each of the 48 booklets). As the task involved judgement 
revision participants were asked to complete the tasks in strict order and not to "look 
ahead". The opportunity was given for participants to ask questions, if necessary. 
 
Three judgements of action were made by each participant on a 5-point Likert scale., 
ranging from Very Likely to Very Unlikely. The responses were scored as shown 
below: 
 Very likely [5] 
Likely  [4] 
Unsure  [3] 
Unlikely [2] 
Very unlikely [1] 
 
No time limit was set for the completion of this task. 
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7.3 Results 
The data from 18 participants was not used for analysis because they did not complete 
all three judgements. For raw data see Appendix B9 (Experiment 9: Raw Data). 
 
Overall mean likelihood ratings are shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 for the non-
superordinate and superordinate inducements, respectively (for full set of mean scores 
see Appendix C9 (Experiment 9: Descriptive Statistics)).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Non-superordinate Inducements 
  
Family Scenario 
 
Inducement Major  Minor   Power of Source 
  Violation/ Violation/ High  Low 
  Compliance Compliance 
Threat 
3.7  4.4  2.6  4.1  1.5 
Warning 
3.3  3.9  2.5  3.9  2.1 
Promise 
3.9  4  3.3  3.5  2.8 
 
Company Scenario 
Threat 
3.5  3.8  2.9  3.9  2.3 
Warning 
3.1  3.7  3.1  3.6  2.4 
Promise 
4.3  4.0  2.9  3.8  3.4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7.1: Overall mean likelihood ratings for the non-superordinate 
inducements for family and company scenarios. Violations are associated with 
threats and warnings, compliance with promises. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Superordinate Inducements 
Family Scenario 
  Major  Minor   Power of Source 
  Violation/ Violation/ High  Low 
  Compliance Compliance 
Threat 
3.4  4.1  2.9  3.7  1.8 
 
Warning 
3.1  4.1  3.0  4.1  1.4 
 
Promise 
4.1  4.3  3.4  4.8  2.1 
 
Company Scenario 
Threat 
4.2  5.0  2.6  3.9  3.1 
 
Warning 
4.0  4.6  2.7  3.9  2.7 
 
Promise 
3.5  3.9  3.7  3.9  3.0 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 7.2: Overall mean likelihood ratings for the superordinate inducements for 
family and company scenarios. Violations are associated with threats and 
warnings, compliance with promises. 
 
The overall mean ratings for major violation / compliance are greater than the 
judgements for a minor violation or compliance, as predicted. Further, the likelihood 
ratings of action for a high power source are greater than a low source of power. 
These findings are consistent across type of inducement, scenario and super- and non-
superordinate principles. The initial likelihood ratings are also very similar for 
superordinate and non-superordinate conditions; ranging between 3.1 – 4.3 for the 
non-superordinate inducements, and 3.1 – 4.2 for inducements presented in the 
superordinate form. 
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The data was analysed statistically using a three-way (2 x 2 x 2) between-participants 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis was undertaken using SPSS version 15. 
Three dependent variables were measured corresponding to the initial judgement (R0) 
and two revised judgements (R1 and R2). The first rating (R0) provides a comparison 
of inducements stated in superordinate and non-superordinate form; the second rating 
(R2) compares major violation / compliance with minor violation / compliance; and 
the final judgement gives a comparison of high and low power. 
 
For the initial judgement (Super P v non-Super P) no significant effect was observed 
(F(1,449) = 1.422, p = 0.234). 
 
For the first revised judgement (R1: major v minor violation/compliance) a significant 
effect was found (F(1,449) = 151.849, p < 0.001) with no interaction effect observed 
between scale of violation v principle (F(1,449) = 0.725, p = 0.395). 
 
For the second revised judgement (R2: high v low power source) a significant effect 
was observed (F(1,449) = 177.589, p < 0.001). However, no significant interaction 
effects were observed between power of source v principle (F(1,449) = 2.745, p = 
0.098), power of source v scale of violation (F(1,449) = 1.986, p = 0.159) or principle 
v power of source v scale of violation (F(1,449) = 2.551, p = 0.111). 
 
 
 
 
 
 183
7.4 Discussion 
The experiment in this chapter involved judgement revision of conditional 
inducements presented in superordinate or non-superordinate form. Manipulations of 
scale of violation / compliance and power of source provided embedded pragmatic 
factors that had previously been shown in previous chapters to influence deontic 
reasoning. A novel factor of the research was the inclusion of a superordinate level of 
inducement. 
The findings provide support for two of the three hypotheses. There was no 
significant effect for principle (superordinate v non-superordinate) conditions. 
However, significant effects were observed for the factors of scale of violation / 
compliance and power of source.  
 
The superordinate phrase provided a generic inducement compared to a more specific 
inducement with the non-superordinate conditions. It appears that either form 
produces similar likelihood ratings, however, the finding contrasts with the hypothesis 
which predicted a difference in ratings of likelihood. It may be that Manktelow and 
Fairley’s (2000) claim that superordinate principles are invoked in many reasoning 
contexts means that the generic inducement form will not be easily distinguished from 
the more specific inducement or when the superordinate is stated explicitly. Further 
investigation may be required to disentangle the reasoning processes occurring with 
superordinate statements from indicative forms. 
 
Scale of violation and power of source were observed to influence ones judgement 
which is consistent with the findings reported in Chapter 6. In the previous 
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experiments, however, judgements were made after all information was given (i.e. 
end-of series). In this experiment the influence of both scale of violation and power of 
source was observed in a judgement revision task (i.e. step-by-step). Thus it appears 
that these features are reliable pragmatic factors of both deontic reasoning and 
judgement revision. 
 
The findings provide good evidence to support the view that reasoning and decision-
making are associated and involve many of the same processes, as suggested by a 
number of theorists (Evans, Over & Manktelow, 1993; Manktelow & Over, 1995; 
Oaksford & Chater, 1994). If comparable findings can be obtained between reasoning 
tasks and judgement revision tasks, as reported here, it would suggest that similar 
cognitive processes are involved in both activities, at least for deontic contexts. 
 
Although the findings support the view for a decision-theoretic approach to deontic 
reasoning (Manktelow & Over, 1995), they do not directly test any theory of human 
reasoning or decision-making. Therefore the experimental results may be explained 
by a number of explanations. Schema theories (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985; Cosmides, 
1989) do not incorporate judgement revision into their models, however, revised 
schema may be plausible as subsequent information is received. Heuristic models of 
decision-making (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1982) could not currently 
explain the findings of this experiment without devising a further heuristic. Linear 
decision-making models, such as Brunswik’s (1952) and derived models, may offer a 
more appropriate explanation as they incorporate environmental variants, which could 
include pragmatic effects. The linear models may also share more features with 
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probabilistic accounts of reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Evans, Handley & 
Over, 2003) as they are both algebraic and can incorporate measures of probability 
and utility. The design of the experiment in this chapter would have to be adapted to 
test a particular theory directly, however, this is feasible. 
 
A number of features of the experiment could be improved. The range of scenarios 
were rather limited, however, the chosen contexts had produced reliable findings in 
previous experiments. Inducements produce different outcomes with promises 
offering a reward, while threats and warnings propose a sanction. The inclusion of a 
promise also meant that the judgement task involved rating the likelihood of an 
individual complying with an inducement, rather than violating it as occurs with 
threats and warnings. The classification of major and minor violations have been 
demonstrated in earlier experiments using motoring transgressions, however, rating 
major and minor compliance may be quite a different task from considering scaled 
violations. 
 
In sum, the findings showed no difference in the ratings of superordinate and non-
superordinate statements which has implications for Manktelow & Fairley’s (2000) 
proposal for a hierarchical structure to spoken inducements. Significant effects were 
found for scale of violation and power of source, suggesting these pragmatic factors 
are transferable from reasoning to judgement revision tasks. The findings give support 
to the view that reasoning and decision-making involve similar cognitive processes 
but do not provide specific support for any particular theory of either reasoning or 
decision-making. 
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
 
8.1 Overview of Chapter Content 
This chapter will begin with a summary of the experimental findings of the 
experiments reported in the thesis. The implications of the findings will then be 
discussed in relation to current issues and thinking within the reasoning and decision-
making fields. A theoretical discussion will then consider current deontic reasoning 
theories as they apply to the findings of this research and it will be postulated that a 
probabilistic theory best explains the reported results. Finally, proposals for further 
research will be made in order to extend and develop the research programme of 
pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning. 
 
8.2 Summary of Experimental Findings 
The first pragmatic factor to be investigated was scale of violation within a working-
rule scenario (Experiment 1, Chapter 3). It was observed that participants rate the 
breaking of a rule as more serious during the day of the violation (Day 1) rather than 
the extent to which the rule is violated on a subsequent day (Day 2). Mean fines 
increased for Day 1 as the scale of violation increased over 1, 4 & 8 hours. However, 
the mean fines for Day 2 showed little difference as scale of violation increased. 
 
The findings of Experiment 1 involved the use of an inference task. The aim of the 
next experiment (Experiment 2, Chapter 3) was to attempt to repeat the results using a 
deductive reasoning task, specifically a Large Array Selection Task (LAST) 
(Manktelow, Sutherland & Over, 1995). However, the findings in Experiment 1 were 
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found not to transfer to the LAST and it was suggested that the detection of violators 
in such a task was relatively easy and did not provide discriminations of judgement. 
 
Experiment 3 (Chapter 4) considered a further pragmatic factor, the circumstances 
associated with violations. The contexts used for this experiment was motoring 
transgressions; speeding and drink-driving. Significant effects were observed across 
three classes of circumstances; mitigating, neutral and aggravating. A significant 
difference in seriousness ratings was also observed between the two offences, with 
drink-driving considered the more serious. 
 
Having established significant findings for scale of violation (Experiment 1) and 
circumstances (Experiment 3), the two pragmatic factors were combined in 
Experiment 4 (Chapter 4). Using the motoring transgressions of speeding and drink-
driving, scale of violation was incorporated with the use of a major and minor offence 
with additional aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Participants judged 
whether a motorist should be fined, using a list of modal terms (e.g. must, should, 
must not, should not etc.). Significant effects were found for circumstances, type of 
motoring offence, and scale of violation providing further support for considering 
these effects as general pragmatic factors of deontic reasoning. 
 
The subsequent experiment investigated the relationship between reasoning and 
decision-making with material presented in series (Experiment 5, Chapter 5). This 
method of presentation affords the opportunity for participants to revise their 
judgements. In this task a fine was determined on a scale from £0 (no fine) to £100 
(max. fine) with the opportunity for two revised judgements, given the scale of the 
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violation and the circumstances. Significant differences were found for the initial 
judgement involving the transgression (speeding v drink-driving), for the first revised 
judgement when scale of violation was introduced (major v minor) and for the second 
revised judgement with the introduction of circumstances (aggravating v mitigating). 
Post hoc t-tests revealed significant differences between revised judgements, 
particularly when a contrast effect was apparent, for instance a minor offence 
followed by aggravating circumstances. In general, judgement revision followed 
predicted directions, given the results of the previous experiments.  
 
A further pragmatic factor, power of source, was introduced in the next series of 
experiments. Experiment 6 (Chapter 6) used conditional statements within an 
inferential reasoning task and it was found that an individual of high social rank was 
judged to be more likely to make a statement true compared to an individual of low 
social rank and this finding was consistent across both formal and informal scenarios. 
Significant trends from low-high power were observed for all scenarios, except the 
armed forces context, which produced an anomalous result between medium and high 
power. 
 
The influence of power was then extended to three types of inducement (threat, 
warning and promise) and to conjunctive and disjunctive statements (Experiment 7, 
Chapter 6). The findings with inducements were similar to those obtained with 
conditional statements; individuals of high power were perceived as having a greater 
probability of making the consequent true given the antecedent and this was also 
found for conjunctive and disjunctive statements. Significant trend tests were 
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observed for each inducement (threat, warning, promise agential and promise 
external) across scenario (family, medical, armed forces, and employment). 
 
Experiment 8 (Chapter 6) provided a theoretical-basis to the research with power of 
source by directly testing the conditional probability hypothesis (Evans, Handley & 
Over, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004). Participants provided ratings of credibility given 
the authority of the message source and probability estimates of possible outcomes. 
Power of source was again found to produce a significant effect with a high power 
source rated as more credible than a low power source when uttering both conditional 
and conjunctive inducements. Probability estimates were used to calculate conditional 
probability ratings (P(q|p)) which were found to be significant for both conditional 
and conjunctive inducements, indicating that a high power source was more likely to 
make q (the consequent) true, given p (the antecedent) compared to a low ranking 
source. Further, calculations of (P(q|¬p)) indicated that counter-examples (not-p’s) 
were significantly more likely to occur when considering a conditional inducement 
spoken by a low power source but not when considering conjunctive statements. The 
delta-p statistic, (P(q|p) – P(q|¬p)), would predict a greater value for a high power 
source compared to a low power source, and this was observed for both conditional 
and conjunctive inducements. 
 
The final experiment (Experiment 9, Chapter 7) involved a judgement revision task 
incorporating inducements, scale of violation with threats and warnings or compliance 
with a promise, and power of source. A judgement of the likelihood of action was 
made for the initial inducement (threat, warning, promise agential) and for two 
revised judgements – scale of violation/compliance (major or minor) and power of 
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source (high or low). A significant difference was observed for the revised 
judgements; a major violation/compliance producing a greater likelihood of action 
than a minor violation/compliance and a high power source producing a greater rating 
than a low source of power. A further manipulation comparing superordinate 
statements (Fairley & Manktelow, 2004) with non-superordinate inducements did not 
produce a significant effect. 
 
8.3 Implications of Experimental Findings 
The findings from the experiments conducted for this thesis have a number of 
implications for the thinking and reasoning literature. In particular we shall consider 
how pragmatic factors develop earlier findings of content effects and thematic 
versions of the Wason selection task. Pragmatic effects also extend the range of 
factors found to modify deontic reasoning. The context in which pragmatics operate 
must also be stated; pragmatics involve familiar, real-world situations and involve 
practical, System 1 thinking. Pragmatics can also be applied to judgement revision 
tasks bringing the fields of reasoning and decision-making closer together. Finally, 
some consideration will be given to the unpredicted and anomalous findings within 
the reported experiments. 
 
Content and context effects with syllogistic and other forms of reasoning were 
documented from the earliest studies (Wilkins, 1928) and facilitation with thematic 
versions of the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968) suggested that reasoning cannot 
be devoid of everyday knowledge. Considering pragmatic factors is one way of 
investigating and explaining the use of world knowledge in reasoning and decision-
making. Pragmatics within the study of language is well developed and it is suggested 
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here that such factors can be applied to reasoning and decision-making. 
 
The seminal paper of Cheng & Holyoak (1985) provided a major development with 
the realisation that thematic versions of the selection task produced facilitation when 
they involved deontic reasoning. Deontic reasoning is concerned with permissions 
and obligations, a feature of the majority of the thematic selection tasks. Aristotle 
made the distinction between theoretical and practical reasoning with deontic 
reasoning being a special type of the latter. Practical reasoning is associated with 
one’s goals, including utilities and involves inferential reasoning which is not truth 
functional. Further investigations into deontic reasoning have found factors that 
modify the reasoning process, such as one’s utilities (Manktelow & Over, 1991) and 
probabilities (Kirby, 1994). In this thesis it is taken that deontic reasoning is a form of 
practical reasoning in which a range of real-world pragmatic effects may be observed. 
 
Traditionally, reasoning has been investigated using logical reasoning tasks that are 
truth functional. However, more recently there has been a trend to use more realistic 
materials and the deduction paradigm has begun to be questioned (Evans, 2002). The 
approach in this thesis has been to endorse this recent trend and the materials used in 
the reported experiments have involved real-world contexts, familiar transgressions, 
inducements, scaled violations and power relations that would be known to all adult 
populations. 
 
The distinction between System 1 and System 2 thinking (Stanovich, 1999) is 
important as it represents everyday thinking and formal, logical thinking, respectively. 
The cognitive processes for the two forms appear to be quite different but have 
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traditionally been ignored by theories of reasoning. Pragmatic factors would fit the 
characteristics of System 1 as they are associated with personal knowledge and 
experience and can be invoked readily, with little conscious processing. Reasoning 
pragmatically does not seem to require deduction. However, that does not preclude 
the possibility of formal, rule-based reasoning occurring.  
 
Research findings with the utilities and probabilities associated with deontic reasoning 
has lead to the suggestion that reasoning and decision making are invariably linked 
(Evans, Over & Manktelow, 1993). However, there has been no research to test this 
hypothesis. The judgement revision experiments reported in this thesis provide 
support for such a view and suggest there is much scope for developing this strand of 
research. 
 
The specific pragmatic factors investigated in this thesis have been scale of violation, 
circumstances, and power of source. Each has been found to modify both reasoning 
and decision-making processes. These factors are associated with deontic contexts 
and transgressions of rules and laws. However, there is no reason why aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances and power of source may not apply to other contexts. 
Furthermore, the findings here suggest further pragmatic factors should be 
identifiable. 
 
A number of unpredicted findings were also observed in the series of experiments. 
The findings of Experiment 1 in which an effect was observed for Day 1 but not Day 
2 is difficult to explain. The perception of transgressions also influenced findings; 
drink-driving was consistently considered more serious than speeding and there were 
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few circumstances that mitigated against a drink-driving offence. Further, scale of 
violation varied between the two motoring transgressions with the minor speeding 
offence barely considered an offence at all, in contrast with drink-driving in which a 
minor violation was often considered comparable to a major violation. Only by 
considering the pragmatics of transgressions can these sorts of findings be discovered. 
 
Limitations of the experiments reported in the thesis should also be mentioned. The 
number and range of social contexts may be considered rather limited, although some 
consideration was given to the inclusion of formal and informal institutions. However, 
one advantage of using a reduced range of social contexts is that it allows genuine 
effects to emerge. For example, a number of studies have used a greater number of 
scenarios to investigate power (Ray, Raynolds & Carranza, 1989) and inducements 
(Ohm & Thompson, 2004, 2006). These studies have obtained some contrasting 
findings to the results reported here and part of the reason may lie in the social 
contexts of their materials. Ray et al. used some power relations that are questionable 
and Ohm & Thompson used several inducements that confounded with power of 
source. 
 
The tasks given to participants varied from study to study, ranging from fines, 
likelihood ratings of action to credibility ratings and probability estimates. One could 
argue for a more consistent approach to the measures used to allow for a comparison 
of effects across experiments. For instance, a better comparison of performance would 
be possible between reasoning and judgement revision tasks if both measured the 
same dependent variable. However, the range of measures and tasks does suggest that 
pragmatic factors produce reliable and valid effects. 
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The findings with inducements reported in this thesis were not consistent with 
previous research. All types of inducement were observed to have similar ratings 
whereas Newstead, Ellis, Evans & Dennis (1997) found subtle differences. Certainly, 
the definitions of each inducement differed between this thesis and those of Newstead 
et al. Each inducement (promise, threat, warning etc.) may have several forms 
requiring further investigation. A similar argument may be applied to conjunctive and 
disjunctive statements. 
 
The introduction of the superordinate level of statement in Chapter 7 produced 
comparable findings to those at the non-superordinate level. However, a number of 
issues arise. It may not always be clear what the superordinate level is. For instance, 
with the experiments involving drink-driving and speeding, one may state the 
superordinate level as motoring offences. However, clear differences are observed 
between the two motoring transgressions and the impact of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances. Therefore, the theory may require further elaboration to 
incorporate pragmatic influences. 
 
The approach taken here is that pragmatic factors produce reliable and valid effects in 
the context of deontic reasoning. Deontic reasoning is considered a type of practical, 
everyday reasoning involving System 1 thinking which is associated with decision-
making and judgement revision. The pragmatics of scale of violation, circumstances 
and power of source produce modifying influences when presented in familiar, 
realistic contexts. A number of findings were original and unpredicted and may 
provide the opportunity for further research. 
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8.4 Theoretical Discussion of Experimental Findings 
This section of the discussion will consider the major theories of reasoning in view of 
the findings obtained from the experiments with pragmatic factors of deontic 
reasoning. 
 
The earliest theory of deontic reasoning, Pragmatic Reasoning Schema (PRS) theory 
(Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), proposed a cognitive schema which is initiated when an 
obligation or permission is identified. However, the implicit suggestion is that the 
schema either fires or does not fire; there is no mention in the theory of partial 
activation as observed with scaled violations or sources of power. A schema-type 
theory may be appropriate for representing ones knowledge of general permissions 
and obligations but PRS theory appears inadequate in explaining the pragmatics of 
reasoning; the theory assumes ones recognition of a permission or obligation and 
activation of the appropriate schema as a priori. A possible modification of schema 
theory, to incorporate the effects reported in this thesis, would be to consider each 
pragmatic factor as an individual schema, however, this would not be a cognitively 
efficient form of representation. 
 
Evolutionary theories also have difficulty in explaining the subtleties of pragmatic 
effects on deontic reasoning. Social Contract theory (SCT) may offer a parsimonious 
explanation of how one reasons with violations and detects violators of social 
contracts but the theory cannot explain the relative responses to scaled violations or 
why one violation is considered more serious than another. Two major criticisms can 
be cast at social contract theory. Firstly, it lacks a semantic (or schematic) component 
containing acquired knowledge of violations from which to draw relevant knowledge 
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when reasoning with a range of infringements. Secondly, the activation of the cheater-
detection module is presented as an all-or-none event. The result of these deficiencies 
is that the theory fails to recognise that many laws and rules are arbitrary and invented 
within a particular social culture to fit a specific demand of the day. 
 
A feature of reasoning with rules is non-monotonicity, that is, drawn conclusions can 
be modified by subsequent information. The inclusion of pragmatic factors, 
particularly when presented in series in a judgement revision task, demonstrates 
reasoning and decision making to be monotonic. This creates particular difficulty for 
logic-based theories. However, theories based on logic have assumed System 2 
thinking while the focus of this thesis has been System 1 thinking. 
 
Ohm & Thompson (2006) in their study of inducements found some overlap between 
conditional probability and the probability of q, given not-p, and sufficiency and 
necessity. Perceived sufficiency reflects the extent to which p (the antecedent) 
guarantees the outcome of q (the consequent) while perceived necessity reflects the 
extent to which p (the antecedent) is a required condition for q (the consequent) to 
occur. Sufficient relations would have the P(q|p) close to one and necessary 
relationships would have the P(q|¬p) close to zero. The notion of sufficiency and 
necessity has been developed by a number of authors (Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis & 
Rist, 1991; Fairley, Manktelow & Over, 1999). In the context of the findings reported 
in the experiments of this thesis knowing that a motorist is drink-driving is sufficient 
for them to receive a heavy fine. For a motorist travelling at 35 mph in a 30 mph zone, 
it would be necessary for additional circumstances to apply for the motorist to receive 
a fine. 
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Mental models theory (MMT) (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) would also have 
difficulty incorporating the findings reported in this thesis, not least because Johnson-
Laird and his many collaborators have concentrated on abstract and arbitrary 
materials, avoiding the more realistic content as used here. However, a modified 
version of the theory may be able to explain pragmatic influences, particularly if 
combined with the probability theory of Evans and colleagues (Evans, Handley & 
Over, 2003; Evans, Over & Handley, 2003; Evans & Over, 2004). 
 
In this dual theory a statement would be represented by a mental model, incorporating 
pragmatic knowledge. The probability of the truth or felicity of the statement is then 
assessed. Mental models theory proposes that only an implicit model of given 
information is initially devised and true deduction requires the explicit evocation of 
counter examples. This initial model can be considered as a representation of System 
1 thinking; an immediate, relatively unconscious mental representation of the given 
information. For example, given the statement: 
 
If a motorist travels above 30mph in a built-up area and is stopped by the 
police, then he or she is liable to a fine. 
 
The following model may be evoked to represent the statement: 
 
  > 30 mph  Fine 
 
 
If informed that the motorist is travelling above 30 mph then one may draw the modus 
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ponens conclusion that the motorist is liable to a fine. However, when the speed of the 
motorist is specified such a conclusion does not automatically follow. For instance, if 
informed the following: 
 
 A motorist travels at 35 mph 
 
The following model may be constructed: 
 
  
  35 mph  No Fine 
 
Pragmatic knowledge determines that travelling at 35 mph does not constitute a 
violation and is unlikely to result in a fine. Hence, the probability of the statement 
being made true is significantly reduced. With this particular case there may be little 
need for the inclusion of probabilities and pragmatic knowledge applied to mental 
models may be sufficient. 
 
However, cases involving power of source and judgement revision appear more akin 
to a probabilistic explanation. For example, given the following inducement: 
 
 A boy is promised, “Mow the lawn and I will give you your pocket money”. 
The inducement may be represented as a mental model with the following: 
 
 Mow lawn  Pocket money 
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If it is then established that the promise has been made by the boy’s father, then one is 
likely to draw the conclusion that the boy will most likely receive his pocket money if 
he mows the lawn. However, the probability of q (will give you your pocket money) 
is reduced when it is known that the promise was made by the boys brother. Hence, 
the probability of the statement being made true, particularly the probability of q|p, is 
reduced. In mental models terms, the representation may be as follows: 
 
 Mow lawn  Pocket money  [Brother] 
 
 Mow lawn  No pocket money 
 
Note: [Brother] represents the fact that the inducement has been made by the brother, 
resulting in a counter example being evoked. 
A judgement revision task would involve similar models being devised with revised 
models formulated as subsequent information is received. Information consistent with 
the initial statement and model may require no modification, as observed with cases 
where ratings are the same (e.g. greater violation and high power of source produce 
high likelihood of action ratings). Contrasting information would require a significant 
revision of model due to the change in probabilities, as observed with cases where 
ratings substantially change (e.g. greater violation may produce high likelihood 
ratings but subsequent information detailing that the statement was made by someone 
of low authority produces a significant decrease in the likelihood rating). 
 
It should be noted that this proposal advances Manktelow & Over’s (1995) suggestion 
for the inclusion of a ‘+’ and ‘-‘ to represent changes to personal preferences or 
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utilities because more semantic information is retained. The mental models as 
presented here represent only the information given; implicit models are not made 
explicit and there is no conscious search for counter examples. As System 1 
processing is suggested to be occurring, logical deduction (System 2 thinking) is not 
required. Pragmatic knowledge can be implicitly inferred within the mental model and 
probabilistic information can be represented as an additional token. Mental models 
theory provides a mental representation of the given information which probabilistic 
accounts do not offer.  
 
The preferred explanation on the grounds of parsimony is the probabilistic theory of 
Evans et al. (Evans, Handley & Over, 2003; Evans, Over & Handley, 2003; Evans & 
Over, 2004). Although the theory does not offer a cognitive representation of 
reasoning and decision-making it does cover a broader scope of the research findings 
reported here, without the necessity for modification. It is, therefore, proposed that 
deontic statements and inducements are considered in terms of the conditional 
probability hypothesis (P(q|p); what is the probability of q being made true, given the 
antecedent (p). A major violation or high power source are pragmatic influences that 
are most likely to see q come true.  The possibility of counter-examples is considered 
in terms of the probability of the consequent occurring, given not-p, P(q|¬p) and is 
more likely to be evoked when a minor offence or a low power source is encountered. 
The felicity of a statement or inducement is questioned in such cases and the number 
of counter-examples increases. 
 
This section has discussed a range of possible explanations of the findings and has 
found schema theories inadequate in their current form. Mental models theory, with 
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substantial modification, could account for pragmatic factors, however, it would 
require the need for a dual theory. The preferred explanation is that of the conditional 
probability hypothesis proposed by Evans and colleagues, which appears to provide a 
parsimonious theory covering the majority of findings. 
 
8.5 Future Research 
Proposals for future research include the possibility of developing the range of 
pragmatic factors and to extend the established factors to other areas of reasoning and 
decision-making. 
 
The range of possible pragmatic factors could be increased to include the 
consequences of a transgression. Just as scale of violation has been observed to 
influence both reasoning and judgement revision one would expect more serious 
consequences of a transgression to be rated more highly than less serious 
consequences. For example, within the context of motoring transgressions a serious 
collision or accident may produce a greater perception of guilt towards the motorist 
compared to a minor collision. 
 
To develop the theoretical aspects of the research findings, probability estimates could 
be taken for a judgement revision task. It would be predicted that revised judgements 
would be aligned to the probabilities observed to date; major offence and high power 
source would increase the probability of action while a minor offence and low power 
source would lower probability estimates. This would also provide a suitable means 
of testing the application of the conditional probability hypothesis to the area of 
judgement revision. 
 202
Manipulations of the current findings could also be undertaken. The perspective effect 
is well established with deontic reasoning tasks and could be applied to the felicity of 
statements and inducements. For instance, a Sergeant (typically high power) may 
have authority when advising a teenager about a career in the army but have little 
authority when advising him about an illness; conversely, a teenager may take the 
advice of a doctor about illnesses but not about careers in the army. There is the 
possibility that such manipulations would be observed with a thematic version of the 
selection task. 
 
The experiments reported in this thesis and the identified pragmatic factors have been 
confined to deontic reasoning contexts. However, there may be the possibility for the 
pragmatics to be applied to other types of thinking, such as causal reasoning. For 
instance, given there has been a car accident and knowing that a driver has been 
drinking may be sufficient to imply that they are guilty of the accident. Indeed, it is 
common practice for police officers to breathalyse drivers at the scene of an accident 
in order to aid the establishment of the causes of the event. 
 
The research undertaken for this thesis provides opportunities to further expand the 
exciting work of pragmatics of deontic reasoning and to develop observed pragmatic 
effects to other areas of reasoning, such as causal reasoning. 
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